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Welcome to the third volume of Cal State San Bernardino’s history 
journal, History in the Making. The history journal is a student-
edited journal with submissions from undergraduate and graduate 
students at California State University, San Bernardino. The 
editorial board strives to publish work that presents the reader with 
unique and important topics in history that appeal to a wide 
audience. This year’s journal also includes three exhibit reviews 
from museums around southern California, including large 
traveling exhibits and local permanent exhibits.  
 
Our first article, by Mark Ocegueda, is an award-winning article 
that uncovers an important piece of local history. Lopez v. 
Seccombe tells the story of an important San Bernardino court case 
involving desegregation that was influential in creating precedent 
for the famous national desegregation case Brown v. The Board of 
Education. Mr. Ocegueda’s original research and photographs help 
bring to life early twentieth century San Bernardino, while at the 
same time recognizing the unsung heroes of this important legal 
battle. 
 
Our next article, by Cherice Estes, examines the role that the 
western media had in spreading disinformation about the Rwandan 
genocide in the 1990’s. The article emphasizes the power that the 
western media has, and how important it is to use that power 
responsibly, particularly in times of crisis. Ms. Estes also forces us 
to rethink common misconceptions about events in Africa and how 
we view African politics. 
 
Our third article, by Alicia Gutierrez, is a fascinating look into the 
history of the Seventh Day Adventist church and their role as 
conscientious objectors and non-combatant military personnel 
throughout the history of the United States from the Civil War to 
the present. Ms. Gutierrez provides us with important details about 
the history of the church’s role in the military and its ties to 
medical experimentation. 




Our final article, by Adam Miller, is a detailed account of the 
flooding issues experienced by communities in southern California 
throughout the twentieth century, in particular the flood of 1938. 
Mr. Miller emphasizes the importance of flood control for the 
industrial and residential development of southern California; 
without which many southern California landmarks could not 
exist. Mr. Miller’s article also includes many photographs as 
evidence of the enormity of the destruction caused by flooding in 
southern California’s history. 
 
Concluding this volume of History in the Making are three exhibit 
reviews highlighting three themes: local museums, social 
resistance and women in the west. 
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Lopez v. Seccombe: 
The City of San Bernardino’s Mexican American 
Defense Committee and Its Role in Regional and 
National Desegregation 
 
BY MARK OCEGUEDA 
 
ABSTRACT: This article examines Lopez v. Seccombe, one of the 
earliest successful desegregation court cases in United States 
history. The legal challenge was decided in 1944 in the City of San 
Bernardino, California and desegregated city parks and 
recreational facilities, specifically the Perris Hill “plunge” or 
pool. The decision of this case set precedent for other local 
desegregation challenges, including the much more celebrated 
Mendez v. Westminster decision in 1947, and eventually had 
influence on the landmark Supreme Court decision of Brown v. 
Board of Education in 1954. This study will focus on the Mexican 
American barrio in San Bernardino’s Westside, the city’s Mexican 
American Defense Committee, and the city’s discriminatory 
policies against Mexican Americans that eventually led to the legal 
challenge. Such an examination contributes to historians’ 
understanding of segregation and the eventual legal victories in 
desegregation by situating the social aspects that surrounded 
Lopez v. Seccombe. More attention should be paid not only to the 
cases that led to the landmark case of Brown v. Board, but also to 
the context in which these cases developed. Major Supreme Court 
decisions rarely come to pass suddenly; they usually arise through 
a long journey of precedents and legal challenges that force an 
evolution in legal philosophy. Mexican American communities 
played a unique role in desegregating their communities and 
contributed toward the national process of desegregation through 
legislative and judicial means. 
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On August 1, 1943, the Mexican American Defense Committee of 
San Bernardino held a meeting to discuss strategies to combat 
discriminatory practices Mexicans and Mexican Americans faced 
on a daily basis in the city of San Bernardino, California. During 
this period, Mexican children in San Bernardino could only attend 
segregated schools, and the Mexican population of San Bernardino 
could only use public pools on Sunday, the day before the pools 
were drained and cleaned. The Mexican American Defense 
Committee met at San Jose Hall on Fifth Street and Pico Avenue.  
Eugenio Nogueras, Mexican American Defense Committee 
organizer and editor for a local Spanish language newspaper, El 
Sol de San Bernardino, presided over the meeting.1 The members 
at the meeting decided to confront the city about the explicit role it 
played in the inequitable and discriminatory treatment that 
Mexicans living in the Westside barrio, specifically along Mount 
Vernon Avenue, suffered due to the City’s segregation policies. On 
August 19th, the Mexican American Defense Committee sent a 
letter to Mayor W.C. Seccombe and the City Council demanding 
that Mexicans be allowed to use the municipal pool at Perris Hill 
Park. The letter had local support, including that of Tommy 
Richardson, the City Recreation Supervisor for baseball games 
held on Mount Vernon Avenue. When the City rejected the 
Defense Committee’s demands, Ignacio Lopez, editor of El 
Espectador, another local Spanish language newspaper, and 
members of the Mexican American Defense Committee filed a 
class action lawsuit against the Mayor and the City Council.2 
The results of the ensuing court case, known as Lopez v. 
Seccombe, served as legal precedent for future court cases, 
especially the landmark Mendez v. Westminster, a school 
desegregation case that took place in Orange County in 1947. The 
San Bernardino case successfully desegregated local parks, pools, 
and recreational facilities in the City on grounds that segregation 
was unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
                                                
1 Mario T. Garcia, Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, and Identity, 
1930-1960 (London: Yale University Press, 1989), 88. 
2 Retired professor Manuel R. Delgado writes about growing up in his 
hometown of San Bernardino in The Last Chicano. Manuel Delgado, The Last 
Chicano: A Mexican American Experience (Bloomington, Indiana: Author 







– one of the first times that the argument was used to desegregate a 
public facility other than a school.   Specifically, the Lopez case 
used the argument that the Mexican community paid taxes for 
public parks and recreational sites and should benefit equally from 
those publicly-funded facilities.  Before analyzing the significance 
of these court cases in-depth, it is important first to examine the 
conditions that led to Lopez v. Seccombe. 
 
 
Looks Like Mexico’s Moved In! The Westside barrio of San 
Bernardino 
  
During the 1880s, San Bernardino became a significant trading 
center with the establishment of railroads. By the early twentieth 
century, the Santa Fe railroad began to double-track its line as 
citrus groves and irrigation became more prominent in San 
Bernardino. As these industries grew, there was a greater need for 
unskilled labor that included ditch diggers, track workers, and fruit 
pickers. Since Anglos3 filled the skilled labor positions, Mexicans 
were recruited to work menial labor jobs because they were seen 
by employers as “tractable, easily moved, and willing to work for 
low wages.”4 San Bernardino’s Santa Fe Railroad Depot, the 
nearby city of Colton’s Southern Pacific Railroad operation, and 
the growing citrus industry, which had boomed throughout the 
towns of inland Southern California during the 1880s, all 
demanded an unskilled labor force.  At the time, Mexicans, 
Italians, blacks, and Chinese mostly served as the unskilled labor 
force in San Bernardino. Chinese exclusion played a role in 
transforming the Westside into an almost exclusive Mexican 
                                                
3 I will use the term Anglos throughout this work to refer to white Americans, 
specifically those of Anglo-Saxon descent. In the historiography of Mexican 
American history, the term Anglo has been used constantly to discern white 
Anglo-Saxon Americans from Irish or Eastern European immigrants, because 
“white” identity at the time was still being developed. Additionally, the terms of 
“Mexican” and “Mexican American” are used to differentiate Mexican 
immigrants and Mexican Americans, whose constitutional rights theoretically 
should have been protected. At times the term “Mexican” will just be used to 
refer to both Mexicans and Mexican Americans. 
4 Ruth Tuck, Not With the Fist (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 
1946), 38. 
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barrio. As Chinese residents moved out of the Westside of San 
Bernardino, an influx of new Mexican immigrants filled vacant 
jobs that were left as the number of Chinese immigrant laborers 
declined.  As a result of the shifting demographics of laboring 
populations, the segregated Westside of the city along Mount 
Vernon Avenue became home to a concentrated population of 
Mexicans. 
The combination of various factors, such as geographical 
proximity of Mexico to the Southwest and San Bernardino, low-
paying labor positions that were available to Mexicans, and 
volatile political conditions in Mexico all provided push and pull 
factors for Mexicans to continue migrating into the inland 
Southern California region. The Southwest’s adjacency to Mexico 
made it convenient for employers to recruit Mexicans for 
temporary positions. Employers took advantage of existing cyclical 
migration patterns and reinforced them while at the same time 
ignoring the role that they played in perpetuating a lack of 
permanence among Mexican laboring populations. They both 
enjoyed the benefits of having access to a temporary labor pool 
and chided Mexicans for their lack of permanence.  This sentiment 
proved to be prevalent among Anglos in San Bernardino where in 
the initial stages of the Mexican migration northward they, 
according to anthropologist Ruth Tuck, “cherished the illusion that 
its new Mexican population was not going to be very permanent. 
Some day when the work was all done, they would ‘go home.’”5 
Moreover, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed the 
emergence of American employment agencies that would enter 
Mexico and recruit workers for U.S. labor purposes.  Anglo labor 
recruiters would also be located in border towns, such as El Paso, 
where they provided Mexican workers with low-paying labor jobs 
on railroads, in factories, and on farms throughout the Southwest, 
including San Bernardino. 6 
 Factors that pushed Mexican migration north included the 
unstable economic and political conditions in Mexico. Mexico 
                                                
5 Tuck, Not With the Fist, 39. 
6 George J. Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and 
Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York: Oxford University 







during the nineteenth century had been ravaged by constant wars 
and political and ideological instability that failed to unite the 
nation and establish a stable economy. During President Porfirio 
Díaz’s reign (1876-1911), agrarian reforms left thousands of 
Mexican peasants landless. The transition to exporting food crops 
also severely decreased the supply of Mexico’s staple foods and 
inflated their prices, causing many peasants in Mexico to live on 
the brink of starvation. Landless and without food, thousands of 
Mexican peasants were compelled to join the migration northward 
in order to survive.7 One of the major historical events that pushed 
Mexicans north was the 1910 Mexican Revolution.  Many 
Mexicans fled the country to escape the chaos and violence of the 
revolution. Manuel Delgado, a native of San Bernardino, recalled 
his grandmother’s journey to San Bernardino: 
 
During… the revolution of 1910, Mexico was a 
dangerous place, especially for beautiful young 
women, so Mama Lupe was sent to live… with 
friends in the United States. She came first to 
Albuquerque, New Mexico… and, in 1921, moved 
to San Bernardino’s Mt. Vernon district.8 
 
 Violence and political instability in Mexico remained on-going 
factors that caused Mexicans to emigrate north into the towns and 
cities of the Southwest including San Bernardino.  
Although there had already been an established Mexican 
community in San Bernardino before large numbers of new 
migrants arrived, the continued influx of significant numbers of 
new Mexican immigrants contributed to the development of a 
well-established, self-contained Mexican barrio.  Between 1890 
and 1900, San Bernardino’s census recorded 69 foreign-born 
Mexican residents; however, by 1910 the city had experienced 
exponential growth and recorded 888 foreign-born Mexicans in 
San Bernardino. By 1930, census figures continued to mark an 
increase of foreign-born Mexican residents and recorded nearly 
2,500 Mexicans living in the City.9 An Anglo resident living in 
                                                
7 Sanchez,  20. 
8 Delgado, 2-3. 
9 Tuck, 38. 
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San Bernardino during this period of growth stated the following 
about the growing Mexican population: 
 
I was working near the depot on a grading job and I 
used to see them getting off the cars. I’d seen 
Mexicans all my life but these sure looked different. 
Half of ‘em had blankets on and sandals on their 
feet. Some of  ‘em wore funny big hats and some 
wore funny little ones. There were women with 
their arms full of babies and bundles. They’d mill 
around and jabber all excited, for a while, and then 
they’d stand still and look scared… there were a lot 
of them! I said to my partner, ‘Looks like Mexico’s 
moved in!’10 
 
The influx of Mexican immigrants into the Southwest and their 
eventual establishment in the barrios would set the stage for 
segregation. As the description above makes clear, Anglo-
Americans’ attitudes toward the existing population of Mexican 
Americans were shaped by the large influxes of new Mexican 
migrants and their perceptions that these immigrants represented 
not only a non-white population but also a distinctly foreign class 
of people. 
Throughout the decades from the end of the nineteenth 
century into the beginning of the twentieth, pseudo-scientific views 
and racial philosophies reinforced Anglo-American fears of ‘the 
other’ and validated the gradual construction of racial barriers in 
San Bernardino.  Although racist ideas were not quite as menacing 
to the Mexican in the early 1900s, historian David Gutierrez 
explained that “by the mid-1920s many Americans were beginning 
to conclude that Mexicans were inferior even to the lowliest 
European immigrant.”11 In 1928, Congressman John Box called for 
exclusion of Mexican immigrants because they were “a mixture of 
Mediterranean-blooded Spanish peasant[s] with low-grade Indians 
                                                
10 Tuck, 38. 
11 David G. Gutierrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican 
Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 







who did not fight to extinction but submitted and multiplied as 
serfs.”12 Vanderbilt University economist Roy L. Garis also 
expressed similar views held by Americans during the time and 
noted that Mexicans were characterized as possessing “minds that 
run to nothing higher than the animal functions--- eat, sleep, and 
sexual debauchery” and that if immigration restriction did not 
materialize, Americans would risk “a lowering of our standards of 
morals and of our political and social ideals; the creation of a race 
problem that will dwarf the negro problem of the South; and the 
practical destruction, at least for centuries, of all that is worthwhile 
in our white civilization.”13 These emerging racial ideologies the 
Anglos developed about Mexicans would become the foundation 
for justifying segregation on the local level in communities 
throughout the Southwest. 
As Mexicans established themselves in the San Bernardino 
barrio, they soon became targets for the pseudo-scientific views of 
white Americans at a period of time when racist philosophies were 
at their peak in American history.  For example, anthropologist 
Ruth Tuck noted:  
 
[San Bernardino]14 was immediately convinced… 
that no immigrant group had ever been so ‘low’ or 
so ‘dumb… The [Mexicans] were uniformly low 
intelligence… (Poorly used testing devices, applied 
to bi-lingual school children were later to give this 
estimate a great air of ‘scientific’ validity, but it 
doubtless would have been made anyway.) They 
lived like animals, produced too many children, 
                                                
12 John Box. “Congressman John Box Objects to Mexican Immigrants, 1928,” 
quoted in Jon Gjerde, ed.: Major Problems in American Immigration and Ethnic 
History (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 287. 
13 Gutierrez, 54-55. 
14 Note that in Ruth Tuck’s history of San Bernardino, Not With The Fist, she 
referred to the city as “Descanso” in order to fulfill a theoretical argument in 
which she asserted that a descanso “was a spot at which [Spanish] parties 
stopped to refresh themselves” in the days of Spanish exploration. For the 
Mexican American during the 1940s, the period in which Tuck’s work was 
written, “Descanso”, or San Bernardino, could therefore represent a “stop-over 
on the journey toward complete assimilation into and acculturation with 
American society.” Tuck, xviii. 
Lopez vs. Seccombe 
 
 8  
wasted their earnings on drink, and never took 
thought of the morrow.15 
 
These racist views against Mexicans in San Bernardino further 
help to explain why segregated policies came into practice. Anglos 
would certainly want to distance themselves from Mexicans 
because of these social and racial anxieties. 
The Westside of San Bernardino developed into a barrio by 
the late 1920s along Mount Vernon Avenue between Fifth and 
Ninth streets. During the 1920s, this rural area consisted of a 
mixed community of Mexicans, Italians, Chinese, and a few 
Anglos. As the decade rolled along and the Mexican population 
began to grow, they would further populate the Mount Vernon 
district. Anglo residents, in an effort to exclude Mexicans from 
settling permanently, began to call for restrictions against selling 
homes to Mexicans. Anglos living north of Ninth Street appealed 
to the City Council to restrict Mexican home ownership because 
“property owners on both sides of 9th street had agreed to restrict 
their property to whites only.” The City Council responded by 
introducing policies to increase the value of homes in order to 
prevent Mexicans from affording them by improving sewers, 
curbs, and sidewalks.16 This provides an example of City efforts to 
racially segregate residents through methods less often recognized.  
The City made efforts not only to confine Mexicans to a particular 
area, but began a ghettoization process of the area by improving 
neighboring sections of the town to elevate property values of 
white residents and economically excluding others.  This is a 
strong example of how segregation did not just hinder the inclusion 
of others but materially uplifted the white population.   
 
                                                
15 Tuck, 38. 








Figure 1. Mount Vernon Avenue facing North during the 1950s. San 
Bernardino, CA, (Courtesy of Manuel Delgado). 
 
 
 Once the influx of Mexican residents could not be 
prevented in the Mount Vernon district, city officials soon 
neglected the area.  For example, in 1947, more than 650 residents 
signed a petition to add stop signs and appropriate traffic lights 
along Mount Vernon Avenue because of traffic incidents that had 
resulted in multiple deaths of residents in the Mount Vernon 
district.17  This neglect to protect the security of residents could 
also be seen in 1944, when G.E. Carlson ran for city council in San 
Bernardino’s Fifth Ward, which contained the Mount Vernon 
district.  Carlson commented on the underdevelopment of the 
Mount Vernon district and lack of security provided by City 
officials:  
 
The… district needs more police and fire protection. 
The merchants and responsible people of that area 
want it. Mt. Vernon is a main artery of 
transcontinental traffic [referring to Route 66 that 
ran along the district] and lacks adequate police 
protection. We have a problem of juvenile 
irresponsibility in this ward. Restrictive measures 
alone will not cure it. This problem deserves 
                                                
17 Ignacio Lopez, El Espectador, 13, no. 18 (May 23, 1947), California 
Polytechnic University, Pomona Microfilm. 
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solving at its source--- that is adequate recreational 
and other facilities to take care of excess energies of 
young people. Where is the plunge18 that was 
promised this ward?19  
 
The comments that G.E. Carlson provided about the Mount 
Vernon district suggested that city officials neglected the area 
through a variety of means: lack of development, refusal to provide 
adequate recreational facilities, and a lack of police and 
firefighters. The fact that Ignacio Lopez and the Mexican 
American Defense Committee chose segregation in recreational 
facilities as the focus of their lawsuit against the city is significant 
when placed in context of their overall battle for equitable 
treatment.  In other words, the case of Lopez v. Seccombe was not 
only about desegregation but also about the fact that the City had 
completely neglected the Mount Vernon neighborhood in nearly 
every respect.   
Another effort to exclude Mexicans in the Mount Vernon 
district from city development came in 1956 with the construction 
of Interstate 215. Two important off-ramps, according to Manuel 
Delgado, “at 5th Street and Baseline, [led] to Downtown, away 
from the barrio” and “effectively diverted all the traffic from 
Route 66 and the businesses along Mt. Vernon Avenue.”20 The 
building of the freeway cut off economic opportunities for 
Mexicans in the Mount Vernon district by diverting potential 
consumers into the downtown area. In addition, Mexicans would 
also experience restricted economic mobility as the jobs available 
to them paid low wages. Low-paying positions at the Santa Fe 
Railroad, agricultural labor jobs, and other menial labor offered 
minimum wages to Mexicans with no benefits. As the barrio 
became increasingly Mexican, the city used various methods to 
further segregate Mexicans into the Mount Vernon district and 
eventually prevented any development in the area by funneling 
economic development into other sections of the City. A pattern of 
                                                
18 Swimming pool. 
19 San Bernardino Sun, 1944. California State University, San Bernardino 
Microfilm. 







economic neglect would contribute towards the Mexican American 
Defense Committee’s demands for justice on behalf of San 
Bernardino’s Mexican residents. 
 City officials also segregated the African American 
residents of San Bernardino. Most African Americans were located 
in the southern section of San Bernardino off of Waterman Avenue 
known as the Valley Truck Farms area. When accusations of 
deliberate residential exclusion of blacks arose, real estate 
developers responded by stating that the sale of lots had no 
restrictions on the homes and that any race could buy; however, 
according to Ruth Tuck, they “were fully aware that without the 
restriction, whites would not risk buying a lot for fear of having a 
black neighbor.”21  Tuck also noted that the housing segregation 
for African Americans was severe; blacks were confined to certain 
areas in southern San Bernardino and many would never consider 
buying or renting a home in the northern part of town where whites 
primarily lived. In addition, employment was also severely 
restricted as blacks were channeled into menial service trades, such 
as porters, elevator operators, dish washers, and other cheap labor 
positions.22 By the late 1920s, the City of San Bernardino had 
established a racially divided city. Mexicans lived in the Westside 
barrio along Mount Vernon Avenue, African Americans were 
living in the Southern section known as the Truck Valley Farms 
area, and Anglos lived primarily in the northern part of the city. 
The plight of the African Americans in San Bernardino is useful 
for comprehending the injustices the City committed against ethnic 
minorities and helps to explain why opposition to those injustices 
emerged. 
It should also be noted that many Mexicans preferred to 
live in the barrio.  According to historian Albert Camarillo, the 
barrio allowed the Mexican American communities of the 
Southwest to function “within a closed Mexican social universe. 
Faced with their new-found status as a segregated minority and 
confronted by a hostile outside world, the Mexican community 
entered a phase of social change and adaptation… [that] ensured 
                                                
21 Delgado, 7. 
22 Tuck, 46. 
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the continuity of Mexican society” in California.23 This positive 
aspect of the segregated barrio, as David Gutierrez has 
persuasively argued, allowed Mexican Americans to: 
 
Transform Anglo Americans’ efforts to stigmatize 
them as racial inferiors into a positive strategy of 
self-affirmation as Mexicans in American society. 
At the same time, Mexican Americans’ success in 
generating such new bases for solidarity went a long 
way toward guaranteeing the survival and growth of 
a distinct, if syncretic, variant of Mexican culture in 
what had become part of the United States. This 
was the last thing the proponents of Manifest 
Destiny had in mind when they had predicted the 
eventual fading away of the region’s ethnic 
population… Americans planted the seeds of 
continuing ethnic discord in the region.24 
 
If the barrio allowed for the survival and growth of the Mexicans 
and for a strategy of self-affirmation as Gutierrez contends, then it 
would almost certainly lead to a path of resistance against 
discriminatory Anglo policies. As racial hostilities increased, 
Mexican Americans found power in solidarity and through the 
maintenance of their own communities. The persistence and even 
the growth of barrios throughout the Southwest was not merely a 
function of white racism against Mexicans but a strategic defense 
on the part of Mexican Americans. This helped give rise to the 
Mexican American Defense Committee in San Bernardino and to 
leaders like Eugenio Nogueras and Ignacio Lopez who pushed the 
legal envelope in an effort to overturn discriminatory practices.  
 
                                                
23 Albert M. Camarillo, Chicanos in a Changing Society: From Mexican 
Pueblos to American Barrios in Santa Barbara and Southern California, 1848-
1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 53-54, quoted in Gutierrez, 
Walls and Mirrors, 22. 








School Segregation in San Bernardino and Early Resistance by the 
Mexican American Community 
 
In addition to being economically excluded and residentially 
segregated, Mexicans living in San Bernardino and other towns in 
the inland region of Southern California suffered from typical 
forms of segregation as well, such as segregation in schools. In 
1874, newly arriving Anglos in Riverside, a town in inland 
Southern California, created the Trujillo School District to serve 
the Mexican community of La Placita. The Riverside City School 
Board maintained that all children must attend the school in the 
attendance precinct in which they lived. The school board’s ruling 
was a response to the increasing Mexican immigrant families that 
worked the line crews of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific 
Railroad and the subsequent increased enrollment of immigrant 
children within Riverside schools. 25 The Riverside City School 
board would reaffirm this decision again in 1906. The Casa Blanca 
School of Riverside provides evidence of early educational 
discriminatory policies against Mexicans and an example of 
segregation through means of residential exclusion. The Trujillo 
school district in Riverside was not alone in inland Southern 
California and the Southwest with its discriminatory educational 
policies. By the mid -1930s, roughly 85 percent of school districts 
in the Southwest were segregated.26   
 Another example of school segregation in the inland region 
of Southern California can be seen in Ontario. In 1921, Chaffee 
Union High School Superintendant, Merton Hill, recommended 
that a new school site be built for Mexican children in the 
                                                
25 National Park Service, “Five Views: An Ethnic Historic Site Survey for 
California (Mexican Americans): A History of Mexican Americans in 
California: Casa Blanca School,” 
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/5views/5views5h10.htm 
(accessed June 11, 2009). 
26 Gilbert G. Gonzalez, “The System of Public Education and Its Function 
Within the Chicano Communities, 1910-1930” (Ph.D. diss., University of 
California, Los Angeles, 1974), quoted in Gilbert G. Gonzalez, Chicano 
Education in the Era of Segregation (Philadelphia: The Balch Institute Press, 
1990), 20-21. 
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southeastern part of Ontario.27 In addition, the San Bernardino Sun 
reported in 1922 that 
 
Children living west of Euclid Avenue and north of 
Fifth Avenue should attend school at San Antonio 
building. Children living east of Euclid Avenue and 
north of Southern Pacific Railroad should attend 
school at Central building. All other children, 
except Mexicans, in the Ontario School district, 
should attend school at South Euclid building. 
Mexican pupils in the first three grades will report 
to Sultana school.28  
 
These examples show clearly that during the early twentieth 
century, segregation was intrinsically linked to residential 
segregation in the inland region of Southern California. Historian 
Gilbert G. Gonzalez has further commented on the issue and stated 
that: 
As the pattern of Mexican residential segregation 
into colonias developed, school segregation 
followed… segregation reflected and recreated the 
social divisions within the larger society formed by 
residential segregation, labor and wage rate 
differentials, political inequality, socioeconomic 
disparities, and racial oppression… Education for 
the Mexican community therefore meant change as 
well as the preservation of their subordination.29  
 
Mexicans in inland Southern California and San Bernardino had 
thus been structurally separated into a group of people who had 
been cut off geographically, excluded from city services, and 
                                                
27 Mary M. Peters, The Segregation of Mexican American Children in the 
Elementary Schools of California: Its Legal and Administrative Aspects 
(Master’s thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1948), 37, quoted in 
Gonzalez, Chicano Education, 21. 
28 San Bernardino Daily Sun, Friday, September 15, 1922, 10. “Assignment for 
Schools Given: Full Roster Obtained for Opening of Grammar Grades 
Monday.” California State University, San Bernardino Microfilm. 







separated in public schools. This amounted to total segregation for 
Mexicans and depicts the depth of discrimination that Mexicans 
experienced in San Bernardino and the Southwest.  
In San Bernardino, events surrounding Ramona Elementary 
in the Mount Vernon barrio provide early examples of resistance 
by the Mexican community towards discriminatory educational 
policies. In 1926, a new site was built for Ramona Elementary 
school. The fifth grade students that attended the old Ramona 
Elementary school building were excited about the prospect of 
attending Sturgis Junior High School in downtown San Bernardino 
after completing the sixth grade. They had been particularly 
excited about attending school with Anglo students for the first 
time. After graduating from Ramona Elementary, school officials 
notified their parents that the district planned to hold back the 
students of Ramona Elementary for one more year because of 
supposed overcrowding at Sturgis Junior High School, forcing 
them to repeat the sixth grade. The parents, students, and some 
teachers protested before the school board to let the sixth grade 
students enter Sturgis Junior High School; however, the sixth grade 
students would have to repeat the same grade at Ramona 
Elementary the following year.30 Although the Mexican 
community of San Bernardino did not succeed in getting their 
children reassigned from Ramona Elementary to Sturgis Junior 
High School, they would prove to be the first Mexican Americans 
to resist unequal policies in the city. 
Additionally, when the new Ramona Elementary site was 
built in 1926, school officials built it to serve as a vocational 
training site for Mexican students that would “lead to habits of 
thrift and industry, and to the ability to make necessary contacts 
with the industrial world.” 31 Vocational education would be 
offered to Mexican children through fourth and sixth grades.  This 
educational experiment remained in practice through the 1931-
1932 school year. School officials believed that vocational training 
benefitted Mexican school children because Mexican pupils were, 
according to school officials, “becoming retarded in academic 
                                                
30 Delgado, 14. 
31 Annie Reynolds, The Education of Spanish-Speaking Children In Five 
Southwestern States quoted in Carlos E. Cortes, ed.: Education and the Mexican 
American (New York: The Arno Press, 1974), 53. 
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subjects” and “vocational opportunities [might] open [them to] 
become interested in remaining in school in order to make 
furniture or cook and sew.”32 Gilbert Gonzales has also noted that 
educators who advocated segregation supported vocational training 
that could Americanize the children in a controlled cultural and 
linguistic atmosphere and train them for occupations that Anglos 
considered best suited for them.33 Ramona Elementary offers an 




Figure 2. Ramona Elementary Class photo, 1947. San Bernardino, CA, 
(Courtesy of Manuel Delgado). 
 
One justification for segregating Mexican students in San 
Bernardino dealt specifically with language. As Mexicans became 
demographic minorities to Anglos in the decades following the end 
of the U.S.-Mexico War in 1848, English became the primary 
language used in the political, economic, and educational realms. 
In 1923, the San Bernardino Sun reported that County 
Superintendent Ida M. Collins would give “the study of English… 
                                                
32 Reynolds, 53. 







special emphasis during the 1923-24 scholastic year.”34 Collins 
justified segregation of Mexican children on the grounds that the 
Spanish-English language barrier impeded their learning 
capabilities and separation was necessary in order to help the 
children learn English. In 1929, students, parents, and the Mexican 
consulate protested unsuccessfully to Collins concerning the 
school board’s efforts to segregate Mexican and black children at 
De Olivera Elementary School.35 Just as in 1926, when students 
and parents protested against holding the sixth grade Mexican 
students back a year, the Mexican community once again 
responded in a unified effort to prevent further discriminatory 
policies from being implemented.  
The reasons for the segregation of Mexican students had 
deeper underlying causes than just an English-Spanish language 
barrier. One of the prominent writers on Mexican American 
education, George I. Sanchez, concluded that Anglos believed 
“that a foreign home language is a handicap, that somehow 
children with Spanish as a mother tongue were doomed to failure--
- in fact, they were, ipso facto, less than normally intelligent.”36 
Indeed, one of the reasons Anglos segregated Mexican children 
had to do with racial stereotypes that cast Mexicans as inferior and 
less intelligent.  In 1920, a San Bernardino school teacher stated 
that segregation of Mexican children resulted from public opinions 
within the Anglo community that was “based largely on the theory 
that the Mexican is a menace to the health and morals of the rest of 
the community.”37 In addition, Chaffee Union Superintendent 
Merton Hill justified segregation on grounds “that Mexican 
children advance more rapidly when grouped by themselves,” and 
thus profited “most by the instruction offered in such classes.”38 
                                                
34 San Bernardino Sun, March 25, 1923. California State University, San 
Bernardino Microfilm. 
35Francisco A. Rosales, Chicano! The History of the Mexican American Civil 
Rights Movement (Houston: Arte Público Press, 1996), 70. 
36 George I. Sanchez, History Culture and Education quoted in Julian Samora, 
ed.: La Raza: Forgotten Americans, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1966), 15.  
37 Gracey C. Stanley, “Special Schools for Mexicans.” The Survey 44 
(September 15, 1920), 714 quoted in Gonzalez, Chicano Education, 24. 
38 Merton E. Hill, Development of An Americanization Program (Ontario, Calif.: 
Union High School District, 1928) quoted in Gonzalez, Chicano Education, 24. 
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These examples illustrate that many Anglo educators considered 
separate education beneficial to the Mexican community; however, 
according to Gilbert Gonzalez, “these shallow arguments masked 
the same prejudices that motivated the overt racists.”39 Arguments, 
such as language barriers and the underlying racist reasons all 
intertwined to create the segregation policies in San Bernardino 
that would meet resistance from the Mexican American 
community. 
The resistance to Ramona’s sixth grade students’ injustice 
and the incident between Superintendent Ida Collins and the 
Mexican parents in San Bernardino served as early examples of 
community resistance against discriminatory policies. Another 
example of resistance would occur again in 1940, when the 
registrar at Mount Vernon Elementary refused to enroll children at 
the school on the basis of language and race.  Manuel Delgado 
recalled a confrontation between his tía Agapita and the registrar at 
Mount Vernon Elementary when her niece’s children had been 
denied enrollment into the school: 
 
Tía Agapita: I want to enroll my niece in this school. 
Registrar: I can’t accept them here because Mexican 
children have to go to Ramona 
Elementary. 
Tía Agapita: But I see some Mexican kids out there. 
Registrar: They speak English already. Besides, 
they live in this district. 
Tía Agapita: Well, my niece speaks English too and 
we also live in this district. 
Registrar: I’m sorry. 
 
After this discussion, Agapita asked to see the Principal and the 
registrar eventually acquiesced and stated that Agapita’s niece 
could be enrolled only if she was to be helped with her studies in 
order to keep up with the other children.40 These types of 
occurrences that surrounded Ramona Elementary School from the 
1920s into the 1940s would eventually contribute to the formation 
                                                
39 Gonzalez, 24. 







of Mexican American self-help organizations that would seek to 
achieve civil rights for the Mexican community in San Bernardino. 
 
 
Ignacio Lopez and San Bernardino’s Legal Challenge for Civil 
Rights, Lopez v. Seccombe (1944) 
 
The movement to desegregate parks and recreational facilities in 
San Bernardino began in 1943 when John H. Milor, Principal of 
Alessandro Junior High School, stated that racial prejudice against 
Mexicans by whites was a real problem in the city. He blamed 
segregated parks and pools for the recent outbreak of San 
Bernardino’s own Zoot Suit gangs, similar to those that emerged in 
Los Angeles. Milor also advocated the building of another pool for 
Mexicans in the Mount Vernon barrio because of their non-
admittance into the Perris Hill Park Pool.41 Mexicans at this time 
were only allowed to swim in city pools on Sundays, the day 
before the pool was drained and cleaned. Shortly after Milor’s 
statements, Eugenio Nogueras held the Mexican American 
Defense Committee meeting on August 1, 1943, that would send a 
letter to the City Council demanding Mexicans’ admittance into 
the pool at Perris Hill Park. The letter was supported by various 
members of the Mexican community including Father Joseph 
Nuñez and Ignacio Lopez, editor of El Espectador. 
Father Joseph Nuñez had crossed into the United States in 
1926 from Zacatecas, Mexico, a place from which many Mexicans 
in the San Bernardino barrio had also emigrated. Nuñez took over 
Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church on Pico and Spruce Street 
in 1937 and quickly became an outspoken leader for Mexican 
American struggles against injustices in San Bernardino.42 A 
specific incident with Father Nuñez contributed toward the 
Mexican American Defense Committee’s demand to desegregate 
parks and recreational facilities in the city. Ignacio Lopez wrote: 
“Last Tuesday afternoon Reverend J.R. Nuñez and three of the 
Mexican children of his parish were refused admittance to the San 
Bernardino Municipal Plunge because they were Mexicans… They 
were refused the use of a swimming pool which displays a bronze 
                                                
41 Delgado, 13. 
42 Delgado, 11. 
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plaque that says ‘no one is to be refused admittance because of 
race or color,’ and which was built with WPA [Works Progress 
Administration] money.”43 When the city council rejected the 
Mexican American Defense Committee’s demands, Ignacio Lopez 
and other leaders of San Bernardino’s Mexican community filed a 
class action lawsuit against the city of San Bernardino.  
 
 
Figure 3. Ignacio Lopez and El Espectadr44 
 
Ignacio Lopez was born in Guadalajara, Mexico in 1908 
and raised in the United States. Lopez, from 1933 until 1961, ran 
El Espectador, his weekly Spanish language newspaper that served 
the Mexican residents of inland Southern California towns. El 
Espectador assisted Mexicans in fighting for greater civil rights on 
many fronts, such as: political integration, housing equality, school 
desegregation, and police brutality against Mexican Americans. 
Lopez would also help form the Unity Leagues in Southern 
California and vigorously encouraged civic participation by 
Mexican Americans because, as Mario García has noted: 
 
                                                
43 Ignacio Lopez, Wooing in the Dark (undated column) quoted in Garcia, 
Mexican Americans, 88. 







López spoke more for the attainment of the fruits of 
the American Revolution than the Mexican 
Revolution. Hence the concept or sense of 
permanency [among Mexican Americans]--- the 
United States being the home country--- and the 
recognition that one was an American citizen with 
all the rights pertaining to such citizenship strongly 
influenced the political ideology and activism of 




Figure 4. Ignacio Lopez, September 16, 194546 
 
Ignacio Lopez also helped to mobilize the Mexican 
American community by calling them to action. When a case of 
police brutality occurred in San Bernardino in the late 1940s, 
Lopez publicized the case against police officer John Epps for his 
role in the wrongful death of San Bernardino resident Ramon Rios. 
When talking about the death of Ramon Rios, Ignacio Lopez 
declared that “Johnnie Epps is not to blame,” but that the “guilty 
ones are all of us, who permit the police to become executioners of 
those they are supposed to serve…. We are the criminals.”47 
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Constant calls to action by Lopez helped mobilize Mexican 
Americans in San Bernardino and other Mexican communities in 
Southern California. 
On September 1, 1943, Ignacio Lopez announced that he 
had contacted the nationally known civil rights lawyer and former 
United States Presidential candidate Wendell Willkie to represent 
the Mexican American Defense Committee.48 Willkie, however, 
refused to take the case.  Instead, Los Angeles based attorney 
David C. Marcus agreed to represent San Bernardino’s Mexican 
community. On September 17, 1943, Marcus filed a class action 
lawsuit against San Bernardino Mayor W.C. Seccombe and the 
city council. The petitioners in the Lopez v. Seccombe case 
included Ignacio Lopez, Eugenio Nogueras, Father Nuñez, 
Virginia Prado, and Rafael Muñoz. Marcus made the argument that 
as tax payers and United States citizens, the Mexican Americans of 
San Bernardino were entitled to use parks and recreational 
facilities within the city and that non-admittance was 
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.49 
Mayor Seccombe denied the allegations and stated that under the 
city charter, the Mayor and City Council had the legislative 
“authority to acquire, own and maintain public libraries, common  
museums, gymnasiums, parks and baths.”50 Presiding Judge Leon 
Yanckwich ruled on behalf of San Bernardino’s Mexican 
American Defense Committee and declared that segregation of 
swimming pools and other recreational facilities was 
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. On 
February 5, 1944 Judge Yanckwich concluded: 
 
                                                
48 Delgado, 14. 
49 Lopez v. Seccombe. Records of the District Court of the United States for the 
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(Los Angeles). Civil Case Files 1938-1969. National Archives and Records 
Administration Pacific Region (Laguna Niguel), box 578, folder  3158. 
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That respondents' conduct is illegal and is in 
violation of petitioners’ rights and privileges as 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States… as particularly provided under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. That petitioners are 
entitled to such equal accommodations, advantages, 
and privileges and to equal rights and treatment 
with other persons as citizens of the United States, 
in the use and enjoyment of the facilities of said 
park.51 
 
At last, the organizing and resistance against discrimination paid 
off when Judge Yanckwich ruled in favor of the San Bernardino 
Mexican American Defense Committee. This was only the second 
case where a judge ruled against the segregation of Mexican 
Americans and the first case in which a judge did so with regards 
to public facilities other than schools. The Lopez v. Seccombe case 
thus marked a significant victory for San Bernardino and for all 
Mexican Americans fighting for similar rights throughout the 
Southwest.  
After the case, an article in El Espectador stated that the 
legal victory resulted from the San Bernardino Mexican American 
Defense Committee’s efforts to eliminate discriminatory policies. 
The article also noted that the City Council decided shortly 
thereafter to have San Bernardino merchants remove signs from 
their windows that stated “White Trade Only.”52 The Lopez 
decision marked the first time in history that the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was used to uphold the rights 
of Mexican Americans.53 This court case was a landmark decision 
for Mexican residents in San Bernardino and would later be used 
in the judgment of Mendez v. Westminster, one of the most 
significant court cases leading up to the Supreme Court’s Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954), which ended de jure racial segregation 
in public schools. 
                                                
51 Judgement, paragraph I. Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769. 
52 Garcia, 88. 
53 Richard R. Valencia, Chicano Students and the Courts: The Mexican 
American Legal Struggle for Educational Equality (New York: New York 
University Press, 2008), 25. 
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Lopez v. Seccombe’s Influence on Mendez v. Westminster (1947) 
and National Desegregation 
 
On March 2, 1945, attorney David C. Marcus filed a lawsuit on 
behalf of Gonzalo and Felícitas Mendez against the Westminster 
School District in Orange County, California. Gonzalo, born in 
Mexico, had become a U.S. citizen and had resided in California 
since the age of six. His wife, Felícitas, was born in Puerto Rico 
and therefore entitled to U.S. citizenship as well. The Mendez 
family experienced a similar incident to that of Agapita when she 
tried to enroll her niece’s children into Mount Vernon Elementary 
in 1940. When the Mendez family attempted to enroll their three 
children into a local school, school authorities denied them 
admission because of their dark skin and Mexican last name. 
Gonzalo’s sister, however, was able to gain admission for her 
children because they were fairer skinned and had the less evident 
Mexican surname of “Vidaurri.” School officials informed the 
Mendez family that the children would have to attend the school 
established for Mexicans in another part of town. 54 
 Soon after the incident, an outraged Gonzalo Mendez 
consulted attorney David C. Marcus, who had just won the Lopez 
v. Seccombe case in 1944. Marcus accepted the Orange County 
legal challenge because of its similarities to Lopez.  He believed he 
could win using the same type of Fourteenth Amendment 
argument used in San Bernardino. The following is a discussion 
from the Mendez v. Westminster pre-trial between David C. 
Marcus and Federal Court Judge Paul J. McCormick, which 
brought the San Bernardino case into question: 
 
The Court: I have been thinking a good deal about 
the procedure in this case. The case seems to be, as 
far as I can discover, sui generis. I don’t believe 
                                                
54 The Honorable Frederick P. Aguirre is a Superior Court Judge in the 
Lamoreaux Justice Center in Orange County, California and writes an excellent 
analysis on the Mendez v. Westminster trial and it’s affect at the national 
desegregation process. Frederick P. Aguirre, “Mendez v. Westminster School 
District: How It Affected Brown v. Board of Education,” Journal of Hispanic 
Higher Education 4, no.4 (October 2005): 321, 






there is any case in the books that parallels this 
case… I was hopeful that there might be some 
appeal to the State court primarily instead of 
bringing the case to the Federal Court ab initio. 
Counsel doesn’t seem disposed to do that. The 
complaint did state a case, I think, under the 
modernized method of pleading in civil actions in 
the Federal Court. For that reason I thought that the 
motion to dismiss was not well taken. I will think 
that is true, but I was hopeful when I permitted the 
amicus curiae to come into the case that they would 
help us some. Instead of being friends of the Court, 
they seem to be onlookers. We have been trying to 
formulate some method whereby the time of 
everybody could be conserved in a case of this kind. 
 
Mr. Marcus: Your Honor, there was a like suit in 
this court before Judge Yankwich55. The case 
involved - - 
 
The Court: Well, that was the case that you called 
the Court’s attention to. That was a consent 
judgment, as I recall it, wasn’t it? 
 
Mr. Marcus: That was after a hearing on the 
motion, your Honor. 
 
The Court: Well, I have ruled on the motion. I have 
denied the motion. 
 
Mr. Marcus: But the motion went to the respective 
capacities to sue. The same position as counsel has 
taken here was taken in that. That suit was brought 
by some four people on behalf of all the Mexican 
people of Mexican descent in San Bernardino 
County. 
 
                                                
55 The Honorable Judge Yankwich ruled in the case the San Bernardino Case 
Lopez v. Seccombe (1944). 
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The Court: That case wasn’t analogous to this 
case.56 
 
Despite the motion being denied during pre-trial to use the Lopez 
decision as a precedent for the Mendez case, Judge McCormick 
would eventually use it to justify the decision.  
The final decision in Mendez came in 1946 and was the 
first federal court case in the country to state that separate schools 
for children of color was unconstitutional because they violated 
constitutional rights provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.57 
Mendez would eventually lead to the desegregation of public 
schools in California. On June 14, 1947, Governor of California, 
Earl Warren signed the bill to desegregate public schools. In the 
concurring majority decision of the Mendez case, the Lopez 
decision was mentioned to have a considerable influence on the 
outcome of the Orange County case. Circuit Judge Denman wrote: 
 
I concur in what is said in the court's opinion but 
cannot agree with the omission of the consideration 
of Lopez v. Seccombe, so widely discussed in the 
profession… What our decision here does is to 
follow the precedent of Judge Yankwich's decision 
in the Lopez case… the priest and the two editors, 
suing for themselves as American citizens and eight 
thousand (8,000) other San Bernardino persons of 
Latin descent, sought an injunction against the 
mayor, councilmen, chief of police and park 
superintendent for such discriminatory exclusion. 
The case was tried by Judge Yankwich who ruled, 
as in the instant case, that such discriminatory 
barring of the class of Latin descended people 
                                                
56 Mendez v. Westminster Pretrial. Records of the District Court of the United 
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Angeles). Civil Case Files 4292-4305. National Archives and Records 
Administration Pacific Region (Laguna Niguel), box 3811, folder CV 4292-M 
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violated the due process and equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 
 
San Bernardino’s Mexican American Defense Committee’s efforts 
three years prior to the final decision in Mendez thus had a major 
influence on one of the most significant test cases in United States 
history in regards to desegregating public schools. 
Gilbert Gonzalez commented on Mendez’s significance and 
stated that the case would be the first stage of overturning the 
“separate but equal” doctrine as outlined in Plessy v. Ferguson 
(1896).  The effects of the decision, according to Gonzalez, “were 
widespread… Mexican parents and civil rights organizations such 
as LULAC and the GI Forum in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, 
and Texas, entered the campaign against school segregation shortly 
thereafter.” Gonzalez also mentioned that attorneys for the 
plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education would use similar 
strategies to those used by Marcus in Mendez.59 Frederick Aguirre 
noted Mendez’s national significance leading into Brown v. Board 
of Education by stating that Chief Justice Earl Warren clearly read 
and understood Judge McCormick’s decision in Mendez.  
According to Aguirre, Mendez helped shape Warren’s “sense of 
fairness and equity that manifested itself in the Brown case.”60 
Mendez v. Westminster has only recently become 
recognized for its legal significance as a test case leading into 
national desegregation. Although the Lopez v. Seccombe case does 
not carry the legal ramifications that Mendez had, historians should 
not neglect the legacy of the Lopez court case. Attorney David C. 
Marcus first utilized the Fourteenth Amendment argument that 
won the Mendez case in the San Bernardino decision. Therefore, 
the Lopez case helped set a precedent, even if not formally 
recognized in Mendez v. Westminster, that helped pave the way 
towards the Mendez decision and the eventual landmark 1954 
Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education. The 
                                                
58 Concurring decision by Circuit Judge Denman. Mendez v. Westminster, 161 
F.2d 774. 
59 Gilbert G. Gonzalez, Chicano Education in the Era of Segregation 
(Philadelphia: The Balch Institute Press, 1990), 28-29. 
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Mexican American Defense Committee’s legal challenge in 1944 
deserves a higher degree of recognition and a closer analysis by 
historians as it is one of the integral test cases that led towards 
national desegregation and greater attainment of civil rights for 
Mexican Americans. Furthermore, San Bernardino’s Mexican 
American Defense Committee should also be recognized as one of 
the groups that advanced the civil rights struggle for Mexican 
Americans. Their courageous resistance led towards a fairer and 
greater U.S. legal system and consequently a more equal and just 
United States.  
In addition, since the City Council mandated that ‘White 
Trade Only’ signs be removed from businesses soon after the 
decision, the aftermath of the Lopez case assisted in further 
eliminating discrimination beyond just parks and recreational 
facilities. The Mexican American Defense Committee fought 
against wide scale structural exclusion that included economic 
exclusion, residential covenants, and school segregation. As 
recently as 2009, the City is still working to eliminate the 
institutional discrimination that Mexicans in San Bernardino 
experienced by correcting the effects of the 215 freeway by 
redesigning off ramps that will finally lead into the Westside. The 
1944 case thus was not just about segregation of parks and 
recreational facilities but part of a larger effort to expose 
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The Western Media and the Portrayal of the 
Rwandan Genocide 
 
BY CHERICE JOYANN ESTES 
 
ABSTRACT: On December 9, 1948, the United Nations established 
its Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.  Genocides, however, have continued to occur, affecting 
millions of people around the globe.  The 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda resulted in an estimated 800,000 deaths.  Global leaders 
were well aware of the atrocities, but failed to intervene.  At the 
same time, the Western media's reports on Rwanda tended to 
understate the magnitude of the crisis.  This paper explores the 
Western media's failure to accurately interpret and describe the 
Rwandan Genocide.  Recognizing the outside media’s role in 
mischaracterizations of the Rwanda situation is particularly useful 
when attempting to understand why western governments were 
ineffective in their response to the atrocity.  The media is self-
evidently a central tool in informing the public about issues, 
shaping public opinion, and promoting change within societies.  
Despite the objectivity that the media is expected to maintain, there 
is no denying that the media, whether intentionally or not, has 
occasionally reported on events and issues in ways that have 
misled or been misinterpreted by the public.  The western media's 
treatment of the Rwandan Genocide is a clear example of 
inaccurate and incomplete news coverage. 
 
 
In one hundred days, an estimated 800,000 Rwandan citizens lost 
their lives, while the United States and European powers failed to 
intervene.  Inaccurate reports in the Western media compounded 
the failure of outside governments to recognize the crisis as 
genocide.  Western publications circulated stories that 
characterized the tragedy in Rwanda in ways that minimized the 
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enormity of the event. For example the media would characterize 
the situation as "a tribal war" or merely the "continuation of a civil 
war." 
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the ways 
the Western media described the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and 
contrast those descriptions with the actual historical facts and 
circumstances of Rwandan politics and social relations.  Too often, 
African political events that have particular and distinguishable 
contexts and precedents are simply labeled as irrational tribalism, 
without any attention given to the causes of a particular 
occurrence.1  While journalists may attempt as best they can to be 
objective when relaying information, they, like anyone else, are the 
products of their training, their upbringing, their religious 
affiliation, and their political and social views. And, in the case of 
the Western media and Africa, the question of perspective is often 
exacerbated by the relative ignorance of Western media about the 
countries in Africa that they are asked to write about.  Anne 
Chaon, a journalist who spent time in Rwanda during the genocide, 
explains that: 
 
Most journalists are not experts in genocide.  Many 
of them - myself included - arrived in Rwanda with 
very little knowledge of the country.  So, it was 
tempting, especially at the beginning, to speak of 
the civil war, and to link these massacres to 
previous massacres since 1959.  We failed to 
understand that the killing was something totally 
new, that this was not a continuity of what 
happened before.2  
 
                                                
1 Melissa Wall, “An Analysis of News Magazine Coverage of the Rwanda Crisis 
in the United States,” in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, edited by Allan 
Thompson and Kofi Annan, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 262. 
2 Anne Chaon, “Who Failed in Rwanda, Journalists or the Media?” in The 
Media and the Rwanda Genocide, edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. 
Weiss, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 160-166. 





Far too often, correspondents assigned to cover an event or issue 
involving Africa have not received the training necessary to “cover 
issues, activities, and crises in developing countries.”3 
The media's mischaracterization and erroneous reporting 
about the Rwandan genocide is apparent in examples from 
American, Canadian, and European periodicals, and from other 
sources that covered the incident while it was occurring.  Many of 
the misguided reports were due to a lack of historical knowledge 
about Rwanda.  Thus, the first section of this paper examines the 
historical foundation for the social divide between the Hutu and 
Tutsi in Rwanda, the two groups involved in the genocide.  The 
paper then examines the events leading up to the genocide.  The 
third section focuses on the genocide itself and what I term the 
Rwandan "hate media."  In the last section of the paper, I highlight 





Rwanda’s population consists of three main groups: the Hutu 
(85%), the Tutsi (14%), and the Twa (1%).4  These three groups 
share the same religion, speak the same language, and, prior to 
colonization, lived peacefully with one another in the same 
community.  In many cases they intermarried.  Each group 
considered itself as belonging to a single, integrated society, 
despite various social differences. The shared community among 
the three groups was not unlike the shared communities of the 
West, where, for example, Catholics and Jews live and work 
together in the same city or suburb. 
Pre-colonial Rwandese society was organized around the 
mwami, or king as the central figure of authority.  The mwami was 
considered to be powerful, sacred, and divine.  Rituals were carried 
out in his honor and a special vocabulary known as "king’s 
                                                
3 John C. Hammock and Joel R. Charny, “Emergency Response as Mortality 
Play: The Media, the Relief Agencies, and the Need for Capacity Building," in 
From Massacres to Genocide (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1996), 125. 
4 Catharine Newbury, “Background to Genocide: Rwanda,” A Journal of 
Opinion 23 (1995): 12. 
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speech" was used to describe his daily activities.  Gerard Prunier, 
author of The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide notes that: 
 
The king was the father and the patriarch of his 
people, given to them by Imana (God).  He is the 
providence of Rwanda, the Messiah and the savior.  
When he exercises his authority, he is impeccable, 
infallible.  His decisions cannot be questioned.  The 
parents of a victim he has injustly struck bring him 
presents so that he does not resent them for having 
been forced to cause them affliction.  They still trust 
him, because his judgments are always just.  
Whatever happens, he remains Nyagasami, the only 
Lord, superb and magnificent.5 
 
There were three types of chiefs who were under the king:  the 
mutwale wa buttaka (chief of landholdings), who was responsible 
for agricultural production, land attribution, and taxation; the 
mutwale wa ingabo (chief of men), in charge of recruiting men for 
the king’s armies; and the mutwale wa inka (chief of pastures), 
who ruled over the grazing lands.6  The mutwale wa buttaka was 
normally Hutu as agriculture was their expertise, while most of the 
other chiefs were Tutsi.  The chiefs were responsible for minding 
the cattle, working the land, and maintaining their quarters.  They 
also set the form of payment for each household under their 
jurisdiction, which allowed people to make their own arrangements 
to fulfill their government demands.  This system became known 
as ubuhake and remained in existence until the European powers 
changed the taxation system.7 
Rwanda remained free from European colonization until 
May 4, 1894, when the first European, German Count Gustav 
Adolf von Goetzen, was received at court by King Rwabugiri. The 
King welcomed the Count, but was unaware that the European 
powers had already divided up the African continent at the Berlin 
Conference of 1885. The decision to give Rwanda to Germany was 
                                                
5 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis History of a Genocide (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 10. 
6 Prunier, 11-12. 
7 Prunier, 12. 





an act of ignorance: Germans knew nothing about Rwanda. The 
Rwandan monarchy continued to exist while Germany deployed 
twenty-four military officers and six administrators to Rwanda. 
According to Linda Melvern, a British journalist and published 
author, “The German policy was to support the chiefs in such a 
manner that they would be convinced that their own salvation and 
that of their supporters depended on their faithfulness to the 
German.” 8  The Germans also supported expansion and helped the 
Tutsi monarchy subjugate the northern areas.  
 After World War I, control over Rwanda and Burundi was 
transferred from Germany to Belgium under a League of Nations 
mandate.  This covenant “was to herald a new phase of human 
evolution, to offer a framework for practical and effective co-
operation between nations for their common good.”9 The covenant 
stipulated that the “tutelage of the peoples in the colonies should 
be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, 
their experience, or their geographical position, could best, 
undertake this responsibility.”10  Rwanda and Burundi were 
categorized as countries lacking in self-determination.  Belgium 
agreed to assume administration, as well as to promote 
development, free speech, and freedom of religion.   
 The Germans had implemented a policy of indirect rule, 
which changed to one of direct rule under the Belgians.  Slowly, 
the Belgians progressed in changing the societal structures that had 
existed throughout Rwanda’s history.  In 1922, the king was forced 
to accept the assistance of Belgian representatives and one year 
later Belgium made it illegal for the king to have regional chiefs.  
Belgian colonialists dismantled the only structure that Rwandans 
had known.  In 1931, King Mwami Musinga, who opposed 
colonization, was removed from power by Belgian administrators 
and replaced by Mutara Rudahigwa, who later became known as 
“king of the whites.” 11 His values and practices were more 
“western,” and his conversion to Christianity in 1943 became part 
                                                
8  Melvern, Linda , A People Betrayed The Role of the West in Rwanda’s 
Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 7.  
9 Melvern, 9. 
10 Melvern, 9. 
11 Melvern, 10. 
The Western Media 
 
 38  
of the Belgian policy that made Christianity mandatory for anyone 
wishing to be part of the Tutsi elite.12 
 The Belgian government divided Rwanda into four 
chiefdoms and gave Belgian administrators the authority to control 
every aspect of Rwandan society.  They introduced currency and 
implemented an education system available only to the sons of 
chiefs.  They also created an African civil service that included 
only members of the Tutsi oligarchy. Despite the Tutsi being a 
decidedly small fraction of the total population – dwarfed in 
numbers by the Hutu—Belgium was intent on elevating the Tutsi 
over the Hutu based on physical characteristics.  In this way, the 
Belgians were cementing their unfavorable attitudes toward the 
Hutu.  Under the direction of the Belgian administration, Tutsi 
chiefs demanded forced labor from the Hutu in building roads.  
The Belgians insisted on cruel and inhumane beatings as a method 
of punishment and control.  As a result, hundreds of thousands of 
Hutu peasants fled to Uganda to become migrant workers and 
escape the mistreatment.13 
 
 
European Stereotypes and the Hamitic Myth   
 
Europeans in Rwanda had long noted physical differences within 
the Rwandan population and, beginning with the Belgians, they 
began to exploit those differences to create a social divide and 
implement policies based on racial discrimination.  John Hanning 
Speke, a well-known Nile explorer in the 1800s, linked Rwandan 
“monarchic institutions” to the arrival of conquering invaders from 
Ethiopia (whom he speculated to be ancestors of the Tutsi). Speke 
posited that Tutsis were of a Hamitic, non-African race, and thus 
“superior.”14  Other explorers, such as Sir Samuel Baker and 
Gaetuno Casati, accepted this formulation. 
 Missionaries, such as Father van den Burgt and John 
Roscoe, also believed the explorers’ theories; some, however, had 
different opinions.  Father Pages, for example, believed that the 
Tutsis were descendants of ancient Egyptians.  Father van den 
                                                
12 Melvern, 10. 
13 Melvern, 10. 
14 Prunier, 7. 





Burgt claims, “We can see Caucasian skulls and beautiful Greek 
profiles side by side with Semitic and even Jewish features, elegant 
golden-red beauties in the heart of Ruanda and Urundi.”15 
 Tutsi features were described as though they were 
European and not of the same group as the Hutu.  Prunier notes 
that some Europeans thought: 
 
The Bahima [a Tutsi clan] differ absolutely by the 
beauty of their features and their light colour from 
the Bantu agriculturalists of an inferior type.  Tall 
and well-proportioned, they have long thin noses, a 
wide brow and fine lips.  They say they came from 
the north.  Their intelligent and delicate appearance, 
their love of money, their capacity to adapt to any 
situation seem to indicate a semitic-origin.16 
 
These Hamitic or Semitic characteristics were purportedly the 
underlying reasons why the Tutsi emerged as the privileged group.  
These stereotypes not only demonstrate that the Europeans were 
ignorant of Rwandese history and populations, but that they in fact 
facilitated the spread of racial animosity and hatred among the 
different groups.  Based on the assumption that the Tutsi were 
ancient European descendants, the Belgian government decided 
that they were “fit to rule.”  The Hutu, by contrast, were deemed 
inferior.  They were described as having typical African features:  
“short and thick-set with a big head, jovial expression, a wide nose 
and enormous lips.”17 
In 1933, the Belgian administration put together a group of 
Belgian bureaucrats to conduct a census of the entire population.  
The purpose was to classify every Rwandan as belonging to one of 
the three groups: Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.  They counted each 
Rwandan, measuring height, nose length, and eye shape.18  Using 
physical characteristics as a way to group people into categories 
was, in fact, a flawed methodology because many Rwandans were 
mixed due to intermarriage.  The Belgians' solution to that issue 
                                                
15 Prunier, 7. 
16 Prunier, 7. 
17 Prunier, 6. 
18 Melvern, 11. 
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was to classify persons who were mixed as Hutu.  Hutus who were 
wealthy and owned the required number of livestock were 
considered Tutsi.19   
The Belgians then issued to every Rwandan an 
identification card that indicated the group to which the person had 
been assigned.  The identification card policy is a primary example 
of how the Belgian government created and fostered a racially 
divided population based on physical appearance, a policy that 
contributed significantly to the country's progression down a path 
that led to genocide.  
 
 
Belgian Discriminatory Policies and Their Outcomes 
 
The favoritism displayed by the Belgian government to the Tutsi 
population was pervasive and resulted in the creation of an African 
civil service limited to Tutsi elites.  In 1952, the Belgians 
introduced electoral procedures for advisory councils at four 
different administrative levels, limiting voting privileges such that 
the minority Tutsi won all the seats.20 
 Because of these types of discrimination and repression, a 
sense of Hutu nationalism and racist ideologies began to surface in 
the northern region of Rwanda.  In 1957, a group of Hutu 
nationalists published a manifesto that called for majority rule.  
Belgian Catholic priests supported the Hutus in their mission to 
gain equality and abolish discrimination within the public service, 
and in 1957, the United Nations pressured Belgium to liberate the 
Hutu. 
 On July 24, 1959, Rwanda’s Tutsi King Mutara III 
Rudahigwa died while in the hospital.  The Tutsi elite were under 
the impression that he was killed by the Belgians and that the Hutu 
were also involved.21  This rumor sparked outrage among the Tutsi 
population, and on November 1, 1959, a Tutsi group called Union 
National Rwandaise (UNAR) attacked a Hutu leader, Dominique 
Mbonyumutwa, which placed Rwanda in violent turmoil.  The 
                                                
19 Melvern, 11. 
20 Melvern, 13. 
21 Melvern, 14. 





Hutu started burning Tutsi homes and launching attacks on them.  
Many Tutsi fled Rwanda as a result of the violence.   
This upheaval was only the beginning of the repercussions 
from European interference and the Belgians' restructuring of 
Rwandan society.  The Belgian government placed Rwanda under 
military rule on November 11, 1959.  Under international pressure, 
they tried to rectify the situation by replacing some Tutsi chiefs 
with Hutu and announcing to Belgian administrators that the Hutu 
would now be “favored within the administration.”22  Tens of 
thousands of Tutsi were forced into exile in neighboring 
countries.23 
 Gregoire Kayibanda, founder of the extremist Hutu group 
Parmehutu, wanted to end Tutsi dominance forever. He organized 
rallies to overthrow the Tutsi monarchy, a goal he achieved in 
September 1961.  By February 1962, an estimated 135,000 Tutsi 
refugees were living in exile in the Congo, Burundi, Uganda, and 




Opposition Growth Across Borders 
 
Tutsi men displaced in refugee camps were recruited into secret 
militia groups, called Inyenzi, or cockroach, by the Hutu.  On 
November 14, 1963, the Belgian National Guard stopped an 
Inyenzi attempt to enter Rwanda to kill Hutu.25  On December 21, 
1963, two hundred armed Tutsi men left Burundi and succeeded in 
crossing over into Rwanda, heading toward the capital Kigali.  
They were defeated and Kayibanda reacted to the Tutsi infiltration 
with an organized campaign to kill Tutsi. 
 These killings in 1963 left journalists puzzled as to why an 
event like this would happen.  Lord Bertrand Russell, a Welsh 
historian and philosopher, spoke of the event on Vatican Radio, 
claiming that, “It was the most horrible and systematic 
extermination of a people since the Nazi’s extermination of the 
                                                
22 Melvern, 14. 
23 Melvern, 14. 
24 Melvern, 14. 
25 Melvern, 17. 
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Jews.26 These massacres organized by Kayibanda were propelled 
by Kigali Radio, which aired warnings that the Tutsi were coming 
back to “enslave” the Hutu, proclaimed that, “The Tutsi must be 
killed before they killed the Hutu.” 27  Hoes, machetes, clubs, and 
any other tools attackers could access were used to kill at least five 
thousand men, women, and children.  Some one hundred Tutsi 
women and children committed suicide by drowning themselves in 
the river to escape Hutu mobs at the Congo border.   
Some consider this specific event genocide, though 
Europeans working for aid agencies in Rwanda during this time 
described the killings as “savagery of the negro.”28  Unfortunately, 
this was not the last time that massive killings would take place; a 
far worse massacre – the most horrible mass destruction of human 
beings since the Jewish Holocaust of World War II – would occur 
thirty years later. 
 Various groups of Tutsi refugees prepared to return to their 
homeland in order to oppose Hutu nationalism.  One group was the 
Rwanda Refugees Welfare Association, later known as the 
Rwandan Alliance for National Unity.29  This group operated in 
exile in Kenya from 1981 to 1986.  In 1987, the group changed its 
name to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF consisted of 
a 26-member executive committee that included 11 Tutsi and 15 
Hutu who opposed then-President Habyarimana and wanted to end 
his regime.  A guerilla army known as the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army eventually grew from this organization.  They were well-
trained, disciplined and had considerable combat experience.30 
 
 
Civil War 1990-1993 
 
On October 1, 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Army forces attacked 
guards posted at the Rwandese border.  This surprise attack was 
the start of a civil war.  Former Major Paul Kagame, who is the 
current president of Rwanda, called this “the beginning of a 
                                                
26 Melvern, 17. 
27 Melvern, 17. 
28 Melvern, 18. 
29 Melvern, 26. 
30 Melvern, 27. 





protracted popular war.”31  The goal was to put an end to the 
Habyarimana regime, return the Tutsi to their home country, and 
take control of the government.  Kagame worked with 
Habyarimana’s former accomplice, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, 
who was a Hutu living in exile.  After three years of fighting, the 
civil war ended with the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 
1993. 
 The civil war gained international attention.  President 
Habyarimana, a Hutu extremist, had come under scrutiny for the 
instability and violence that his rule generated throughout the 
region.  It took thirteen months of talks to get the Rwandan 
government and the RPF to agree to sign the accords, the only 
hope for an end to the civil war.32  The negotiations were overseen 
by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), under the leadership 
of Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi.  Five African states 
were involved in the negotiations (Burundi, Zaire, Senegal, 
Uganda and Tanzania), along with four western countries: (France, 
Belgium, Germany, and the United States), which had observer 
status.  Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and the European 
Union monitored the talks from their local embassies.33  
 Under the peace agreement, Rwandan presidential power 
was “reduced to no more than representing the Republic: the 
President could promulgate laws but had no authority to modify or 
veto them.”  Not only did he have no power to nominate civil 
servants, but he also could not suggest names for nominations.  
Any messages addressed to the nation had to be approved by the 
Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG).34 
 President Habyarimana agreed to sign this accord only to 
maintain a good image in the eyes of foreign donors.35  He 
scrambled to get support from other African leaders to buy time 
and hold up democratization.  He traveled to Uganda to meet with 
President Museveni on August 31, 1993.  The meeting turned out 
to be unfavorable for President Habyarimana and left him 
                                                
31 Prunier, 96. 
32 Melvern, 52. 
33 Melvern, 52. 
34 Prunier, 193. 
35 Prunier, 195. 
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searching for outside supporters to delay the implementation of the 
Accords.36 
 Despite Habyarimana’s signing of the Arusha Accords in 
August 1993, he failed to implement the agreement; too much was 
at stake. The Hutu supremacists who had supported him realized 
that he was incapable of defending their interests. The Hutu 
extremist group Coalition Pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR) 
decided to withdraw their support for Habyarimana and search for 
more radical representation and appease foreign governments who 
supported Habyarimana financially.  Despite criticism from Europe 
and other African states, and despite the eagerness of the RPF to 
integrate the forces and implement the accords, Habyarimana 
refused.   
 On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam, 
Tanzania and met with Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, 
Vice-President George Saitoti of Kenya, President Cyprien 
Ntaryamira of Burundi, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.  
The focus of the discussion was supposed to be on Burundi; 
Habyarimana’s refusal, however, to abide by the Arusha Accords 
was the topic of discussion.  Back home, on the other hand, Hutu 
extremists felt betrayed by Habyarimana’s signing of the Accords.  
Thus, whether or not he implemented the agreement, he was still in 
a difficult situation that he could not ignore. 
President Ntaryamira accompanied President Habyarimana 
in his aircraft on the way back to Kigali.  At around 8:30 in the 
evening on April 6, the aircraft was struck by two missiles.  
Ironically, it crashed into the garden of Habyarimana’s home and 
caught fire, killing everyone on board.  This incident sparked the 
beginning of the wave of killings that became widely 
acknowledged as the Rwandan Genocide. 
 
 
The Genocide of 1994: Rwandan Radio Hate Media 
 
The Hutu-controlled Radio-Television Libres des Milles Collines 
(RTLMC) was financed by Hutu extremists, which also included 
Habyarimana.  The purpose for this radio station had always been 
                                                
36 Melvern, 52-54. 





to incite the Rwandan Hutu majority to genocide.37  The radio 
station started calling for the extermination of Tutsi as early as 
January 1994 in response to the Arusha Accords.  After 
Habyarimana’s death, the radio station announcers had a new 
rallying cry; they called for murder “to avenge the death of their 
president.”  On May 5, they declared that the country must be 
“cleansed” of Tutsis.38 
In order to achieve their goal, they helped recruit and 
organize the Interhamwe militias, whose purpose was to annihilate 
all Tutsi in Rwanda.  Radio announcers read the names and 
addresses of Tutsi and moderate Hutu who were to be killed.  Their 
last-known locations were also broadcast, and listeners were told, 
“You have missed some of the enemies [in this or that place].  
Some are still alive.  You must go back and finish them off.”39  
The results proved to be one of the worst human disasters ever.  
Fergal Keane, a journalist and writer, asks his readers: 
 
Remember the figures, never ever forget them, in 
one hundred days up to one million people were 
hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed, and burned to 
death.  Remember, carve this into your 
consciousness: one million.  This estimate equates 
to three hundred and thirty-three and a third 
murders an hour, or five and a half killings every 
minute.40 
 
The enormity of the bloodshed should have been recognized as 
genocide immediately, but, due to Rwanda’s remote geographic 
location and its lack of influence in the international arena, 
thousands of men, women, and children were slaughtered while 
world powers turned a blind eye.  An article in The Economist 
explained that, “The killing in Rwanda is too terrible to ignore. It 
amounts to genocide, a word that the United States will not 
                                                
37 Melvern, 71. 
38 Peter Ronayne, Never Again? (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 157. 
39 Ronyane, 158. 
40 Ronyane, 159. 
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officially utter since to do so would make it harder to resist taking 
action.”41   
The Clinton Administration opposed using the term 
genocide to describe what was taking place in Rwanda at the time.  
Recognizing this as genocide would require the United States to 
intervene according to their adoption of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.  Nevertheless, United States government officials 
publicly acknowledged that “acts of genocide” may have been 
committed.42  David Rawson, former US Ambassador to Rwanda 
during this time, said during an interview that “As a responsible 
government, you don’t just go around hollering genocide.  You say 
that acts of genocide may have occurred and they need to be 
investigated.”43  While western powers danced around the issue, 




Western Media Coverage of the Genocide 
 
The 1994 Rwandan Genocide officially started when President 
Habyarimana was killed.  The Hutu extremists who supported him 
blamed the Tutsi for his murder and wasted no time in trying to rid 
Rwanda of Tutsi.  Western media reported the violence as “a 
product of tribal factions.”44   The New York Times, for example, 
on April 9, 1994, headlined “Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as 
Tribes Battle.”  The article understated events, citing “tribal 
bloodletting” as the cause for the high death toll and also for the 
evacuation of foreigners from Kigali, Rwanda’s capital.  The 
reporter, who clearly lacked an understanding of Rwanda’s long 
history of Hutu-Tutsi conflict, attributed the violence simply to the 
murder of President Habyarimana.  In fact, tension between Hutu 
and Tutsi had been building and worsening since the post-World 
War I entry of Belgium into Rwandan society and Belgium's 
                                                
41 “Who Will Save Rwanda,” The Economist, June 25, 1994, 13. 
42 Douglas Jehl,. “Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings ‘Genocide.’” 
New York Times, June10, 1994. 
43 Jehl. 
44 Niranjan Karnik, “Rwanda & the Media: Imagery, War & Refuge,” Review of 
African Political Economy 25 (December 1998): 614. 





implementation of policies that included: inscribing “ethnic” 
identification on identity cards; relegating the vast majority of 
Hutu to onerous forms of forced labor; and favoring Tutsi in access 
to administrative posts, education, and jobs in the modern sector.45 
In another article titled, “Africa Has Yet to Come to Terms 
with Its Tribal Divisions,” the author stated, “Rwanda is African 
tribalism in its extreme form.”46  A news article in the San 
Francisco Chronicle also incorrectly referenced the genocide as a 
“tribal vendetta.”47  On the same day, the New York Times also 
incorrectly referred to the genocide as a tribal war.48  In point of 
fact, the Hutu and Tutsi should not be referred to as different 
tribes.  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a tribe is 
defined as “a group of persons forming a community and claiming 
descent from a common ancestor.”  The Hutu and Tutsi lived in the 
same community, spoke the same language, and shared the same 
religion.   
An article featured in the Boston Globe stated, “The 
Troubles in Rwanda and Burundi go back 500 years, to the time 
when the tall Tutsi came in from neighboring Ethiopia to establish 
dominance over the Hutu people.”49  Even though some of the 
physical features of Tutsi and Hutu differed, the two groups had 
been living together and co-mingling in Rwanda when the 
Europeans arrived.  Moreover, recall that under Belgian policy, the 
Hutu could be classified as Tutsi merely as a result of their wealth.  
The classification system that was created never accurately 
represented the population, thus to describe the genocide as a 
“tribal war or tribal conflict” is an incorrect description of what 
occurred.  The article below appeared in the New York Times one 
month after the genocide began and exemplifies the language used 
to describe this event. 
                                                
45 Catharine Newbury, “Background to Genocide: Rwanda,” A Journal of 
Opinion, 23 (1995): 12-17. 
46 Jonathan Power, “Africa Has Yet To Come To Terms With Its Tribal 
Divisions” The Gazette, final edition, B5, July 30, 1994. 
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More Massacred in Tribal Vendettas,” San Francisco Chronicle, final edition, 
April 9, 1994. 
48 “Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as Tribes Battle,” New York Times, late 
edition, April 9, 1994. 
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Figure 1. Michael McMahon, “Tribal Fighting Flares Again Around the 
Rwandan Capital,” New York Times, late edition, 16 May 1994. 
 
 
Prolonged Civil War or Genocide? 
 
Raphael Lemkin, a Polish jurist who lost forty-nine family 
members in the Holocaust, first used the word “genocide.”50  The 
term has been used to describe, “the systematic targeting of 
                                                
50 Samantha Power, “Raising the Cost of Genocide” in Fifty Years of Dissent, 
edited by Nicolaus Mills and Michael Walzer, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), 295.  





national, ethnic, or religious groups.”51  The United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, to include, however, has defined the term, more 
broadly: 
 
Any of a number of acts committed with the intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group: killing members of the 
group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the 
group, and forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group.52   
 
It is the totality of the intended extermination that marks genocide.  
 The intention and attempt of the Hutu to annihilate the 
entire Tutsi population is clearly an example of genocide, yet the 
media often portrayed this crisis as a civil war, implying that two 
opposing political viewpoints had taken up arms simply to gain 
control of the government.  Three months after the genocide began, 
USA Today headlined “Rwandan Rebels Call for Civil War Cease-
Fire.”53  The Gazette used the same mischaracterization in an 
article entitled, “Toll From Rwanda’s Civil War Nears 3 Million, 
UN Says.”54  The Washington Post published an editorial that 
identified the violence as “savage civil war.”55  The labeling of 
Africans as savages was started with the Europeans during the pre-
colonial era. Although colonialism is a thing of the past, western 
media continued to use these terms to describe the genocide.  Mark 
                                                
51 Power, 295. 
52 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
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Doyle, a British journalist, recalls a conversation that he had with a 
BBC presenter: 
 
There are two wars going on here.  There’s a 
shooting war and a genocide war.  The two are 
connected, but also distinct.  In the shooting war, 
there are two conventional armies at each other, and 
in the genocide war, one of those armies – the 
governments side with help from civilians – is 
involved in mass killings.56   
 
Rwanda had been involved in a civil war from 1990-1993. The 
actions and goals of the Hutu extremists in 1994, however – to 
exterminate all Tutsis – made the million deaths in 1994 genocide 
and not merely the continuation of a civil war.  Mahmood 
Mamdani, professor of anthropology and international affairs at 
Columbia University, wrote:  
 
But whereas these Hutu were murdered as 
individuals—butchered for their beliefs or their 
actions—the Tutsi were murdered because they 
were Tutsi.  This is why the killings of more than 
half a million Rwandan Tutsi between March and 
July of 1994 must be called genocide.57 
 
"War" and "genocide" are not simply two variations of the same 
behavior and the media's characterization of the 1994 events in 
Rwanda as "civil war" necessarily misled and misinformed 
Western audiences.  In the Western mind, war is an activity 
involving two or more opposing sets of organized combatants or 
warriors who might contest land, property, or political supremacy.  
War involves accepted rules of engagement, the taking and 
humane treatment of prisoners who are returned at the conclusion 
of hostilities, and perhaps most importantly, the idea that civilians 
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are off limits to the warriors. The loser in a war surrenders and is 
not exterminated. 
 Genocide, on the other hand, is directed at the civilians as it 
aims to exterminate rather than to imprison, to annihilate rather 
than to capture.  It is not land or political powers that those 
engaged in genocide seek; rather, it is the total elimination of the 
existence of the persons who are the objects of the genocide.  
Western audiences were deceived by a "war" characterization that 
distorted, and in the process minimized, what was actually 
occurring in Rwanda. 
 
 
The Genocide and its Representation of Africa 
 
Africa is often depicted to Westerners as a place of destruction, 
death, and deprivation. Westerners should not be led to believe 
such characteristics represent the entire continent.  Nonetheless, 
some journalists reported the genocide as if it took place in all of 
Africa rather than in one specific country.  The Salt Lake Tribune 
published an article titled, “Map of Africa Shifts As More Wars 
Break Out African Map Runs Red; Wars Erupt Among 
Incompatibles.”58  The same newspaper also issued another article 
one day later headlined, “Foreigners Flee As Blood Flows in 
Rwanda Stench of Death Everywhere As Rebels Advance; U.S. 
Sends Troops to Burundi Americans Flee For Their Lives From 
Africa’s Land of Death.” 59  These headlines give the impression 
that the entire African continent was affected by the genocide and 
not just the country where it was taking place.  The cartoon image 
below was featured in the Christian Science Monitor when the 
Rwandan Genocide first started.  Garth Myers, Thomas Klak and 
Timothy Koehl argue that this image highlights the exaggerated 
misconceptions that all of Africa is experiencing the same crises.60  
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A mother and her child are seen emerging from the continent 
without any specific geographic context as to where the genocide 
was actually occurring.  These types of depictions send a clear 
message about the way Western media views Africa, especially in 
a time of crisis. 
 





The Rwandan Genocide represents both an international and media 
failure.  As acts of genocide were perpetrated, Western powers 
ignored what was happening and the Western media continued to 
report the situation inaccurately and without any context.  The role 
of Belgian colonialism had created divisions within Rwandan 
society that segregated persons who were not members of separate 
tribes, but people who had lived and worked together for centuries 
before the Europeans arrived. 
The media, however, overlooked and over-simplified the 
origins of the genocide, and in so doing, misled Western 
audiences.  California State University Fullerton professor Ronald 
Pahl states, “What is neglected or ignored in the reporting on 
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Africa are the issues that have caused these problems for the 
African nations.”62  As long as Western media continue to portray 
the continent in this manner, the rest of the world will never be 
able to understand accurately the underlying reality of Africa and 
its issues. 
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Project Operation Whitecoat: 
Military Experimentation, Seventh-Day Adventism 
and Conscientious Cooperation  
 
BY ALICIA GUTIERREZ 
 
ABSTRACT: From 1954-1973, the U.S. Army established an 
unlikely alliance with the Seventh-Day Adventist (SDA) Church 
and their unequivocal support for a series of biomedical 
experiments called Project Operation Whitecoat (POW). In a letter 
dated October 19, 1954, Dr. T. R. Flaiz, Secretary of the Medical 
Department of the General Conference of SDAs wrote to then-
Surgeon General Major George E. Armstrong, “the medical 
research project which you have under way… offers an excellent 
opportunity for these young men to render a service which will be 
of value not only to military medicine but to public health 
generally.”1 While the notion of church, military and government 
cooperation, especially in regards to human experimentation may 
seem incongruous, unorthodox and paradoxical, the nature of the 
relationship that the church was able to maintain with the military 
hierarchy allowed for a series of biological experiments that can 
be considered a model of ethical human experimentation. 
 
According to testimony by the United States General Accounting 
Office to the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, 
Committee on Government Operations in the House of 
Representatives, a shroud of secrecy surrounds government 
sponsored experiments conducted on humans between 1940 and 
1974.2 Since the Nuremberg trials, which condemned the acts of 
Nazi doctors, US agencies adopted the Nuremberg Code.  The 
Nuremberg Code requires that researchers obtain informed consent 
                                                
1 T. R. Flaiz, M.D., “Letter to Major General George E. Armstrong,” October 
19, 1954. 
2 Human Experimentation: An Overview on Cold War Era Programs 
(Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, September 28, 
1994), 3. 
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before conducting any research involving human subjects.  
Researchers are also required to allow their human subjects the 
freedom to discontinue participation in any study in which they are 
involved as human subjects.  Despite these codes designed to 
protect the rights of human subjects in research, in terms of 
government and/or military medical experimentation after World 
War II, no overarching or overseeing agency existed to ensure that 
these experiments were being executed in accordance with federal 
laws or policies, such as the Nuremberg Codes.3 Between 1954 and 
1973, a series of ethical experimentation was conducted in the 
United States that stood in sharp contrast to regulations that might 
have better protected the humans involved in the research.  
Project Operation Whitecoat (POW), as it was called, was a 
code name for an alliance between the US Army and the Seventh-
Day Adventist (SDA) Church to provide an alternative means by 
which Seventh-Day Adventists could serve their county militarily.  
This alternative means of service meant that Seventh-Day 
Adventists would become the subjects of military medical 
research. In a letter dated October 19, 1954, Dr. T. R. Flaiz, 
Secretary of the Medical Department of the General Conference of 
SDAs wrote to then-Surgeon General Major George E. Armstrong, 
“the medical research project which you have under way… offers 
an excellent opportunity for these young men to render a service 
which will be of value not only to military medicine but to public 
health generally.”4 Attached to this letter was a preliminary 
statement by the General Conference regarding the use of 
volunteers for medical research. It stated, “it is the attitude of 
Seventh-Day Adventists that any service rendered voluntarily by 
whomsoever in the useful necessary research into the cause and 
treatment of disabling disease is a legitimate and laudable 
contribution to the success of our nation and to the health and 
comfort of our fellow man.”5  POW gave Seventh-Day Adventists 
a way to serve the country in a meaningful way that did not 
involve fighting in a war directly.   
                                                
3 United States General Accounting Office, Human Experimentation, 1. 
4 Flaiz, 10. 
5 Statement of Attitude Regarding Volunteering For Medical Research (The 






   Surprisingly little, if any, research has been done on POW. 
Because of the direct involvement of the SDA church and the strict 
supervision of the Army surgeon general, POW was able to 
distinguish itself away from the shroud of secrecy surrounding 
other military experiments and serve as a model for conscious, 
ethical human experimentation in an era when deception ran 
rampant.  
The Seventh-Day Adventist Church in America: A Brief Military 
History  
 
Throughout its history, the SDA church has been actively engaged 
and concerned with the involvement of its members in the military. 
In order to better grasp the role that the SDA church was able to 
play in POW, it is important to look at its history through the lens 
of military relations.  The SDA church emerged from the Christian 
Connection and later, the Millerite Movement. The Christian 
Connection was “a religious body that in the mid-nineteenth 
century was fifth in membership within the United States.”6 One of 
the founding beliefs in this movement was literal interpretation, 
and sole authority, of the Bible. This included observance of the 
seventh-day (Saturday) as the Sabbath and the belief in the “literal 
soon advent of Christ.”7 
 Baptist preacher William Miller was renowned for the 
knowledge that he displayed when interpreting the Bible. He 
believed that Christ’s second coming was fast approaching which 
prompted believers and scores of churches to adopt the name 
‘Adventist’ for themselves by the 1830s and 1840s.8 Some 
Adventists followed Miller’s belief that based on his calculations 
the Second Advent would occur in 1844. There were others, 
however, who believed that Christ’s advent could not be 
determined, and was yet to arrive, causing a theological schism. In 
1844, a small wood structure in Washington, New Hampshire 
became the first ‘Adventist’ church, and on May 21, 1863, “the 
                                                
6 “History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church,” 
http://www.adventist.org/world_church/facts_and_figures/history/index.html.en 
(accessed June 25, 2010).   
7 “History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.”  
8 “History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.” 
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denomination was officially organized… [and] included some 125 
churches and 3,500 members.”9 
 The early SDA church placed an important emphasis on 
freedom. As the church itself points out, because of this, SDAs 
“worked toward abolition of slavery as well as roles for women in 
the church… Freedom was also emphasized through an orientation 
toward temperance and health reform… Thus within nineteenth-
century Adventism one finds strong anti-slavery actions, women 
licensed as ministers, and health reform principles that included 
abolition of alcohol and tobacco.”10 This movement towards 
freedom, especially anti-slavery sentiment, caused SDAs to side 
with the North during the Civil War. According to a statement 
released by renowned Adventist prophetess Ellen G. White in 
1863, “God gives him [the slaveholder] no title to human souls, 
and he has no right to hold them as his property... God has made 
man a free moral agent, whether white or black. The institution of 
slavery does away with this and permits man to exercise over his 
fellow man a power, which God has never granted him.”11 Yet, 
literal interpretation of the Bible, including the Sixth 
Commandment that forbids killing, put them at odds with the 
military. Because of the Civil War, the SDA church was forced to 
deal with this ideological dilemma just as the church was being 
formed.12  In 1863, the Union implemented conscription and the 
SDA church took an official stance against military service. This 
clearly resonates from White’s prophecy: 
 
God’s people… cannot engage in this perplexing 
war, for it is opposed to every principle of their 
faith. In the army they cannot obey the truth and at 
the same time obey the requirements of their 
officers… Those who love God’s commandments 
will conform to every good law of the land. But if 
the requirements of the rulers are such as conflict 
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11 Ellen G. White, “The Rebellion,” in Testimonies for the Church, vol. 1, 4th 
ed. (Mountain View: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1948), 358. 
12 Ronald Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers? Seventh-Day Adventists and 







with the laws of God, the only question to be settled 
is:  
Shall we obey God, or man?13 
 
The SDA position on war made them a minority, which resulted in 
some disdain and contempt, yet they were not faced with legal 
penalization. When a member of the SDA church was drafted, the 
congregation utilized a provision allowing them to pay their way 
out of military service.  Thus, drafted men were able to avoid 
military service by paying a $300 commutation fee. When a poor 
member of the congregation was drafted, the church worked 
together to raise money, thereby cementing a legacy of the SDA 
church involving itself in individual members’ military affairs. In 
1864, the military created a stipulation allowing people or religious 
organizations to file for noncombatant status; however, the 
Adventist church did not immediately seek to gain recognition 
under it because they felt secure, confident and protected by the 
general accessibility of the commutations fee. When the 
commutation fee became subject to restricted use in July of 1864, 
the SDA church sought to gain recognition as noncombatants and 
ultimately received it from the state and federal levels of 
government.  
Along with the end of the Civil War went any further 
discussion of SDA military service. Although SDAs admonished 
the Spanish-American War of 1898 and encouraged pacifism, the 
lack of conscription did not necessitate any further action. But 
when World War I erupted and conscription once again became an 
issue that members had to face directly, the SDA church developed 
a new viewpoint on what it meant to be a noncombatant. 
When the draft was implemented for World War I, the 
SDA church took a major step in their stance on military service. 
Avoiding the myth that church doctrine was fait accompli, the 
SDA church changed their definition of noncombatant service. 
According to sociologist Ronald Lawson, “instead of being 
pacifists who refused to be involved in war, Adventists would now 
respond to the draft but refrain from bearing arms. As unarmed 
soldiers, they would not kill but do good.”14 This conversion did 
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14 Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers?,” 198. 
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not come without debate. A week after the U.S. declared war, 
Adventist leaders met and petitioned that Adventists “be required 
to serve our country only in such capacity as will not violate our 
conscientious obedience to the law of God.”15  Dr. Lawson 
believes that this change was an attempt by the church to move 
away from ‘sect’ towards ‘denomination.’ According to Lawson, 
who utilizes Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge’s church-
sect theory:  
 
A highly sectarian group has high tension with 
society, a mainline denomination low tension, with 
a continuum between the two representing varying 
degrees of tension. As a group moves from sect 
towards denomination, this is indicated by 
relaxation in tension… When a religious group 
concludes that military service contravenes its 
principles and rejects the call to arms, that decision 
marks it as different. Depending on the political 
context, it may elicit antagonistic responses—scorn 
and harassment from the public and punishment by 
the state. This indicates that the group’s tension 
with society is high— that it is towards the sect end 
of the church-sect scale. Since many sects, over 
time, reduce their tension with society and move 
towards the church end of the scale, a sect holding a 
deviant position on conscription is likely to modify 
its stand in order to reduce tension.16 
 
In other words, religious denomination and sect sit at opposite ends 
of a sliding scale. ‘Sect’ or ‘denomination’ is determined by a 
group’s tension with society. If a group’s religious doctrines or 
practices place them in a position where they are at odds with 
mainline society, they are considered a sect. Consequently, the 
more a religious group’s doctrines and practices fit within mainline 
society, the more they are considered a denomination. If a group 
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does not want to retain the stigma associated with being considered 
a ‘sect,’ then the best way to do this would be to reduce the 
“tension” with society by adjusting their beliefs and practices to fit 
mainline society. 
The shift from non-militarized pacifists, who paid 
commutation fees to avoid the draft, to militarized noncombatants, 
who allowed themselves to be drafted, yet, classified differently 
not to bear arms, did not seem to challenge SDA and biblical 
doctrine. SDAs did not see a problem with aiding the sick. They 
believed that whatever a wounded soldier decided to do after being 
rehabilitated was not their responsibility. They were proud, 
patriotic and willing to offer any assistance to their country so long 
as it was harmonious with their religious conviction. Further, this 
would create a legacy that combined patriotism with pacifism in a 
way that was religiously based.17  
Based on biblical principles, SDAs long believed that it 
was important to give to God what is God’s and give to Caesar 
what is Caesar’s.18 In other words, while SDAs believed that their 
primary duty was to serve God, this adherence to God’s law and 
the bible should not get in the way of their duties and 
responsibilities here on earth (granted they do not conflict with 
biblical principles). SDAs believed that it was imperative to follow 
civil authority because it maintained order. Further, by being good 
citizens and not stirring up agitation or confrontation, SDAs would 
not be harassed for avoiding their duty to the country in a time of 
war, and might even be regarded highly for doing their service.19 
Good citizenship would allow the SDA to remain in good favor 
with the government and allow the individual to continue to enjoy 
the comfort and protection the government provides him (or her).  
In order to prepare SDA men for noncombatant service, the 
North American Division of the SDA church established training 
schools at its colleges and academies in conjunction with the Red 
Cross. This allowed young men who were predisposed to the draft 
                                                
17 Morgan, “Adventist Review: Between Pacifism and Patriotism." 
18 Based upon Matthew 22:21, in which several disciples asked Jesus if it was 
right to pay taxes to Caesar to which he replied that Caesar should be given what 
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19 Francis McLellan Wilcox, Seventh-Day Adventists in Time of War 
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to acquire basic medical training so that they would be attractive 
candidates for noncombatant medical units within the military. 
This also worked well with the church because providing medical 
aid would not conflict with allowable activity for the Sabbath.20  
With the implementation of the draft, the SDA church took 
steps to resolve potential conflicts between the service that their 
noncombatant members would be asked to perform and other core 
religious beliefs.   The SDA church created the National Service 
Organization (NSO), an organization that deals with conflicts that 
arise in the armed forces between noncombatancy and Sabbath 
observance.21 The creation of the NSO made it outwardly clear that 
the SDA church would be readily available and vigilant in the 
handling of its members within the armed forces. 
 In the wake of rising tensions in Europe prior to the start of 
the second World War, the General Conference of SDAs released a 
pamphlet in 1934 that, “urged youth to prepare for noncombatant 
service by graduating in medicine, nursing, dietetics, or some other 
medically related field, or to at least get experience as cooks, 
nurses’ aides, etc.”22 The SDA church also implemented another 
program, similar to their Red Cross training in WWI, but it was 
revised and refined into a collaborative effort with the military and 
army leaders who were used to supervise the program.23 Once the 
war began, the program expanded among the SDA educational and 
religious system. However, some SDAs disfavored the 
involvement and relations between the government and SDA 
church and accused it of being a “part of the national war 
machine.”24 Referred to as ‘reformers,’ the SDA Reform 
Movement began to diverge from mainline SDAs after WWI. The 
movement began in Europe and expanded to the United States. 
SDA Reformers believed that when the General Conference 
adjusted their position of noncombatancy in the beginning of the 
First World War, “the leadership… overthrew the commandments 
of God… Hence, they have the right to exist as a separate 
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movement… Reform Adventists believe that no true believer could 
ever join the military, even in medical work.”25 For the most part, 
however, SDA reformers were the minority, and mainline SDAs 
supported noncombatant roles in military service. 
With the passage of the Selective Service Act in September 
1940, the SDA once again had to clarify its stand on SDA military 
service versus other classifications such as conscientious objectors 
or noncombatant military service:  
 
Those refusing to bear arms were classified as 
‘conscientious objectors’… During World War II, 
American Adventists enthusiastically embraced the 
national consensus about the rightness of defending 
freedom against aggression of ultra-nationalist 
dictatorships. Noncombatant military service… 
offered a way to prove their patriotism. Moreover, 
their distinguished service demonstrated that 
noncombatancy was not cowardice. Desmond T. 
Doss, with his bravery in winning the Congressional 
Medal of Honor in 1945—the first ever awarded to 
a noncombatant—provided compelling evidence for 
that point.26 
 
However, there was still lingering uncertainty as to whether or not 
SDAs should bear arms. In Atlantic Union Gleaner, an SDA 
newsletter for the Atlantic region, dated December 24, 1941, two 
weeks after the attack at Pearl Harbor, an article entitled “Should 
Our Men Drill with Rifles?” relayed this fear. This article stated 
that “considerable… agitation has been stirred up among our 
people regarding the question as to whether our young men in 
army camps should consent to drill with rifles when pressure from 
army officers is brought upon them…”27 In order to alleviate some 
of the tension felt by men in the military, or planning to enter the 
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military, Atlantic Union Gleaner provided, in text, the Definition 
of Noncombatant Training and Service as signed in Executive 
Order on December 6, 1940. It also stated that the SDA 
headquarters was “taking steps… to relieve this pressure at these… 
camps by bringing to the attention of their post commanders the 
official documents which have a bearing upon this particular 
matter.”28 The article also listed the various different task groups 
and assignments that were suitable for 1-A-O29 level COs.  
Because of their dedication to serving both God and 
country, many SDAs in military service refused the label of 
‘conscientious objectors,’ and preferred, instead, the label of 
conscientious cooperators. With this more cooperative position, 
SDAs were more welcomed and received by the military hierarchy 
than other religious groups.30 According to Lawson, “some 12,000 
American Adventists served during World War II as 
noncombatants in medical branches of the services, where they 
could observe the Sabbath conscientiously, with official 
government recognition.”31  
When the Korean and Vietnam Wars commenced, the SDA 
church revived their Medical Cadet Training Program as they 
previously had operating during WWII. In Atlantic Union Gleaner, 
an article on July 17, 1951 explains training at Camp Desmond T. 
Doss. At the close of their training, one man stated “‘I do not fear 
to enter the army service…I want to be faithful in my service to 
my God and my country.’”32 In addition to the revamped training, 
the Korean War also saw the first appointments of SDAs into 
positions of military chaplaincy. This was clearly another step with 
SDA/military relations. This is where the POW story begins. 
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Human Medical Experimentation: An Overview 
 
Human experimentation has been in existence since the early 
development of science, and it is beyond the scope of the paper to 
deal with its extensive history. Nonetheless, it is useful to have a 
brief understanding of the history of medical experimentation in 
order to understand why POW was so different. The Ancient 
Greeks and Romans engaged in occasional vivisection for 
exploratory knowledge in medicine. Many experiments in early 
civilizations were done on condemned criminals because their 
suffering and death was seen as restitution for their crimes and as a 
token for the greater good of society. In the Middle Ages, animals, 
cadavers, and the occasional living human were used to learn about 
the human body.33  
During the Renaissance, an example of experimentation on 
humans can be found in Fallopius, a physician who acquired 
permission to perform experiments on criminals from the duke of 
Tuscany. Throughout the Scientific Revolution, Paracelsus, 
Andreas Vesalius and William Harvey began applying data 
gleaned from the dissections of animals onto the study of humans. 
This resulted in applications of the scientific method, and more 
dangerous experiments being performed on humans.34  
During the 19th and 20th centuries, human experimentation 
increased along with newfound medical theories. Most of the time:  
 
Research was done with treatments or cures in 
mind; in others, treatments were denied or studies 
ignored either because the disease in question was 
limited to black populations or poor immigrant 
groups, or so that researchers could follow the 
progression of an untreated disease from beginning 
to fatal end. The purpose in both instances was 
simply to add to the body of knowledge, regardless 
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of the consequences, or to answer questions 
addressed by basic research.35 
 
Because of this goal-oriented research, many basic human rights 
were violated. For example, Adil Shamoo and David Resnik relate 
how: 
 
In 1895, Henry Heiman, a New York pediatrician, 
infected two mentally retarded boys, 4 and 16 years 
old, with gonorrhea. In 1897, the Italian researcher 
Giuseppe Sanerilii injected yellow fever bacteria 
into five subjects without their consent in order to 
test its virulence… [and] the discoverer of the 
bacillus strain that causes leprosy, Amauer Hansen, 
carried out an appalling experiment on an unwitting 
33-year-old woman when he twice pricked her eye 
with a needle contaminated by nodules of a leprous 
patient.36  
 
Germ theory made experiments of the latter kind more common. In 
1892, Albert Neisser, a professor of dermatology at the University 
of Breslau, wanted to study the possibility of vaccinating healthy 
children from the syphilis virus. To do so, he took samples from 
syphilitics and inoculated three teenage prostitutes and four healthy 
children without acquiring consent from them, their parents or 
guardians. 37   
The notion of consent in early medical experimentation was 
novel and/or occasional at best. Because of social constructions, 
racial theories and social Darwinism, certain people were not seen 
as being as valuable as others, thereby resulting in scientists 
performing some experiments without informed consent. This 
meant that the people most often at risk were those belonging to 
“vulnerable populations: children, mentally ill people, poor people, 
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prisoners, minorities, and hopelessly ill people.”38 Vulnerable 
populations are people whose capacity to provide consent is 
inhibited or questionable. Also considered vulnerable populations 
are: embryos, fetuses, and people who are coerced or pressured 
into participating. Early to early-modern scientists and physicians 
were in a situation where human ethical concerns were either 
nonexistent, or juxtaposed to their desire and commitment to 
critical advances in medicine, science and anatomy. 
In Cuba between 1900 and 1901, Major Walter Reed and 
his acting assistant surgeons wrestled with yellow fever. When 
Jesse Lazear received orders from the Army Medical Corps, he 
acquainted himself with Walter Reed and the two joined forces to 
create a research team to study yellow fever where it originated.39 
Their goal was to study the cause of yellow fever. Previous 
research had led them to assume it was either mosquitoes or 
fomites. The research team in Havana’s “aim was confirmation of 
the mosquito theory and invalidation of the long-held belief in 
fomites.”40 While they were able to prove their theories, another 
important aspect that emerged from this experiment was the notion 
of informed consent. Written in both English and Spanish, and 
done “with the advice of the Commission and others, he [Reed] 
drafted what is now one of the oldest series of extant informed 
consent documents.”41 The informed consent forms required the 
men to be over the age of 25, and allowed them the opportunity to 
exercise their free will. They signed that they were volunteering to 
participate in the experiment “and as a reward for participation 
would receive $100 ‘in American gold,’ with an additional 
hundred-dollar supplement for contracting yellow fever. These 
payments could be assigned to a survivor, and the volunteer agreed 
to forfeit any remuneration in cases of desertion.”42 
 While Reed and his team made efforts in the early 20th 
century towards an ethical model for human experimentation, 
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some of the clearest and most recent examples of unethical human 
research can be seen in Nazi and Japanese experimentation during 
WWII. In the concentration camps, the prisoners were at the mercy 
of their captors. Nazi medical doctors within the concentration 
camps had an unfathomable degree of freedom in performing 
experiments. Humans were treated like guinea pigs and subjected 
to the experiments of their physicians’ choice which usually fell 
into at least one of three categories: experiments for military 
research purposes, experiments to prove racial superiority, or 
experiments based on the interest of a particular scientist or 
researcher. Among these (but not limited to these) were typhus 
experiments, malaria experiments, high altitude experiments, 
hypothermia experiments, seawater experiments (to determine 
possibilities for making seawater potable), polygal (blood 
coagulation) experiments, mustard gas experiments, and 
sterilization experiments.   
In China during WWII, the Japanese implemented their 
very own system of medical and biomedical experimentation on 
subjugated people and prisoners-of-war. Unit 731 was “the world’s 
largest and most comprehensive biological warfare programme 
[sic].”43 It was responsible for dropping “plague-infected fleas… 
over Chinese cities, causing epidemics, [and pouring] cholera and 
typhoid cultures… into wells. Prisoners were dissected alive 
without anesthetics. Others were subjected to pressure changes that 
made their bodies literally explode.”44 While there is evidence of a 
American and Japanese cover-up, it is estimated that “more than 
10,000 Chinese, Korean and Russian POWs were slaughtered in 
these experimental facilities.”45 Even as some Nazi doctors were 
condemned at the Nuremberg trials, all the Japanese doctors who 
had been posted to Unit 731 “returned as pillars of the postwar 
medical establishment, as deans of medical schools and heads of 
pharmaceutical companies… [When asked about Unit 731 later, 
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they] complained of wasting the best years of their lives on 
medical research that could not be continued after the war.”46 
The lasting legacy of WWII and human medical 
experimentation was the Nuremberg code. During the Nuremberg 
Trials, one trial was devoted entirely to medicine. Sometimes 
called the Doctors’ Trial, U.S.A. v. Karl Brandt et al transpired 
between 1946 and 1947. During the trial, “twenty-three doctors 
and administrators [were] accused of organizing and participating 
in war crimes and crimes against humanity in the form of medical 
experiments and medical procedures inflicted on prisoners and 
civilians.”47 The doctors were “indicted on four counts: 1. 
conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity; 2. 
war crimes (i.e., crimes against persons protected by the laws of 
war, such as prisoners of war); 3. crimes against humanity 
(including persons not protected by the laws of war); and 4. 
membership in a criminal organization (the SS).”48 The exact 
crimes they were charged with included “twelve series of medical 
experiments concerning the effects of and treatments for high 
altitude conditions, freezing, malaria, poison gas, sulfanilamide, 
bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration, bone transplantation, 
saltwater consumption, epidemic jaundice, sterilization, typhus, 
poisons, and incendiary bombs.”49 The experiments were 
performed on concentration camp inmates and did not involve any 
kind of informed consent. While in some cases, patients found 
ways to be medical test subjects for the ‘perks’ it invoked (i.e. less 
crowded living conditions, more food, not having to work), they 
were subject to the will of the camp doctor and could be sent off 
for experimentation as easily as they could be sent off for 
dissection or the gas chambers.  
Karl Brandt was the primary defendant because of his 
position as the “senior medical official of the German government 
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during World War II; other defendants included senior doctors and 
administrators in the armed forces and SS.”50 The results of the 
trials were staggering. Brandt and six others were sentenced to 
death and executed, nine others were given lengthy prison terms, 
while the rest were acquitted. Besides the executions and prison 
terms, the Nuremberg code was established for appropriate codes 
of conduct for ethical research using human beings. 
Following WWII, human medical experimentation was 
forced to revise itself according to the horrors that had been seen 
via Nazi and Japanese medical experimentation. However, 
research purposes shifted from germ theory to creating new 
biochemical weaponry. Much of this shift in the United States can 
be attributed to the newfound information acquired from giving 
impunity to certain perpetrators of WWII, particularly Unit 731, in 
exchange for research and data.  
Despite the Nuremberg code, ethical abuses persisted for 
quite some time. One of the reasons for this may be that “many 
researchers here [in the U.S.] thought the Nuremberg Code applied 
only to ‘barbarians’ and not to ‘civilized physician investigators’… 
so human-subject research was not as strongly influenced by the 
principles of the Nuremberg Code as it ought to have been.”51 A 
striking example of this is the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. 
Though it began in the 1930s, it continued well into the 1970s. 
This study, which occurred in public health facilities in Tuskegee, 
Alabama, was designed to study effects of later-stage syphilis on 
African-American men.52 Funded by the U.S. Department of 
health, six hundred men participated in this study. Those who 
participated were not informed that they had syphilis or that they 
were partaking in a medical experiment. Infected participants were 
merely told “that they had ‘bad blood’ and could receive medical 
treatment for their condition, which consisted of nothing more than 
medical examinations. Subjects also received free hot lunches and 
free burials.”53 Though a dependable treatment for syphilis was 
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available in the 1940s, it was not administered to the test subjects 
and the experiment continued despite the ethical concerns that this 
raises. 
In the 1950s, thalidomide, an approved drug in Europe, was 
given to pregnant women because physicians believed it to help 
with nausea and sleep deprivation. Unfortunately, it was soon 
learned that exposure to thalidomide during the first trimester of 
pregnancy could cause severe deformities in the fetus. Most the 
women did not know that thalidomide was still an experimental 
drug and did not give informed consent. Thalidomide caused many 
of the babies to have shortened and/or missing limbs. It is 
estimated that “some 12,000 babies were born with severe 
deformities due to thalidomide.”54  
From 1956-1980, “a team of infectious disease experts 
from New York University working under a distinguished 
researcher, Dr. Saul Krugman, had been doing hepatitis research at 
the Willowbrook School on Staten Island, New York.”55 
Willowbrook was a state-run facility for mentally handicapped 
adolescents and children. In “trying to find a way to protect people 
from hepatitis, Krugman and his colleagues deliberately infected 
some of the children with the virus.”56 Though hepatitis isn’t 
generally life threatening, it can cause permanent damage to the 
liver. The conditions at Willowbrook made headlines in the 1960s; 
“viral hepatitis was endemic… most children who entered 
Willowbrook became infected within 6-12 months of admission.”57 
Though Krugman and his team did acquire informed consent from 
the parents of the children, critics of the experiment felt that the 
parents were coerced into acceptance because they could not care 
for their special-needs children on their own and were not fully 
aware of the stipulations of the study. 
In 1964, The Nuremberg code would be revisited in order 
to create a new model for human medical experimentation. The 
“World Medical Association met in Helsinki, Finland to… add… 2 
novel elements [to the basis of the Nuremberg code]: the interests 
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of the subject should always be placed above the interest of 
society; [and] every subject should get the best known 
treatment.”58 The Declaration of Helsinki, however, did not put an 
immediate end to the unethical human experiments that were still 
transpiring, or to future unethical medical experiments. In fact, 
experiments seemed to increase at an alarming rate. For example, 
continuing through the 1960s was the Jewish Chronic Disease 
Hospital Study in which twenty-two elderly, severely ill, and 
mostly demented patients with weak immune systems were 
injected with live cancer cells in order to see the effects and spread 
of cancer on those with compromised immune systems.59 Between 
1963 and 1973, a million-dollar Atomic Energy Commission study 
used prison inmates from Oregon and Washington and had their 
testicles irradiated.60 The government used “approximately 6,700 
human subjects… in experiments involving psychoactive 
chemicals [like LSD]… Other agents were also used, including 
morphine, Demerol, Seconal, mescaline, atropine, and 
psilocybin.”61 Pregnant women and mentally handicapped children 
were fed radioactive iron, and cereal, respectively; all without 
informed consent or an awareness of their participation in the 
studies. 
Though many tests were under the individual supervision 
of the directing scientists or physicians, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) “and other national security agencies conducted or 
sponsored extensive radiological, chemical, and biological research 
programs.”62 Since these were largely for military intelligence, the 
scientific and military communities cooperated together for more 
than thirty years to attempt to stay ahead of the United States 
military rivals.63 Because of their secretive nature, the exact 
number of experiments and test participants remained hidden from 
public knowledge.64 The secret nature of the programs and 
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experiments has also made it difficult for test subjects to acquire 
deserved medical care later in life. While the government does 
offer compensation for its employees (military and civilian) who 
have been injured on the job, the lack of information, risks, and 
centralized information has caused difficulty for those who had 
experiments performed on them from 1940-1974 and are 
attempting to claim poor health as a result.65 The scope of tests 
conducted under military or federal direction served to “support 
weapon development programs, identify methods to protect the 
health of military personnel against a variety of diseases and 
combat conditions, and analyze U.S. defense vulnerabilities.”66  
 
 
Project Operation Whitecoat 
 
Project Operation Whitecoat was a project to identify and protect 
civilians and the military from biological and chemical agents. 
Since the use of these agents in earlier wars, the desire to 
investigate these weapons and their effects became a military 
priority.67  Project Operation Whitecoat originated from a smaller 
test called CD-22. CD-22 was a coordinated effort between the 
“Chemical and Medical elements of the Army and involved the 
supervision of the Secretary of the Army, Army Chief of Staff, and 
the Secretary of Defense.”68 In October of 1954, Lt. Colonel W.D. 
Tigertt of the U.S. Army contacted Theodore R. Flaiz, M.D., 
Secretary of the Medical Department of the General Conference of 
SDAs. In a memorandum from Tigertt to Major General George E. 
Armstrong, MC, the Surgeon General of the Department of the 
Army, Tigertt explains the letter he wrote to Flaiz. In the memo, he 
states he contacted Dr. Theodore R. Flaiz, Secretary of the Medical 
Department for the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists 
as he wrote:  
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To ascertain the views of his church organization as 
they relate to the use of volunteers in medical 
research…Dr. Flaiz proposed that it should be 
considered by a small group of the Conference 
Officers and agreed to bring such a group together 
during the week of 18 October. Dr. Flaiz appeared 
to be extremely interested and to consider that it 
was a real opportunity for members of the Seventh-
Day Adventist group to assist in the national 
defense. It is possible that the Church will actively 
support the project and assist in obtaining the 
necessary volunteers.69 
 
Major General Armstrong, too, followed up with a letter to Dr. 
Flaiz that expressed his hope that the General Conference of SDAs 
would find the program acceptable and suitable for SDA 
participation. Participation, Major General Armstrong stated, 
would allow SDAs to “make yet another significant contribution to 
our nation’s health and to our national security.”70  
On October 19, 1954, Dr. Flaiz replied to Major General 
Armstrong. In the letter, he stated that the General Conference 
“appreciated very much Colonel Tigertt’s clear and patient 
delineation of the plan for the medical research project… If any 
one should recognise [sic] a debt of loyalty and service for the 
many courtesies and considerations received from the Department 
of Defense… Adventists, are in a position to feel a debt of 
gratitude for these kind considerations.”71 He continued that the 
General Conference felt that “the type of voluntary service which 
is being offered to our boys in this research problem offers an 
excellent opportunity for these young men to render a service 
which will be of value not only to military medicine but to public 
health generally… It should be regarded as a privilege to be 
identified with this significant advanced step in clinical 
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research.”72 The letter ends stating that the General Conference 
would work on releasing a statement regarding the subject within a 
few days. In the statement, it is expressed “it is the attitude of 
Seventh-Day Adventists that any service rendered voluntarily by 
whomsoever in the useful necessary research into the cause and the 
treatment of disabling disease is a legitimate and laudable 
contribution to the success of our nation and to the health and 
comfort of our fellow men.”73  
There are several reasons that might indicate why the 
military sought out SDAs. One aspect, that many like to focus on, 
is that SDAs were considered an ideal control group. With so many 
church principles focusing on health and wellness, SDAs refrained 
from drinking, smoking, most ate a vegetarian diet and most were 
in general good health. According to “Colonel Dan Crozier, then 
commander of USAMRIID [U.S. Army Medical Research Institute 
for Infectious Diseases, previously USAMU, U.S. Army Medical 
Unit]…‘because of high principles and temperate living, Adventist 
men are more nearly uniform in physical fitness and mental 
outlook.’”74  
Another aspect is the commitment of the SDA church to 
medical advancement. Over the course of its history, the SDA 
church had established itself as a premiere health-serving 
institution. Presently, “the SDA church organization owns and 
operates a health care system that includes 168 hospitals, 433 
clinics, and 130 nursing homes or retirement centers. SDA 
educational institutions include 55 nursing schools… [with] 
approximately 7300 nursing students currently enrolled…”75 
According to a report by the National Service Organization of the 
General Conference of SDAs, SDAs were recruited because the 
“volunteers must be men in good health who are motivated to 
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hazard some risk for a humanitarian cause.”76 Further, the fact that 
most of the SDA men recruited for POW had similar backgrounds, 
lifestyle, education and morals allowed for favorable research 
conditions on a group requiring minimal disciplinary actions.  
Another possibility is the relationships that had been 
formed with SDAs and the military through the years of 
established cooperative noncombatancy and Red Cross training 
academies.  Also, it is important to note “Adventist basic trainees 
at Fort Sam Houston, Texas…[were] the largest single group of 1-
A-O soldiers.”77  
SDAs may have also decided to embark on this project 
because medicine was seen as a form of evangelism. According to 
Francis McLellan Wilcox, former editor for the Review and 
Herald, an SDA magazine, “this work [of evangelism] has been 
carried forward in four great divisions, namely, evangelistic, 
publishing, educational, and medical… all of these agencies should 
be used for the accomplishment of one end,—the salvation of 
souls.”78 Regardless, with the approval from the General 
Conference, recruitment and testing began almost immediately. In 
November of 1954, Lt. Col. Tigertt recruited twelve individuals 
from Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, TX. On December 30, 1954, 
the twelve recruits left Fort Sam Houston to Camp Detrick near 
Frederick, Maryland and on January 14, 1955, the secretary of the 
Army granted the authority to permit “research investigation 
utilizing volunteers in defense against biological warfare.”79 In all, 
Tigertt “indicated that approximately 80% of Seventh Day 
Adventists who qualify and are approached by him do volunteer 
for this particular assignment.”80 
 CD-22 was a series Q-fever tests. Q-fever is a “zoonotic 
disease… [and is transmitted to] humans usually… by 
inhalation.”81 Once an individual was designated for CD-22, and 
later, Project Operation Whitecoat service, they were forbidden 
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from receiving vaccines for typhus, yellow fever, cholera and the 
plague while in basic training. For CD-22, volunteers from Camp 
Detrick were flown to Fort Dugway, Utah and were exposed to Q-
fever via wind measures. Others remained at Camp Detrick and 
were exposed via aerosol measures in the notorious eight ball 
sphere, used for containment and disbursement of airborne 
pathogens and directed to the inhaler.  
In the experiments, the volunteers were “ordered onto 
wooden platforms at various levels. When the atmospheric 
conditions were right… medical officers conducting the tests put 
on their gas masks and radioed to overhead aircraft to commence 
dispersing the infectious agent onto the test sight.”82 The purpose 
of the experiment was to acquire “dose-response data on… Q-fever 
in humans.”83 After being exposed to the infecting bacteria, 
Coxiella burnetii, the men returned to Fort Detrick for  
“monitoring and observation.”84 Exposure to C. burnetii can cause 
fever, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, chills, sweat, weakness, and 
malaise. When the men returned to Fort Detrick, they “were left to 
develop fever for three days before antibiotic therapy was 
initiated.”85 Q-fever investigations were “terminated… in 1956 
after yielding the first scientific data of its kind, gathered by U.S. 
military investigations from experiments conducted on human 
volunteer subjects.”86 Tigertt and Beneson (another doctor 
involved in the experiments) published the results of the Q-fever 
tests in Transactions of the Association of American Physicians in 
1956. 
When tests for CD-22 were terminated, a new phase of 
tests was to begin but with a much broader scope. Project 
Operation Whitecoat was designed to test:  
 
The vulnerability of man to biological agents; 
prevention and treatment of BW (biowarfare) 
casualties; and identification of biological agents. 
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Information such as the minimum infectious 
dosage, effectiveness of prophylactic and 
therapeutic measures, serologic responses to 
infection and the effects of various doses of 
inoculum, eventually provided answers to most 
initial questions contained within the research 
objectives.87 
 
Again, Camp Detrick would serve as the experimental test center.  
Camp Detrick came into existence in the early 1940s and was 
intended to serve as a large-scale, militarized research facility. The 
location was ideal because of it’s close proximity to Washington 
DC and the Edgewood Arsenal, a chemical warfare research 
center.88 Camp Detrick, officially named in April 1943, was the 
center for early military research of “vaccines, toxoids, antibiotics, 
disinfectants, and antiseptics… all the while developing techniques 
for detecting, sampling, and identifying many pathogens and their 
toxic products. Simultaneously, sterilization procedures and 
decontamination protocols required development and 
improvement.”89 The termination of CD-22 and the beginning of 
Project Operation Whitecoat coincided with the changing of name 
from Camp Detrick to Fort Detrick, making it a permanent 
facility.90 
Project Operation Whitecoat was no secret to the SDA 
community. In an October 17, 1966 issue of the North Pacific 
Union Gleaner, an article was devoted entirely to POW. POW was 
described as a study “aimed at developing protective measures 
against disease-producing organisms which might be disseminated 
by an enemy in the event biological warfare is ever used against 
this country.”91 Even youth Bible lessons discussed POW. On 
October 8 and 15, 1963, a two-part lesson plan was given on POW. 
POW, “after eight… years of continuous work… is still going… 
The project simply involves medical experimentation. But as a 
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result of this activity the Army Medical Service has made material 
advances in the development of suitable methods of prevention and 
treatment of infectious diseases… Thus all citizens benefit from 
the program, not only members of the armed forces.”92 It describes 
the experience of Tom Kopko, a young GI, and his first 
experiences as a POW volunteer. The article follows him from his 
plane ride from Fort Detrick to his testing area. It describes a wind 
experiment similar to the aforementioned CD-22 experiment. 
When the conditions for the experiment were right, the experiment 
commenced. After the experiment, the men were taken back to 
their test center and “‘were told to remove our clothing as quickly 
as possible. A warm shower came next… we then went through an 
ultra-violet-light area and found ourselves in a room where our 
regular Army clothes were waiting for us.’”93 The duration of the 
individual test was short. When the men returned to Fort Detrick, 
they were placed in isolation where they were monitored 
throughout the day for several weeks or months, depending on the 
individual.  
Throughout the duration of POW, the volunteers “were 
involved in 153 research projects to determine the safety of 
vaccines and antibiotics and prevention and treatment of… Q 
Fever, Tularemia, Sandfly Fever, Typhus Fever, Typhoid Fever, 
Rift Valley Fever, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Yellow Fever, 
Plague, and Eastern, Western and Venezuelan Equine 
Encephalitis.”94 Other tests and experiments sought to test the 
effectiveness of protective materials such as masks and suits, 
others endured hypothermia and sleep deprivation tests and other 
tests sought to develop appropriate “decontamination processes… 
[for use] in the space program, in hospitals, biological outbreaks 
(e.g., present bioterrorism) and for the protection of research 
workers.”95 
The SDA church’s participation in POW did not go without 
consequence or insult. In University Scope, the newspaper for 
Loma Linda University, an article entitled “GC panel denies aid 
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charge to biological warfare test” explains one of the more 
prominent accusations against the church for its participation in 
POW. During the turbulent social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, 
links between church and government brought heated debates and 
accusations, one of which charged SDAs with helping the 
government create biological weapons. In light of these attacks: 
 
A committee of the General Conference of Seventh-
day Adventists, under the chairmanship of Neal C. 
Wilson, vice-president of the North American 
division, was appointed to investigate the project. 
On September 11, Mr. Wilson and six other 
members of the committee, including two 
physicians, visited Fort Detrick and the 
commanding officer of Project Whitecoat, Colonel 
Daniel Crozier, U.S. Army.96 
 
The committee visited Fort Detrick, acquired material evidence 
and was to issue a report of its findings to Adventist colleges and 
universities. Dr. Winton Beaven, one of the physicians on the 
committee, was responsible for reporting the findings. When: 
 
Speaking for the committee [he said], ‘…the project 
has no relationship to…chemical or biological 
warfare, either directly or indirectly… the Army 
directive which established Project Whitecoat 
clearly reads that it is related to defensive aspects in 
developing… biological protective measures, 
diagnostic procedures, and therapeutic methods… 
None of the work in this project is used to improve 
bacteriological weapons of the United States.’97  
 
He stated that POW was not classified. He also stated that 
professionals, both within and outside of the armed forces, 
performed the tests that were based on sound research, and these 
same professionals conducted the monitoring after the 
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experiments. According to the article, Dr. Beaven explained, 
criticism was being directed towards POW because its experiments 
were being performed in the building adjacent to the one housing 
the top-secret experimentation. According to Beaven, POW was 
freely accessible and not top-secret.98 According to Clark Smith, 
director of the NSO, “less than one percent of the Whitecoat work 
is classified… the only reason so much remains unpublished is that 
it is not complete.”99 As experiments were completed, many were 
published in highly reputable journals. For example, in 1966, the 
American Society for Microbiology published a POW study for 
peer review. At the end of the article entitled “Antibiotic 
Prophylaxis and Therapy of Airborne Tularemia,” the scientists 
specifically stated “these studies were supervised by the 
commission on Epidemiological Survey of the Armed Forces 
Epidemiological Board. The cooperation of the War Service 
Commission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church… [is] 
gratefully acknowledged.”100 
 The church was greatly involved in the operations of POW. 
When Tigertt went to Fort Sam Houston to recruit more SDAs to 
POW, Elder Clark Smith of the NSO went with him to assure the 
men that, while their service to this project was voluntary and up to 
their own personal discretion, the church approved it as a form of 
noncombatant service. When a man wanted to participate in POW, 
he was interviewed to examine psychological health and was 
requested to fill out a questionnaire provided by Elder Smith. An 
SDA chaplain was allowed to be present during briefings and 
interviews. The local SDA chaplain was provided with a finalized 
list of POW participants “…for posting on [the] church bulletin 
board.”101 Elder Smith was also allowed to answer questions 
should they arise, and the local SDA chaplain helped arrange 
housing for married recruits. 
 In an early U.S. Army Medical Research and Development 
Command meeting regarding POW, Col. Tigertt knew right away 
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that it was essential to maintain amicable terms between 
USAMRIID and the SDA church. In the minutes of that meeting it 
states “this relationship was essential to continue work at his 
laboratory…”102 Tigertt felt that failing to keep up on their part of 
the bargain would be a blow to the relations between the 
government and the cooperation with the SDA church. Further, in 
order to maintain these good relations, Col. Tigertt recommended 
that those POW men who wished to stay on assignment after their 
experiment be allowed to do so in order to gain medical 
experience. According to Tigertt, “…these personnel are good 
men, educated and in a number of cases will continue their 
education in medicine… If it were the policy that personnel who… 
participate in Operation Whitecoat would be denied the additional 
specialized training… a large number of those personnel who had 
ordinarily applied… would no longer apply.”103 By maintaining a 
mutually beneficial relationship, USAMRIID would get the 
volunteers it needed to conduct its research, the SDA church would 
maintain its right to noncombatancy, and volunteers would be 
allowed experience with medical research. 
 The church was even involved at the local level. Frederick 
SDA Church, being the closest SDA church to Fort Detrick, 
provided these men with a church community away from home. 
Even though medical aid was seen as an acceptable form of ‘work’ 
on the Sabbath, POW volunteers got Saturdays off. Frederick SDA 
church members Dr. Frank Damazo and his wife took it upon 
themselves to take care of these fellow SDAs for the duration of 
their stay, and the duration of the project itself. Very quickly, the 
entire “…congregation provided interest, care, and support for all 
Whitecoat members… This church gave special help to those men 
and families nearby during the entire time the program was in 
operation.”104 Frequently, potlucks and fellowships would be held 
at church members’ homes so that the POW volunteers and church 
members could have the opportunity to become acquainted on an 
individual basis.  
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Guarded Secret or Misunderstanding?  
 
Because of the openness of the experiments and the ability for the 
men involved to associate with other volunteers and people outside 
of the experiment, there was no element of secrecy in POW. With 
the wide variety of primary sources (both religious and secular) 
offering articles and experimental research findings, it is seemingly 
incomprehensible to conclude that POW was a secret government 
experiment to create biological offensive weapons.  
 It was in the church’s best interest to maintain contact with 
military personnel to ensure that their support of a particular 
program was not given under false pretenses or inaccurate 
information. It was also in the best interest of military personnel to 
ensure that POW was performed with the utmost ethical standards. 
The informed consent forms for volunteers were very explicit and 
clear. The volunteer had written permission to “revoke… consent, 
and withdraw from the study without prejudice.”105 
 Another clear indication of a difference between POW and 
other military medical experiments is the bond and community that 
POW test subjects still have today. POW volunteers have engaged 
in reunions for approximately two and a half decades. Reunions 
are typically alternated between east and west coast, with most east 
coast reunions at Frederick SDA church. POW volunteers are not 
anonymous; they have names, files, informed consent forms, 
photographs, reunions, and mailing lists. If the military attempted a 
secretive biological offensive warfare program with POW, then 
they failed to do so. This is quite evident in the amount of 
correspondence and literature that was out at the time: the church 
leadership and the church members knew about it. 
POW was created with the intent to serve as a defensive 
measure against biological warfare. Whether or not information 
acquired from POW was used as a measure of offensive biological 
warfare is a matter of debate, but with all advancements in science, 
information can be used as easily for both good and evil. Radiation 
can be harmful, but when used effectively can cure cancer. 
Surgical advancements in reproductive health can allow a couple 
that no longer wishes to conceive to sterilize themselves, but 
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people were forcibly sterilized in the early 20th century around the 
globe for being genetically inferior. POW is no different from 
these aforementioned examples. If the knowledge is there to help 
someone, then the information can just as easily be construed to 
harm someone. The dialectic of medical theory applies no more to 
POW than it does to studies of other medical conditions. 
POW was disbanded in 1973. Some sources indicate this 
date because it was the year the draft ended. Others, however, cite 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 and the 
resulting treaty calling for the end of all biological weapon 
production, development and stockpiling as another possible 
reason for the formal end of this program. However, if the latter of 
the two options is correct in determining why POW ended, this is 
disconcerting to those who believe POW to be directed for the 
purpose of defensive measures. For according to the treaty, all 
signatories must destroy or “divert to peaceful purposes” all 
biological agents, toxins, weapons, etc.106 If POW were purely 
defensive or peaceful, said treaty obligations would not have 
applied to it. Further, no documentary evidence linking the two 
events has been found. However, the end of the draft may also 
have caused a disbanding in POW, as the end of conscription 
would limit the influx of 1-A-Os, thereby depleting their exclusive 
test group and necessitating a new, more open biological test 





Presently, the SDA church’s position on the military has shifted 
dramatically. While it still does not encourage its members to 
actively enlist in the military, it recognizes free, individual choice. 
Ideally, it would have its members serve in noncombatant roles, 
but it does not castigate those who choose combatant roles; “while 
the church ministers to noncombatant members in the army, as 
well as to pacifists and combatants, it recognizes that individuals 
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make free choices…”107 As a result, the SDA church is still 
actively involved in its members’ military affairs. According to an 
article in the SDA Biblical Research Institute website, theologian 
Angel Rodriguez states, “when service in the military may result in 
an open conflict with religious convictions… we [the church] must 
be willing to enter into dialogue with government officials in an 
effort to obtain for our members the right to practice their religious 
convictions while in the military.”108  
While some may question the church’s involvement in 
government and/or military affairs, one thing remains certain: were 
it not for the SDA church’s active involvement in Project 
Operation Whitecoat, it is feasible that the many men who 
volunteered could have become unidentifiable statistics and 
numbers, without names, faces or voluntary consent forms, subject 
to medical health uncertainties—anonymous, and only 
remembered or represented as figures at a congressional hearing 
for restitution and identification of former military medical 
experiment test subjects. The SDA church played an important and 
integral role in ensuring the ethical standards prescribed by the 
Nuremburg Code and the Helsinki Declaration were followed in 
the dealings with its members as test subjects in POW. Further 
research is necessary to determine the full extent of church 
involvement and to gain a clearer understanding of why POW was 
disbanded. Doing so could prove that some U.S. government and 
military experimentations were not buried under a dark shroud of 
mystery and deception. 
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A Watershed Event For a Watershed Community: 
The Development of Flood Control for the Santa Ana 
River Basin 
 
BY ADAM SCOTT MILLER 
 
ABSTRACT: Southern California receives the vast majority of its 
yearly rainfall in the relatively short time period between the 
months of December and March.  Occasionally, this intense 
rainfall creates floods that have historically threatened and 
devastated the communities of this region.  The twentieth century 
proved challenging for local flood control agencies.  California 
experienced tremendous population growth, resulting in migrants 
settling on the existing floodplains.  Unaware of the periodic, 
hidden menace, newcomers were ruined when rivers and their 
tributaries flooded.  It became clear that a significant change in 
flood control methods was required.  In 1936, Congress passed the 
Flood Control Act appropriating funds for flood control.  The 
Army Corps of Engineers took authority on flood control issues 
and began investigating the best possible solutions to assist 
communities like the Santa Ana River basin with the funds 
Congress authorized.  The Army Corps devised a plan that they 
believed, at the time, was sufficient to protect Orange County.  
However, in March of 1938 a major flood struck southern 
California and demonstrated the need for a larger comprehensive 
flood control program.  Ultimately, the affect of this program was 
the creation of immeasurable wealth for southern California.  
Property values increased, as did property taxes.  Land deemed 
unusable because of floods could now be utilized.  The creation of 
a modern comprehensive flood control program greatly aided the 
development of California’s economy—an economy which today 
ranks 8th in the world.  This is the story of the implementation of 
modern flood control in the Santa Ana River basin and the 
devastating storm that demonstrated the need for such 
extraordinary measures. 
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Southern California’s environmental faults are widely known; 
these include prolonged drought periods, intense earthquakes, 
destructive Santa Ana winds, and detrimental wildfires. Enormous 
storms capable of producing floods seem to be the least of southern 
California’s problems.  In fact, if these disasters are ranked 
thematically on the basis of concern today, flooding stands an 
excellent chance of causing the least amount of anxiety for the 
residents of southern California.  Yet, if this question were 
proposed 80 years ago, the flood nuisance would have caused the 
foremost alarm and panic for the residents during that time period.  
To prevent the annoyance of floods, the solution lay in updated 
flood control projects.  
Flooding was a way of life for the sparse population of 
southern California in the 19th century. At the turn of the 20th 
century, however, the Golden State grew in population to such an 
extent that those affected by floods increasingly pled for help.  
Because of rapid urbanization, it was difficult to maintain the 
balance between nature and civilization, and the encroachment of 
humanity into the floodplains was increasing. Policymakers were 
forced to decide whether or not to appropriate funds to develop 
long-term flood control projects.  In a semiarid region, flood 
control was only a concern when periodic intense rainfall occurred.  
Flood control was viewed advantageously by most officials but 
because floods only posed a temporary threat, the millions of 
dollars required to develop flood systems was considered 
impractical at that time.  Additionally, not much was known about 
the intervals at which flooding occurred.  In other words, floods 
happened unexpectedly and with varying strength; they could 
strike two or three times in a decade or twenty years apart.  
California’s lexicon categorizes floods into periods such as: 20-
year, 50-year, and 100-year floods. This means that, on average, 
within those specified time frames a particular sized flood would 
occur.  The infrequent flood, like the 100-year flood, resulted in a 
greater flood being produced than a flood that occurred during a 
20-year interval.  Because southern California covers thousands of 
square miles and has a diverse topography, a storm’s intensity 
could differ among the numerous regions within southern 
California resulting in differentiated flooding. In other words, the 





Los Angeles basin could receive heavier rainfall than the San 
Bernardino basin, causing a difference in flooding levels.   
Southern California’s large, diverse regions made 
implementation of flood control a complex issue that would 
require unique solutions to each particular basin. Therefore, it 
would be monotonous and tedious to discuss flood control on such 
a grand scale, but a condensed perspective will establish significant 
insight into the development of modern flood control.  This paper 
will focus on the Santa Ana River basin, which originates in the 
San Bernardino and San Gabriel Mountains and continues through 
San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange Counties, and examine the 
critical role the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers played in managing 
and attaining flood works projects in a rapidly developing region.  
Ultimately, a comprehensive flood control plan was approved, 
providing a boost in usable land no longer subjected to floods.  
This increased property values, which brought a great deal of 
revenue back to the state in the way of property taxes.   
The term flood control is synonymous with the Army 
Corps of Engineers.  To truly grasp the birth of modern flood 
control a close investigative look is required of the Army Corps’ 
documents.  At what point did flood control become modern? 
Moreover, at what point did an aggressive approach to contain 
flood waters occur? Often in history, a defining moment or catalyst 
takes place that explains a sudden change in events.  This 
precipitating event took place in the month of March 1938 during 
the Great Depression. 
 The 1938 flood happened at a crucial point in history, 
bringing with it national attention and making the front-page 
headlines in many states’ newspapers.  In response to the 
widespread devastation encountered by southern Californians, 
Congress passed an additional flood control act directly benefiting 
the Santa Ana basin.  The 1938 flood effectively redefined flood 
control in southern California.  After the flood it was imperative 
that the flooding be managed, not only to protect the citizens of 
southern California, but for economic reasons. 
  This paper will show that the Army Corps of Engineers 
played a vital role in the design of flood control and persuaded 
lawmakers that short-term appropriations for flood works projects 
would result in long-term savings.  It will further argue that 
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modern flood control was seen as an investment for the 
government.  Flood control is a complex issue, spanning thousands 
of square miles and affecting different basin regions.  The limited 
scope of this paper will be confined to analyzing flood control 
efforts in the Santa Ana River region, which includes the Inland 
Empire and Orange County.  
 To comprehend the subject matter, a quick lesson in the 
history of California’s flooding problem prior to 1938 will be 
useful, as well as an overview of the role the Army Corps of 
Engineers played—and still plays—in society.  From that point the 
paper will focus on events prior to the 1938 flood, then discuss 
why the 1938 flood changed perceptions and led to modernized 
flood control.  Thereafter, the paper will delve into the construction 
advancements that took place after 1938, and then reveal the 
subsequent land-use benefits of flood control.  The implementation 
of a comprehensive flood control system is critical to explaining 
the development of southern California’s shift from an agricultural 
to industrial-based economy and the subsequent creation of 





Flooding occurs in southern California because of an uneven 
landscape. From the coastline, headed inland, the terrain gradually 
slopes upwards until reaching the transverse mountain ranges, 
which encompass the region and, thus, create a basin. In a mere 
70-mile distance, the elevation soars from sea level to peaks of 
over 10,000 feet.  The two most prominent mountain ranges 
affecting the Santa Ana basin are the San Bernardino and San 
Gabriel Mountain range. The San Bernardino Mountain range’s 
maximum height, at San Gorgonio peak, reaches 11,503 feet 
(3,506 meters).  West of the San Bernardino Mountains are the San 
Gabriel Mountains. The highest point is at San Antonio’s peak, 
also referred to as Mt. Baldy, at 10,068 feet (3,069 meters). The 
picture below gives an excellent example of the Los Angeles basin.  
The San Gabriel Mountains reach to the far right of the picture 
cutting off the San Bernardino Mountain range. 
 






Figure 1. Enhanced Satellite Photo from Jet Propulsion Laboratories (JPL) 
depicting steep transverse mountain ranges in comparison to the relatively flat 
land of southern California. 
 
 
Nevertheless, the enhanced satellite image, as a visual aid, 
illustrates the formation of a basin in relation to steep mountain 
ranges.  Notice the Los Angeles River right of center next to the 
L.A. Harbor as it makes its way to the San Gabriel Mountains and 
the Santa Ana River at the far right.  High elevations allow the 
water to run off quickly and then form natural waterways. These 
waterways or tributaries converge to form rivers like the Santa Ana 
and Los Angeles River.  Much like the ancient expression, “All 
roads led to Rome,” all the Inland Empire’s tributaries lead to the 
Santa Ana River, making it a formidable and potent river when 





When addressing flood control, the Civil Works project focuses on 
both the mainstream and lesser tributaries. For example, the Prado 
Dam, completed in 1941, is located at a choke point on the Santa 
Ana River, which restricts and minimizes water flow reaching into 
Orange County.  The Santa Ana River acts as an artery for water.  
It is a combination of all the water collected from its tributaries.  
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However, it is not the only factor contributing to regional floods.  
Flooding affects regions miles away from the Santa Ana River. 
Tributaries are the veins of the Santa Ana River and also unleash 
havoc on local residents. Case in point, the San Timoteo Creek is a 
tributary to the Santa Ana River.  The two converge near the I-10 
and I-215 freeways in the city of San Bernardino.  Even within the 
San Timoteo Creek other creeks converge on it like Wilson and 
Wildwood Creek.  When the region experiences heavy rainfall the 
San Timoteo Creek overflows its banks and/or undermines 
manmade levees, which leaves the residents of Loma Linda and 
surrounding communities in turmoil.  The photograph below 
depicts a large wave as it approaches the Anderson Street Bridge in 
Loma Linda during the February 1969 floods.1  
 
 
Figure 2.  Flood of February 1969.  “Wave action approaching Anderson Street 
Bridge” in Loma Linda, CA 
 
The example of the San Timoteo Creek illustrates how dispersed 
flooding can happen.  Floods are not confined to just the main river 
flow, but can also occur in the vicinity of the tributary.  Therefore, 
a comprehensive flood control plan needs to recognize and 
undertake projects for both the mainstream and tributary 
waterways in order to reduce the risk of floods. 
                                                
1 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District, Flood Plain Information:  
San Timoteo Creek, Vicinity of Loma Linda San Bernardino County California, 
June 1973. Prepared for San Bernardino County Flood Control District, 35. 






Southern California’s Population and Flood History 
 
Southern California’s population began to change after 1900.  Only 
93,000 people lived in California just after the state gained 
admission to the union in 1850.  A half-century later that number 
rose to 1.5 million and by 1960 almost 16 million people called 
California their home.2  The 1920’s became a pivotal point for 
population in southern California.  The state’s population grew by 
2 million during that decade.  Most new migrants headed for 
southern California because of new employment opportunities in 
filmmaking, shipping, and manufacturing.3 Southern California 
saw another wave of migrants in the 1930’s and 1940’s as well.  
The Dust Bowl perpetuated the displacement of Midwest farmers 
in 1930’s and over a million came to find work in the fertile 
agricultural lands of California.4  The Pacific Front in World War 
II brought an abundance of vital defense industry jobs to help in 
the war effort.  Out-of-work citizens throughout the country were 
attracted to these new opportunities.  Even after the war, the 
defense industry beckoned newcomers to the state in search of 
prosperity.5  In 1970, the census confirmed that California’s 
population overtook New York as the largest in the union.6 The 
state’s tremendous population growth required officials to 
reexamine flood control.  As the population soared so did new 
housing, businesses, and other means of infrastructure to support 
an urban sprawl. This unprecedented growth meant more people 
and property were endangered when periodic flooding occurred.  
Prior to the 1938 flood, the 1916 flood showed the disastrous 
effects of a population encroaching on the flood plains. 
 The January 1916 flood was the first large event in the 
twentieth century for the Santa Ana River basin.  Two separate 
storm systems each produced six consecutive, intensive days of 
                                                
2 Larry N. Gerston and Terry Christensen, California Politics and Government:  
A Practical Approach. Ninth ed., (Belmont, CA: Clark Baxter, 2007), 6. 
3 Gerston and Christensen, 6. 
4 Gerston and Christensen, 6. 
5 Gerston and Christensen, 7. 
6 James D. Hart, A Companion to California (Berkeley:  University of California 
Press, 1987), 397. 
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rain that month.  In total, January 1916 had 19 days of rain.7  In the 
Santa Ana basin rainstorms of high intensity for short durations of 
time caused severe flooding. In 1916, according to the U.S. 
Weather Bureau, 16.71 inches of rain in a 24-hour period was 
recorded at a small hotel, named the Squirrel Inn, located near the 
crest of the San Bernardino Mountains.  The concentrated rainfall 
received at the Squirrel Inn demonstrates the tremendous 
magnitude of some southern California storms.8 Such intense 
rainfall swiftly descends to the base of the mountain and drains 
into the already-enlarged Santa Ana River. Furthermore, the total 
amount of water runoff is concentrated to a maximum of 20 square 
miles of drainage area, thus creating a flood.9  Even natural lakes 
such as Lake Elsinore overflowed.10 According to the Army Corps 
the magnitude of a 1916 flood happened only once in every 30 
years’ time.11  The total monetary loss due to the 1916 flood was 
estimated at $7,580,000 million.12  Four people in Orange County 
succumbed to the flood; in addition, five bridges were destroyed, 
electric and telegraph services were interrupted, and a gas line 
broke at the Chapman Street Bridge.13 In other regions, railroad 
tracks, roads, homes, and orange groves washed away.  Ontario, 
Redlands, Anaheim, and other communities remained isolated; the 
                                                
7 Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1946, “Report of 
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 7; 
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosures 1-8, 11-1-46; Records on the Office of the 
Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District Survey Reports 1935-1979, box 161; 
Record Group 77; Nation Archives Pacific Region, Perris, CA (hereafter RG 77, 
NARA).   
8 Major Theodore Wyman, Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District, April 15, 
1937, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.”, 4; Santa Ana 
River, CA FC-Hydraulics April 15, 1937; box 160; RG 77, NARA 
9 Wyman, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.,” 3. 
10  “Flood Control,” page 15; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939 
[1/2]; box 160; RG 77, NARA. 
11 “Flood Control”, 20. 
12 Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1946, “Report of 
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 12; 
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosures 1-8, 11-1-46; box 161; RG 77, NARA. 
13 “Orange County Flood Control Report,” 4; Santa Ana River + other streams, 
CA 1937 (ENCL.) [3/5]; box 505; RG 77, NARA. 





flood eliminated all means of communication and transportation.14  
Disneyland, referred to as, “the happiest place on earth” would 
simply not exist in Anaheim if flooding persistently devastated the 
city. The picture below is an example of how the population coped 
with flooding.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
“Evacuating the Mexican quarter,  4th and Artesia, Santa Ana, CA.” 
 
 
The Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
 
The Army Corps of Engineers plays a vital role managing Federal 
mandated projects, tracing their roots back to Chief Engineer 
Colonel Richard Gridley. In 1775, Colonel Gridley oversaw the 
fortifications for the Battle of Bunker Hill during the American 
Revolution.15 The Corps’ function has significantly increased over 
time.  The Corps’ primary focus was designing military 
fortifications, such as Bunker Hill and Fort McHenry, but 
gradually their responsibilities expanded in the newly developing 
nation.16  In the nineteenth century, the Army Corps continued to 
build fortifications, but also began surveying roads, canals, and the 
                                                
14 Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1946, “Report of 
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 7; 
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosure 1-8 11-1-46; box 161; RG 77, NARA. 
15 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:  A History 2nd Edition, U.S. (Alexandria, 
Virginia: Army Corps of Engineers Office of History, 1998), 1. 
16 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, vi. 
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western frontier. They oversaw the design and construction of 
monuments and buildings in the nation’s capitol.17 In the twentieth 
century, especially after World War II, the Army Corps turned 
their attention to non-defense activities focusing, for example, on 
shoreline projects. They engineered and improved major shipping 
harbors, in addition to smaller harbors used for pleasure craft.  
Developing harbors drastically changed the function of the Army 
Corp of Engineers.18 As a federal agency, the Army Corps’ 
primary focus was for the benefit of the nation.  Therefore, it was 
involved in the construction of interstate projects such as navigable 
waterways—not state and local projects, such as marinas.  
However, in 1932 Congress amended the River and Harbor Act of 
1902 to include the phrase, “’the use of waterways by seasonal 
passenger craft, yachts, house boats, fishing boats, motorboats and 
similar craft whether or not operated for hire.’”19 Slowly, the 
Corps’ authority reached to localized areas within a state, and was 
no longer restricted to projects spanning state lines where 
jurisdiction problems could occur.  The Army Corps steadily 
became the federal government’s authority on water, taking the 
responsibilities out of state and local hands.  From building 
harbors, marinas, and dams it would only be a matter of time 
before the Army Corps added flood control to their extensive 
resume.  
In 1936 Congress passed the Flood Control Act, which 
authorized the federal government to take responsibility for flood 
control activities.20 Instead of creating a new agency on flood 
control, Congress assigned the Secretary of War, who oversees the 
Army Corps of Engineers, to the task of building flood control 
structures.  The Act appropriated $320 million for 250 projects and 
surveys throughout the nation to boost the national economy.21 For 
the people living in the Santa Ana River basin, this meant help was 
on the way. 
  When the Army Corps began their investigation of the 
Santa Ana River basin, they quickly discovered the “deficiency” of 
                                                
17 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, iii. 
18 Turhollow, 77. 
19 Turhollow, 77. 
20 Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, 247. 
21 Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, 247. 





information compiled by local officials on the behavior of flooding 
rivers and tributaries.22  In essence, the Army Corps started from 
scratch without any previous knowledge of how much water 
flowed at a given point in the waterways.  In March of 1938, the 
Army Corps of Engineers was coincidentally blessed when they 
received their immense study case:  a rare 100-year flood. From 
that point on, the Army Corps took the lead role in a progressive 
flood control effort. Today, according to the Army Corp of 
Engineers, “[their] mission areas include planning, designing, 
building, and operating water resources and other civil works 
projects… providing immediate and long-term support to the 
public during natural disasters and national emergencies.”23 Thus, 
the Army Corps emerged as an authority on waterworks projects 
and continues to maintain their presence as a principal engineering 
organization in this field. 
The past acts as a window to the future allowing us to 
compare floods to one another.  A storm’s intensity is always 
variable and there is a great deal of uncertainty as to when another 
large flood will occur. In that regard, floods are very much like 
earthquakes.  Therefore, it is important for researchers to identify 
which flood was historically the largest, not necessarily in terms of 
the most destruction, but which flood created the most discharge of 
water.  Identifying this flood will give the Army Corps of 
Engineers a benchmark so they can, in turn, develop flood control 
to meet that point of reference. 
In an effort to better understand California’s past flooding 
the Army Corps began looking at prior reports delineating the 
different floods.  They turned to a report compiled on September 
21, 1931 named “Big Tujunga Creek” written by consulting 
engineer Franklin Thomas.24 The records indicated that 34 floods 
occurred in a period of 168 years, giving an average expectancy of 
one flood occurring in southern California every five years.25 The 
historical data Thomas used for his report was previous rainfall 
                                                
22 Army Corps Los Angeles District, “Flood Control,” page 53; Santa Ana 
River, CA Flood Control July 1939 [1/2]; box 160; RG 77, NARA. 
23 Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, iii. 
24  Survey Report, page 45; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939 [1/2]; 
box 160; RG 77, NARA. 
25 Survey Report, page 45; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939. 
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records, Mission Priests’ reports, and notes in explorers’ diaries.26 
The data also indicated that the flood of 1861-62 was considered to 
be the greatest flood on record.  A chart created by the San 
Bernardino County Flood Control District analyzes past floods by 
the amount of water that discharged through a place known as the 
Riverside Narrows.  The graph, below, clearly illustrates the 1861-
62 flood as being “off the chart” compared to other floods.  In 
addition, the 1862 flood had three times more water discharge 
through the Riverside Narrows than the 1938 study case.   
 
Figure 4.  The chart represents past discharge rates of water on the Santa Ana 
River at the Riverside Narrows location. 
 
The primary question arising from using this chart is:  How were 
these measurements gathered in 1862?  First hand witnesses wrote 
what they experienced during the flood:  
 
There were billows 50 feet high.  The waters from 
the vast drainage area found themselves forced 
                                                
26 Survey Report, page 45; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939. 





abruptly into a narrow channel, and just above Agua 
Mansa the river filled the valley from bluff to bluff, 
reaching the little church.  Father Borgoatta, then 
the pastor, heard the roar in the distance, rang the 
bell frantically and the people fled to high ground.  
Some of the last ones had to swim. 
 
For scientists, the crucial part of the text is the description of the 
Santa Ana’s water flow reaching the “little church.” The church’s 
location was known when the Army Corp compiled their data.  To 
legitimize the story about the little church the Corps retrieved 
helpful information from Mr. Celso Robidoux, grandson of Louis 
Robidoux, an early settler of Riverside.27 In fact Louis Robidoux 
purchased the region known as Jurupa from a man named Don 
Benito Wilson between 1846-1848.28 Wilson, an early 
pioneer/mountain man, helped develop and soon became the 
second mayor of Los Angeles. The land he sold to Louis Robidoux 
was named Rancho Jurupa, part of greater Riverside, located in 
and around the city of current day Rubidoux and the location of 
Agua Mansa Mission, where the little church of San Salvador 
lay.29 30 The Corps’ documents state Mr. Celso Robidoux: 
 
Accompanied engineers to the site of Agua Mansa 
Mission and identified landmarks which had been 
pointed out to him in childhood by his parents, 
which then showed evidences of the 1862 flood.  He 
corroborated the high water level which of that 
flood at Agua Mansa as determined from other 
sources by the Advisory Committee on Flood 
Control in San Bernardino County, and told of the 
sweeping away of settlements and cultivated lands, 
evidences of which he saw in his boyhood.  The 
peak discharge of Santa Ana River at Agua Mansa, 
                                                
27 Tab 23, page 2; Santa Ana River+ tribs, (ENCL.) [1/5]; box 508; RG 77, 
NARA. 
28 Nat B. Read, From Mountain Man to Mayor:  Don Benito Wilson Los 
Angeles 1841 to 1878. (Santa Monica: Angel City Press, 2008), 40. 
29 Read, 40. 
30 Report, “History of Past Floods Santa Ana basin, Feb. 15, 1939, tab 23 page 
2; Santa Ana River + tribs., CA 1939 (ENCL.) [1/5]; box 508; RG 77, NARA. 
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computed by engineers of the agency referred to 
above, was 338,000 c.f.s. on January 22, 1862.31  
 
Other first-hand accounts gathered by the Army Corps for their 
report describe the following: 
 
In the town of Anaheim, four miles from the river, 
the water ran four feet deep and spread in an 
unbroken sheet to the Coyote hills, three miles 
beyond.  The inhabitants sought safety in the second 
stories of their houses, and those who were not 
fortunate enough to have an upper story quartered 
themselves upon those who had.  One unfortunate 
was carried down by the current and drowned.32 
 
The above story mentions that the floodwater was four feet deep 
four miles away from the Santa Ana River. The magnitude of this 
flood sounds astonishing, almost unbelievable to those that had not 
experienced a large flood.  The March flood would legitimize these 
incredible stories.  The rain that produced this flood started on 
December 25, 1861 and continued for 25 consecutive days, ending 
on January 18, 1862.33  The information the Army Corps of 
Engineers acquired from a reliable source about the 1861-62 flood 
establishes the benchmark that flood control structures would need 
to withstand. 
The above graph is also helpful when analyzing the 
outcomes of the 1938 flood; a flood that was pivotal in 
determining the levels of flood control necessary in southern 
California.  For example, no other flood after 1938 is equivalent in 
water discharge, but three floods prior to 1938 were equal or 
greater than the 1938 flood at the measurements taken at the 
Riverside Narrows.  This comparison illustrates how the old 
system of flood control became outdated and a new “modern” 
                                                
31 As a comparison, the Columbia River on the boarder of Washington and 
Oregon flows at a rate of 225,000 c.f.s. (cubic feet per second). 
32 Report, “History of Past Floods Santa Ana basin, Feb. 15, 1939, 3. 
33 San Bernardino County Flood Control History, 
http://www.sbcounty.gov/dpn/floodcontrol/history.asp (accessed on January 5, 
2010). 





approach was implemented, making a difference in the graph.  
These changes were necessary since a significant population 
growth was occurring in California.  
With a general understanding of the cosmetic makeup of 
southern California and past flooding history, in addition to 
comprehending the function of the Army Corps of Engineers, this 
paper will narrow its scope to examine the flooding events prior to 
1938 and analyze the Army Corps’ study on the Santa Ana River 
basin.  The Army Corps gathered evidence to demonstrate the 
benefits of flood control in the Santa Ana River basin. By no 
means does this paper suggest that flood control never existed in 
southern California.  In fact, local agencies attempted to subdue 
and channel water runoff for more than 80 years prior to 1937.34  
They built, maintained, and improved channels from time to time 
in order to manipulate the flow of water caused by seasonal rain 
for drinking and irrigation purposes. Despite these efforts, on 
occasion the flood menace struck and overwhelmed the manmade 
devices, crippling the swelling communities. The Army Corp 
classified these existing flood control structures to withstand floods 
of five to eight year intervals.35 Not until Congress authorized the 
federal government to finance flood control projects did the Army 
Corp of Engineers intercede on existing flood problems to find 
long-term comprehensive solutions for the benefit of the cities, 
states, and the nation.   
 
 
Flood Control Before the March 1938 Flood 
 
When the Army Corps of Engineers began their investigation into 
flood control in 1937 they asked district flood control agencies to 
compile reports explaining how they perceived flood control and 
the flood menace.  Flood Control Engineer for Orange County M. 
N. Thompson wrote such a report for the County Board of 
                                                
34 Major Theodore Wyman, Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District, April 15, 
1937, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif., page 10; Santa Ana 
River, CA FC-Hydraulics April 15, 1937; box 160; RG 77, NARA. 
35 Wyman, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.,” 9. 
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Supervisors and the Army Corps.  His report reverted back to the 
impacts of the 1916 flood and stressed the future impacts on the 
Orange County area: 
 
Since 1916 the development of the District has 
proceeded at a rapid rate.  The population has more 
than doubled the assessed valuation [(property 
values)] has increased more than 300%.  More than 
half the present inhabitants have no personal 
knowledge of the area that would be overflowed or 
the resulting damage.  Intense cultivation, brought 
about by high returns from citrus fruits and other 
crops, has extended to land where flood waters once 
had the opportunity of spreading without causing 
much damage…The financial losses that would 
result under the present conditions, from a flood 
similar to that of 1916 would not only cause 
hardship to owners and residents of the lands and 
improvements directly concerned, but would affect 
the County as a whole.  Funds for the repair of flood 
damaged public property must come from taxes, 
and to make up the deficiency in tax returns from 
private property, reduced in value from flood 
damage, the tax rate on other property of the County 
must necessarily be increased.36 
 
Exponential population growth in southern California was the core 
problem according to Chief Engineer Thompson’s report.  A 
flood’s increasing capability of causing destruction is linked 
directly to the upsurge of population.  With every new flood, the 
damage becomes more severe and costly to southern Californians.  
For example, an Army Corps’ report reiterates these facts by 
providing additional evidence: 
 
The flood damage measured in dollars has increased 
somewhat out of proportion to the severity of the 
                                                
36 M.N. Thompson, Chief Engineer of Orange County, “Report for Board of 
Supervisors;” Santa Ana Riverside, CA 1937-1939 (ENCL.); box 506; RG 77, 
NARA. 





several floods reported, owing to the extensive 
development that has taken place since 1862 and 
1884.  Over large areas in the cities and towns about 
30 to 60 percent of the ground surface has been 
covered by buildings, paved streets, sidewalks, 
etc.37 
 
As the population continued to grow and encroach on the flood 
plains of the Santa Ana River basin, it became apparent to officials 
that the region needed updated flood control structures.  The 
ongoing replacement of temporary wooden bridges, like those lost 
in 1916, had to change. Not necessarily because of the monetary 
loss, but the various counties’ increasing populations could no 
longer afford to lose crucial transportation infrastructure.38  This 
was especially relevant since America’s infatuation with the 
automobile began to materialize.  As a result, the need to control 
unpredictable floods became much greater than before.  Temporary 
wooden bridges would not suffice in the wake of the 1916 flood, 
which according to Army Corps “forced the thickly populated 
communities into quite serious circumstances.”39  Natural water 
channels proved too challenging to control.  When floods occurred, 
water overflowed its natural channels and created a new path to 
reach the ocean.  For the cities located in the Santa Ana River 
basin to further develop, the necessity of carefully engineered 
flood control devices was required.  A comprehensive approach to 
manage a multi-county problem fell to the hands of the Army 
Corps of Engineers. 
Under the 1936 Flood Control Act, Congress authorized the 
Army Corps of Engineers to take charge in surveying and 
developing flood control projects.  Before Congress appropriated 
money to the Santa Ana River basin, the Army Corps had to 
survey the land, suggest improvements, and analyze the region’s 
                                                
37 Tab 25, “Damage from Future Floods Santa Ana River Basin Above Prado 
Dam, February 15, 1939, 1; Santa Ana River + Tribs., CA-1939 (ENCL.) [1/5]; 
box 508; RG 77, NARA. 
38 “Flood History,” 3; Santa Ana River + other streams, CA 1937 (ENCL.) 
[3/5]; box 505; RG 77, NARA. 
39 “Flood History,” 3; Santa Ana River + other streams, CA 1937 (ENCL.) [3/5]; 
box 505; RG 77, NARA.  
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economy and population. Army Corps Los Angeles District 
engineer, Major Theodore Wyman Jr. composed a report dated 
April 15, 1937 entitled, Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River 
and other streams, for the protection of the metropolitan area in 
Orange County, Calif., calling for Congressional approval to 
allocate funds for improvements on the Santa Ana River and its 
tributaries.40 Wyman asserted that his report was, “…submitted as 
a basis for consideration of plans for flood control works for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, California 
authorized by Section 5 of Act of Congress, Public No. 738, 
approved June 22, 1936.”41  
From this point on, the Army Corps began to build a case 
on behalf of those affected by floods on the Santa Ana River basin, 
but only for those residents living in Orange County. His report did 
not include studies of Riverside or San Bernardino Counties where 
the Santa Ana River originates. Initially, Congress must have 
singled out Orange County specifically to protect from floods, not 
realizing the vast amounts of terrain that contributed to the flood 
problem. After investigating the causes of flooding in Orange 
County, Major Wyman concluded that the required protection 
Orange County (lower basin) needed would not even be located in 
the County itself, but upstream in Riverside and San Bernardino 
Counties (upper basin).42 Major Wyman immediately broadened 
the area of flood control on the Santa Ana River.  He argued that in 
addition to protecting Orange County it was necessary to consider 
the upper Santa Ana River basin, since past floods had caused loss 
of life and a significant destruction of property in that area as 
well.43  “In the upper basin, bridges have been destroyed, channels 
eroded, and debris deposited on the improved areas near the 
mountains; in the lower basin in Orange County the greatest 
damage has been from overflow, erosion and deposition of debris 
on large areas occupied by cities, towns and citrus groves.”44 Thus, 
the Army Corps Los Angeles District engineer Major Theodore 
Wyman was instrumental in incorporating Riverside and San 
                                                
40 “Flood History,” 3; Santa Ana River + other streams, CA 1937 (ENCL.), 1. 
41 “Flood History,” 3; Santa Ana River + other streams, CA 1937 (ENCL.), 1.  
42 “Flood History,” 3; Santa Ana River + other streams, CA 1937 (ENCL.), 7. 
43 “Flood History,” 3; Santa Ana River + other streams, CA 1937 (ENCL.), 7.  
44 “Flood History,” 3; Santa Ana River + other streams, CA 1937 (ENCL.), 7. 





Bernardino Counties in a comprehensive plan for flood control 
along the entire Santa Ana River. 
The Army Corps’ 1937 report proposed that a crucial dam 
should be built in the upper basin of the Santa Ana River to protect 
Orange County.  The Prado Dam became the centerpiece of flood 
control along the Santa Ana River and essentially restrained the 
mighty river during major storms.  First proposed in April 1931 by 
Orange County Flood Control District’s general plan for flood 
control, the Army Corps of Engineers agreed with the dam’s 
location and adopted Orange County Flood Control’s method to 
contain floodwaters.45 The 1936 Flood Control Act allotted $13 
million for Orange County flood control projects, and the Army 
Corps recommended the appropriation of the funds.46 The Prado 
Dam would be completed in May 1941 for $9,450,000, as a result 
of the 1936 Flood Control Act.47 The remaining money was spent 
widening channels.  In addition, Chief Engineer Wyman believed 
$18,000,000 ($13.2 million federal and $4.6 million local 
contribution) was sufficient to establish flood works projects. 
However, the various county governments viewed flood control 
differently.  After Wyman’s report was released (1937) and days 
before the March flood, local agencies asserted their belief that 
$44,525,600 was required for full protection from the Santa Ana 
River and its tributaries above the Prado Dam site in Riverside and 
San Bernardino Counties.48 The subsequent flood affirmed for the 
local communities the need to suppress the flood menace. 
Another interesting aspect the Army Corps’ report 
examines is the monetary value of the regions they proposed to 
protect.  In 1937, were the areas affected by flooding in the Santa 
Ana River basin worth protecting?  Were they of enough 
sustainable value to warrant using federal money to ensure 
protection?  From 1940 to 1970 the southern California economy 
shifted from an agricultural to an industrial base.  Population and 
                                                
45 “Flood History,” 3; Santa Ana River + other streams, CA 1937 (ENCL.), 11. 
46 “Flood History,” 3; Santa Ana River + other streams, CA 1937 (ENCL.), 2. 
47 Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1947, “Report of 
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 5; 
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosure 1-8 11-1-46; box 161; RG 77, NARA. 
48 Tab 22, “Improvements Desired by Local Interests, Santa Ana River Basin 
Above Prado Reservoir” Feb 15, 1939, 1; Santa Ana River + Tribs., CA-1939 
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property values soared and so did the need to protect them.  
According to Major Wyman’s 1937 report, the assessed value of 
land to be protected in San Bernardino was estimated at $111 
million; the highest of the counties affected by the Santa Ana and 
Los Angeles River.49 
 An important question arises when analyzing the Army 
Corps’ reports:  what is the correlation between the value of a 
county’s land and flood control?  Foremost, flood control is for the 
protection of the people.  A group letter composed by Major 
Wyman on January 25, 1938 titled, “Notice of Public Hearing” 
held on February 25, 1938 in Riverside, CA reiterates this fact.  In 
a list of requirements, bullet point “c” states, “The economic and 
other justification for the expenditures that may be entailed by the 
desired improvements, based upon:  Saving of life and protection 
to property, improvement to drainage, conservation of water, the 
development of power.”50 However, concern eventually shifted 
from a strict focus on saving lives and property to other beneficial 
factors—for example, how the government might benefit from 
investing funds in flood control.  At the heart of this argument are 
property taxes. 
  Visualizing the devastation the Santa Ana River basin 
experiences periodically, one can obviously see how floods hinder 
the government’s ability to prosper. The population in southern 
California was growing immensely during this time period and, 
therefore, it was presumed the economy of southern California was 
experiencing the same level of growth.  An investor could see the 
increasing prosperity as an investment.  The federal government is 
the investor and flood control is the investment. Yet, property taxes 
create revenue for state and local governments. How, then, does 
the federal government benefit from subsidizing flood control?  To 
elaborate, the basic function of Congress needs to be evaluated.  
The framework describing the Legislative Branch’s basic function 
may sound elementary, but is critical in order to comprehend the 
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federal government’s interests in flood control.  Congress is 
comprised of representatives from within a state.  The Senate 
serves the state as a whole and the House of Representative’s 
members serve the individual districts.  Representatives have a 
vested interest in their district.  By protecting areas from the flood 
nuisance, property values increase, thus benefiting their district.  
 Beginning with Major Wyman’s 1937 report, the Army 
Corps introduced direct and indirect benefits of flood control that 
soon became a major theme in flood control projects.  The Corps’ 
first report to Congress in 1937 briefly mentioned the increase of 
land values as a direct benefit of flood control. The Army Corps 
realized that if the Santa Ana River was tamed and disastrous 
floods occurred less frequently, then property values and property 
tax revenue would increase.  However, the Army Corps 
acknowledged that their investigative role in 1937 was to devise a 
flood control plan with $13 million—not analyze the benefits of 
flood control.  Nevertheless, the report states, “Although a 
comparison of economic benefits with economic costs is not 
considered necessary, because the works of improvement have 
been authorized by Congress, the following is submitted for 
purpose of record.”51 The report predicted that after new modern 
flood control improvements were completed, Orange County 
would experience greater security from flooding, thus increase 
property values by $480,000 on average per year.52 Furthermore, 
the report mentions a crucial indirect benefit when modern flood 
control is implemented for southern California. The 1937 report, 
with foresight reads: 
 
 In addition to the direct increase in value due to the 
removal of the flood menace, there would be an 
indirect benefit from additional future 
improvements in the area now subject to overflow, 
due to change to a higher use. These 
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changes…would create an increase in taxable 
wealth, not otherwise obtainable.  No estimates 
have been made   of the value of such indirect 
benefits.53 
 
Unbeknownst to Major Wyman, California’s growth would 
continue to multiply decade after decade nearly doubling between 
1950 and 1970.54 When the report was written just prior to the 
1940 census, California’s population stood slightly under 7 
million; according to the 2000 census California’s population 
reached almost 34 million residents.55 Today, California’s 
economy is ranked 8th in the world, which directly relates to the 
diversely skilled population.56 There is a direct correlation between 
California’s economy, flood control, and the ability to support a 
growing population.  Major Wyman’s report predicted an indirect 
benefit between flood control and future developments on the 
Santa Ana floodplain.  Land that was not usable prior to modern 
flood control would be utilized to house residents and support 
various businesses, thus creating incredible, taxable wealth.  With 
hindsight, the 1938 flood changed the perception of flood control 
on the Santa Ana River basin.  The 1937 report speculated on the 
possible damage to the region that could be caused by future floods 
of the magnitude of the one in 1916.  Their predictions can then be 
compared to the outcomes of the 1938 flood. 
 Floods are evaluated on two criteria:  magnitude and 
destructiveness.  To predict the outcomes of future flooding, both 
parts need to be evaluated separately.  Historically speaking, the 
two conditions are not interlinked.  For instance, the 1862 flood 
had the largest magnitude of any known documented flooding, yet 
the destructiveness was less than that of the 1916 flood, which had 
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a lesser magnitude.  The missing part in this equation is 
population. The Army Corps of Engineers needed to analyze all 
three factors to calculate damage from future floods.  Because of 
the intensive development of land on the Santa Ana River basin, a 
flood occurring in 1936 could be more destructive and, therefore, 
more costly than the 1916 flood, even if of a lesser magnitude.57 In 
their calculations, the Army Corps estimated a maximum probable 
flood on the Santa Ana River in Orange County of more than twice 
the magnitude of the 1916 flood.58   
 Under time constraints to submit the report, evidence had 
yet to be gathered to determine damages for Riverside and San 
Bernardino Counties.59  If a flood with the same magnitude as the 
1916 flood struck in 1936, the Army Corps estimated the damage 
in Orange County would be approximately $4 million.60 In 
addition, the hypothetical flood would, without a doubt, cause a 
loss of life between 40 to 50 residents of Orange County.61 The 
Army Corps’ initial investigation came to a close less than a year 
before the 1938 flood.  Their estimates of damages from a future 
flood in comparison with the magnitude of the 1916 flood doubled 
the amount of property damage and caused ten times the loss of 
life.  The flood experienced by the residents of southern California 
and studied by the Army Corps of Engineers forever changed a 
region decimated by periodic flooding.  
News spread throughout the Santa Ana River basin that the 
Army Corps of Engineers had begun a comprehensive 
investigation to improve flood control.  Local governments and 
water districts cooperated with the Army Corps by disclosing any 
information the Corps requested.  Moreover, local businesses 
submitted their perspectives and dilemmas when faced by floods.  
For example, in a letter dated February 34, 1938, days before the 
March flood, addressed to Chief Engineer Major Wyman, 
Pellissier Dairies in Riverside, gave their assessment of how the 
Santa Ana River affects the dairy’s operations. Pellissier Dairies 
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attempted to warn Major Wyman that if another flood like those in 
previous years occurred, not only would it result in a loss of life, 
but the Santa Ana River, at flood levels, would eat away the 
dairy’s property, hurting the business.62  
Another business affected by floods in the Santa Ana River 
basin was the Italian Vineyard Company located in Guasti, CA. 
Guasti is located slightly north of present-day Ontario Airport. In a 
letter dated February 24, 1938 the company stated that during 
floods, the Santa Ana’s tributaries, which passed through the 
property, slowly eroded parts of the vineyard’s immense 5,000-
acre property.63 The vineyard claimed, “ in order for us to put this 
property back in shape it will be necessary that we cut a straight 
channel through one hundred sixty (160) acres, putting us to quite 
a bit of expense.”64  What the letter fails to say but implies is that 
the vineyard wants the Army Corps to appropriate funds to build 
the concrete channel with federal money. Moreover, the letter 
recommended that the Army Corp not build a concrete channel 
from the foothills directly to the Santa Ana River, but to first add a 
“spreading area” or catch basin to allow water to sink underground 
and be conserved.65 
 In fact, most of the area’s drinking and irrigation water 
came from underground artesian well sources known as aquifers in 
the Santa Ana basin.66 M. A. Martinez, General Superintendent of 
Italian Vineyards and author of the letter, showed concern that if 
the Army Corps decided to build a concrete channel per his 
suggestion, water would not have a chance to percolate 
underground. Thus, the ability to conserve water in a semi-arid 
region would be diminished, as would the agricultural business.  In 
the region, water is a scarce commodity but also destructive when 
floods occur. Since most of the region was agricultural based, 
landowners depended on the slow meandering water flow, but 
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when the Army Corps proposed building channels to expediently 
evacuate the water to the Pacific Ocean, “much litigation resulted 
from the objections.”67 In summary, the balance between natural 
conservation and protective flood control needed to be reached. 
The Army Corp of Engineers held a meeting to discuss the 
problems arising from these multi-county dilemmas in Riverside 
on February 25, 1938, just days before the March flood. 
Riverside proved a halfway point for the areas affected by 
the Santa Ana River.  The public meeting allowed the numerous 
water agencies and businesses affected by floods to discuss their 
concerns about water rights.  In addition, they proposed their 
solution for flood control. An Army Corps 1939 report stated: 
 
According to testimony and data presented at the public 
hearing: 
 
At Riverside, California, on February 25, 1938, 
local interests desire that flood control 
improvements combined with improvements for 
maximum practicable water conservation be made 
in the basin of the Santa Ana River to provide 
protection to all localities now exposed to flood 
damage.  The improvements desired include seven 
reservoirs for reduction of flood peaks, and 
numerous debris basins, channel improvements, 
storm drains, and spreading grounds, the total cost 
of which, as estimate by local interests, is 
$44,525,600.  This cost is based primarily on the 
type of structure, which they considered adequate 
prior to the March 1938 flood.68 
 
In 1937 Major Wyman believed $18 million would provide 
“adequate flood control for the metropolitan area of Orange 
County,” but local officials believed the cost to be more than 
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double the Major’s estimate.69  A week later, the March flood 
reaffirmed the local agencies prediction.  All three factors 
determining the outcome of a flood were put to the test in March 
1938: magnitude, population, and destructiveness.  The results 
were astonishing.  The March flood became a wake-up call for 
change. The flood forced the Army Corp of Engineers to re-
examine how to implement a more powerful system of flood 
control. More projects were needed, and therefore stronger support 
from the federal government was required.   
 By March of 1938 preparations for a comprehensive flood 
control plan began to take shape. Congress approved eight crucial 
projects after Major Wyman’s April 15, 1937 report.70 Days before 
the rain began, concerned businesses implored the Army Corps of 
Engineers to help limit the potential damage that could be caused 
by the Santa Ana River.  The Army Corp of Engineers and 
Department of Agriculture organized a meeting in Riverside, 
February 24, 1938 attended by the counties who had a vested 
interest in the Santa Ana River.71  The counties were brought 
together to discuss a comprehensive approach to flood control, to 
talk about concerns, find solutions, and resolve their differences.  
However, the litigious nature of feuding counties over water rights 
caused delays in building flood control structures. The various 
counties’ flood control agencies had a grander approach to flood 
control than the novices at the Army Corps of Engineers, yet it 
required the involvement of the Army Corps to put a 
comprehensive plan in place.  This lack of coordination between 
counties was presumably rooted in cross-county suspicions.  
 Orange County’s fix to the flood lay in Riverside 
County—with the construction of Prado Dam—and this caused 
anxiety between the two counties. Why would Orange County pay 
for a dam not even located in their county? On the other hand, 
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what purpose would the Prado Dam serve for Riverside County? 
The purpose of the dam was to restrict the flow of floodwater by 
allowing it to collect behind the dam and then regulate its 
discharge into Orange County. Once Federal authorities took 
jurisdiction on the matter, disputes between county authorities, 
such as the dispute between Orange and Riverside Counties over 
the Prado Dam, disappeared.  The Army Corps provided the 
necessary funds (appropriated by Congress) which neither county 
wanted to appropriate for the construction of Prado Dam.  Changes 
in flood control began slowly, but made progress. On February 27, 
1938 rain began to fall over a fearfully concerned region abused by 
floods.  The resulting March flood would accelerate the 





The March flood will be discussed in several different ways.  The 
first goal is to focus on the basic facts of the storm.  The magnitude 
of the storm is crucial because it illustrates the intensity needed to 
produce a catastrophic flood. The second objective is to analyze 
the human impact of the flood vis-à-vis the destruction and loss of 
life caused by the flood.  The widespread devastation affected 
every county in southern California.  Newspapers in various states 
ran front-page stories, which informed their readers about the 
horrors faced by the residents. The March flood demonstrated to 
the nation the need to protect the growing state of California.  
Finally, the Army Corps studied the flood to see how the Santa 
Ana River basin behaves during such events. Their investigation of 
the March flood changed the Army Corps’ perspective on flood 
control. The original eight project plan proved insufficient for the 
Army Corps.  A new, extensive investigation began as a result of 
the 1938 flood. 
  Three separate storms brutalized the southern California 
landscape beginning February 27 and ending March 3, 1938. 
According to the Los Angeles Weather Bureau, the intensity 
increased between each storm.72 The greatest recorded rainfall 
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during the storm period was 32.2 inches at Kelly’s Kamp in the 
San Gabriel Mountains: 17.55” fell in a 24-hour period.73 In 
addition, the average rainfall in the mountain ranges varied 
between 20 and 30 inches.74  San Bernardino received 5.47”, 
Riverside reported 5.26”, and Anaheim collected 8.63” over the 
four-day period.75  The severity of the flood reached its pinnacle on 
the last day because a warm tropical air front brought tremendous 
rainfall and raised the altitude of snowfall.76  The Santa Ana River 
and its tributaries absorbed 56 percent of the mountain and foothill 
run-off above the Prado Dam site, raising the water table, but they 
reached their breaking point when the final storm unleashed its 
power.77  Harold Willis, former president of San Bernardino’s city 
Water Board and eyewitness to the March flood at age eleven was 
quoted in the local newspaper in 2003 claiming, “We had this cold, 
cold winter… the snow stacked up and stacked up.  Then we had 
this warm rain come in from the south.  The snow was like a huge 
sponge.  It caught all the water and could hold no more, and it 
turned to slush and just came right on down.”78 As a result, the 
tributaries overflowed and levies breached on the Santa Ana River 
causing widespread devastation and loss of life.  
 The heavily saturated mountains brought down untold 
amounts of debris.  Debris included, silt, rocks, and foliage, which 
covered many parts of the counties.  The Lytle Creek community 
located on the San Gabriel Mountain side of the Cajon Pass 
received incredible damage. A mountain community named after 
the tributary, Lytle Creek, washed away 200 cabins tearing the 
community apart.79  At the Lytle and City Creek, and Santa Ana 
River junction lays the communities of San Bernardino and Colton 
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where the flood destroyed between 200 and 300 homes.80  In San 
Bernardino County a hundred bridges collapsed and two miles of 
railroad track were undermined, crippling the rail system.81 The 
flood not only brought quick moving destructive water, but vast 
amounts of debris that adversely affected the communities.  The 
Army Corps gathered hundreds of photos of the Santa Ana River 
and tributaries flooding devastation and compiled them in a report 
titled “Photographs of Damage from Storm of February 27-March 
3, 1938.”82 The photos themselves provide an excellent pictorial 
record, capturing the detail and widespread damage incurred by the 
March flood.    
 
 
Figure 5.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
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Figure 6.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
“Upstream view of damage in Lytle Canyon at 17.8 miles below Glenn Ranch, 






Figure 7.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
Photo taken 3/3/1938. Merging point of Lytle Creek and Santa Ana around the 











Figure 8.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
Photo taken 3/3/1938 View from Orange County looking west.  Notice the 





Figure 9.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
Photo taken 3/3/1938. View from Orange County looking west.   









Figure 10. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
Picture was taken 3/3/1938 by the Army Corps illustrates widespread flooding 
over Northern Orange County looking northwest. Notice the flood waters 
reflection-covering most of the County. 
 
The 1938 March flood devastated southern California.  
These images are just snap-shots of the areas affected by the Santa 
Ana River and its tributaries, but the flood’s destructiveness 
impacted the Los Angeles community as well.  Total damage and 
loss of life figures vary depending on which source one examines.  
The San Mateo Times headlines on March 4, 1938 read, “Death 
Toll Now Near 250.”83 The Nevada State Journal claimed 400 
dead on March 6, 1938.84 In recent years the death toll is still 
debated.  An article appearing in The Press-Enterprise indicates 
that the number of dead was at least 175 people, but recognizes 
that the “death toll is difficult to pin down.”85 The reporter refers to 
Suzie Earp,86 who at the time (2003) was a master’s student at 
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California State San Bernardino, “it’s hard to know…just how 
many people died…’this was the Depression…and a lot of people 
were camped out by the river.  We don’t have any official 
numbers.’”87 In addition, to the above statement another perception 
arises to help uncover the reasons why an official death toll was 
not sought after.  An article written by the Nevada State Journal on 
March 6, 1938, about the southern California flood, reveals the 
racial attitudes of the time period.  The article reads, “The Red 
Cross spokesman said:  ‘You must realize that most of the dead are 
Mexicans, and when one of their race disappears, they are not 
likely to report the disappearance.’”88 This quote is a prime 
example of racial stereotyping during that era.  Therefore, it can be 
assumed organizations like the Red Cross may not have fully 
investigated the specific total of causalities caused by the flood 
because of racial indifference.  
 Another aspect of flood damage is the monetary costs of 
such an event.  These numbers too vary depending on the source.  
The City of Ontario, CA Risk Management department currently 
compiled historical data estimating $78,602,000 in damages and 87 
deaths resulted from of the March 1938 flood.89  The Army Corps 
of Engineers estimated the direct and indirect damages at 
$48,133,278 in 1939.  Today (2010) that converts to approximately 
$740 million.90 The Army Corps figure of $48 million is twelve-
times greater than their 1936 prediction of $4 million. Even though 
the Army Corps calculated their predictions to a 1916 caliber 
flood, the 1938 flood was not twelve-times the magnitude (see 
figure 3).  The numbers vary between the death toll and financial 
loss incurred from the March flood.  Either way, the storm’s 
magnitude and destructiveness changed perceptions on flood 
control.  This is illustrated in newspapers articles at the time of the 
1938 flood. 
News of the flood prompted various newspapers to run 
headlines informing their readers of the devastation in southern 
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California.  The New Castle News in New Castle, Pennsylvania ran 
a front page headline in bold print “CALIFORNIA HIT BY 
FLOOD:  Estimate 45 Dead As Waters Sweep Over Part Of 
State.”91 Freeport Journal-Standard of Freeport, Illinois headline 
in bold writing read “FLOOD LOSS MOUNTS IN 
CALIFORNIA,” the article describes the number dead or homeless 
and the untold millions in damages.92  The natural disaster even 
caused social upheaval.  For instance, the San Mateo Times on 
March 3 ran a headline “L.A. Looting Starts.”93 Then on March 5, 
1938 the headline read “L.A. Issues Orders To Shoot Looters.”94  
The same article also describes the problems communities like 
Riverside had over contaminated water for drinking purposes and 
“stagnant, disease-breeding pools” of water.95 Corroborating the 
story, The Hayward Review on the same day ran the headline, 
“Disease Perils Flood’s Victims:  Town’s Drinking Water 
Condemned.”96 Communities were isolated due to the flood.  The 
Santa Fe Railroad traffic came to a halt because either their tracks 
washed away or fell victim to landslides, thus cutting off 
supplies.97 Means of communication were severed as power lines 
gave way. The devastation felt by southern Californians and 
reported through various newspapers across the nation informed 
readers of the growing problem of the flood menace in southern 
California. The need for a modern flood control system, capable of 
withstanding floods like that of March 1938, became imperative. 
 
 
After the March 1938 Flood:  A Lesson Learned 
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A newspaper in Alberta, Canada, The Lethbridge Herald on March 
24, 1938 criticized Los Angeles as having a “lack of flood control” 
and moreover argues that; “…monies Los Angeles City and 
County will have to find to develop flood control projects to 
prevent flood damage in the future!”98 What the article did not say 
was that flood control did exist, but was insufficient.  The Army 
Corps had already began establishing ideas for a comprehensive 
flood control system, but in the wake of the March flood they and 
other experts realized they had underestimated the extent of 
construction projects needed.  The Army Corps began to pressure 
the federal government to appropriate additional funds for flood 
control.  On June 28, 1938 Congress modified the Flood Control 
Act of 1936 to provide an addition $6,500,000 for a ninth 
construction unit that would control floods on the San Antonio and 
Chino Creeks.99 Yet, shortly after Congress’s decision the Army 
Corps compiled a new report that analyzed the information 
gathered from the March flood. Their proposed plan in 1936 
proved insufficient.  The report reads: 
 
The plan of improvement in the approved project 
for San Antonio-Chino Creeks…is the only one in 
the Santa Ana River above Prado that is considered 
adequate for the flood protection of the areas 
subject to damage from floods.  The estimates for 
all other basin subdivisions considered in this 
enclosure are based on the type of structures 
considered adequate by local interests prior to the 
March 1938 flood.  It is evident that these structures 
and therefore the respective estimates are 
inadequate.  A survey will be required to determine 
the improvements that should be included in a 
comprehensive plan for flood control on the Santa 
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Ana River and tributaries, together with estimates of 
cost.100 
 
Major Wyman submitted a preliminary report on February 15, 
1939, which nearly negated all previous assumptions to provide 
adequate flood control.  His report explained how the March flood 
was a learning lesson for the Army Corps and local water 
authorities: 
 
As a result of this flood, local engineers and 
interested parties within the basin believe that the 
improvements sponsored at the public hearing are 
inadequate to provide the desired protection and 
that improvements which will provide such 
protection would cost considerably more than the 
amount estimated [$44,525,600] by them and as 
presented at the hearing [February 24, 1938]… 
Plans upon which this estimate was based were 
prepared by local interests prior to the flood of 
March 1938, and as has been explained, local 
interests now believe that their original plans would 
be inadequate and that the total cost of adequate 
improvements would be considerably more than the 
amount mentioned above…$69,000,000, it is 
believed that most of the improvements desired by 
local interests may be warranted.101 
 
However, Major Wyman’s 1936 report “concludes that the 
essential features for adequate flood control…can probably be 
accomplished within the limits of funds authorized,” $18 million in  
total.102 In three years time Major Wyman perspective changed 
dramatically. Adequate flood control now “warranted” $69 million 
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to develop flood control structures for the Santa Ana River basin.  
Furthermore, local interests realized their estimates fell short for 
adequate flood control.  The March 1938 flood demonstrated a 
change in attitude toward a modern flood control system.  Before 
1938, it was clear to the people that a flood problem existed.  After 
March 1938, it was evident that a serious flood problem existed 
that would require tens of millions of dollars to correct.  
Subsequently, Congress authorized a multitude of appropriations 
under Flood Control Act103 after the March flood.104  In the wake 
of another disastrous flood in 1969, Congressman, 33rd District 
Jerry Pettis wrote in the Montclair Tribune, “The 1938 flood 
triggered the construction of $38,700,000 in federal and local 
projects in our country, all designed to prevent a repetition of that 
disaster.”105 After the March flood the Army Corps quickly began 
surveying the land to find new solutions to prevent another 
disaster. 
Immediately after the storm the Army Corps thoroughly 
investigated the extent of the damages from the March flood.106  
They took aerial photos, conducted interviews with property 
owners, and wrote field surveys to determine the total damages 
caused by the flood in addition to studying how floodwaters 
behaved.  These surveys are evident in the above photographs of 
the March flood.  Hundreds of additional photos were part of 
Major Wyman’s May 28, 1938 report on the March flood.  The 
preliminary report by Major Wyman in February 1939 outlines the 
direct and indirect damages of the March flood and specifies which 
tributary caused what damage.  This helped the Army Corps 
classify which areas were at the greatest risk of destructive damage 
                                                                                                         
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif., 1; Santa Ana 
River, CA FC-Hydraulics April 15, 1937; box 160; RG 77, NARA. 
103  “Flood control Act of June 28, 1938, Public Law No. 761, 75th Congress; 
Flood Control Act of August 18, 1941, Public Law No. 377, 77th Congress; 
Flood Control Act of May 29, 1944, Public Law No. 318, 78th Congress; Flood 
Control Act of December 22, 1944, Public Law No. 534, 78th Congress; Flood 
Control Act of March 2, 1945, Public Law No. 14, 79th Congress; Flood Control 
Act of June 12, 1945, Public Law No. 82, 79th Congress.” 
104 Turhollow, 386. 
105  Jerry Pettis, “Jerry’s Journal,” Montclair Tribune, March 5, 1969. 
106 Tab 24, p. 2; Santa Ana River + Tribs., CA-1939 (ENCL.) [1/5]; box 508; 
RG 77, NARA. 
A Watershed Event 
 
 134 
at the time.  The most volatile areas affected by floods were 
investigated to find solutions to prevent future devastation.  
Another important lesson learned was the behavior of water.  A 
July 1939 report established a conundrum to southern California’s 
flood problem.  To control floods, construction of additional 
channels and storm drains were needed to prevent flooding in 
localized areas. However, these channels allowed water to quickly 
flow downstream at concentrated levels, straining levies 
downstream in Orange County.  When a storm’s intensity hits the 
hardest it creates a surge of water funneling downstream, resulting 
in overflow or broken levies. In support of improved or concrete 
lined channels, they allowed the water to move as one continual 
mass, which allowed for a smaller storage capacity.  In other 
words, concrete channels were useful in some places, but not 
others.  Upstream dams or reservoirs would collect water even 
during intense periods to minimize high concentration 
downstream.  Prado Dam is a key example.   
After the March flood, the Army Corps sought out new 
locations for dams or reservoirs.  In addition to dams and 
reservoirs, spreading grounds would also be utilized.  Spreading 
grounds are located at both the foothill of a mountain and at the 
canyon’s mouth.  Their purpose is to disperse water as it flowed 
out of the canyon mouth, thus slowing down the water’s velocity. 
Moreover, spreading grounds could catch much of the debris that 
devastated most of the Santa Ana basin community.107 Also, 
spreading grounds allowed water to seep underground, which 
helped replenish the aquifer.  The picture on the next page is an 
example of one spreading ground utilized in the Santa Ana River 
basin.  In today’s standards, spreading grounds require an 
enormous amount of valuable land, but their benefits far outweigh 
the disadvantages. Thus, spreading grounds act as a buffer during 
intense rain periods and help solve 
a variety of problems pertaining to debris, floods, and water 
conservation.  Dams and reservoirs also became a tool of flood 
control. 
  The solution was not as simple as building a concrete 
channel or a single dam as the Army Corps first had intended.  A 
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study case was required to comprehend how flooding waters 
behave.  Then the Army Corps could take their findings and 





Development of adequate flood control structures is a learning 
process. The Army Corps learned tremendously from the March 
1938 flood, but their system was not bullet-proof.  In other words, 
other floods had to occur to put these improvements to the test.  
Besides, Army Corps historian Anthony Turhollow states, “LAD 
[Los Angeles District Army Corps] and local agencies have barely 
kept pace in providing necessary flood control works to protect the 
momentous growth of population and industry in southern 
California.”108  
In January and February of 1969, two large storms 
comparable to the March flood struck the region.  Depending on 
one’s viewpoint, flood control was either a success or a failure.  
The City of Ontario Risk Management report claimed the two 
floods created the most damage of any previous flood on record.  
Damage in San Bernardino County was estimated at $54 million 
and caused at least 13 deaths.109 “Nineteen inches of rain fell in 
Ontario over a 24-hour period.”110 For historian Anthony 
Turhollow, success or failure of flood control does not depend on 
the damages and costs of the flood, but how much money was 
saved and damage was prevented as a result of flood control.111 
“The system more than paid for itself by preventing more than $1.5 
billion in flood damages and preventing the loss of many lives.”112 
Former Los Angeles County Board Supervisor Frank G. Bonelli 
stressed “in 1969 that ’the overall flood control system prevented 
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one of the worst catastrophes in the history of Los Angeles 
County.’”113  
Today, southern Californian’s experience a near worry free 
environment as compared to those who lived here in the early part 
of the 20th century.  Many residents probably never realized that 
southern California has a flood problem.  Truth be told, we still do 
not understand completely.  The Army Corps of Engineers and 
local water districts are continually improving flood control.  
 In 1979, the Army Corps realized flood control was 
insufficient on the Santa Ana River.  The Prado Dam was targeted 
for improvement.  Increased urbanization downstream and a 
stronger understanding of the Santa Ana basin hydrology led the 
Army Corps to conclude, “that a greater degree of protection than 
the dam now affords is needed.”114 Their recommendations 
required raising the dam by 30 feet and increasing the output 
release of water from 5,000 to 30,000 c.f.s.115 The work proposed 
in 1979 was finally completed in recent years.  Another major 
project for the Army Corps of Engineers was the Seven Oaks Dam 
in Mentone, CA.  The dam is located in the foothills at the canyon 
opening of the Santa Ana River.  Compared to Prado Dam, the 
Seven Oaks Dam dwarfs the 1938 flood control centerpiece.  The 
Mentone Dam was first mentioned as a future construction 
endeavor in 1979 and the Army Corps began construction of the 
Seven Oaks Dam (Mentone Dam) in September 1995.116 117 
Completed in 2000 the Seven Oaks Dam measures 550 feet high 
and 2,980 feet across and was built at a cost of $420 million.118 
The Seven Oaks Dam became the centerpiece in a renewed effort 
to provide greater protection for the Santa Ana basin community.  
Almost $1.4 billion was appropriated in 1986 to re-modernize 
flood control along the Santa Ana River and its tributaries.119  
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 Is spending an additional $1.4 billion on flood works’ 
projects justified?  Does the cost outweigh the benefits?  For those 
who remember 1938, the money was well spent.  Just as the March 
1938 flood illustrated to the Army Corps the dire need for a serious 
approach for flood control, the floods of 1969 demonstrated the 
constant need for flood control improvements.  The solution 
became the $1.4 billion program to prevent possible future loss of 
life and damage.  Anthony Turhollow indicates the same attitude 
toward flood control, “Because floods sometimes do not occur for 
a number of successive years, the question of the need for a flood 
control system is invariably raised.  However, when the inevitable 
floods do occur, then public appreciation for the foresight of 
engineers is openly and gratefully manifested.”120 The benefits of 
flood control are not limited to the protection of life and property, 
but are indirectly linked to increased wealth and taxes. 
 
 
Uncovering the Indirect Benefits of Flood Control 
 
Since adopting a proactive approach to flood control after the 
March 1938 flood, southern California’s available land use has 
spread remarkably.  As discussed earlier, Major Theodore Wyman 
introduced the direct and indirect benefits of flood control as a side 
note in his April 15, 1937 report.  After the completion of the 
Army Corps proposed projects, to a certain extent floodwaters 
could be contained.  Colonel R.C. Hunter in a November 1, 1946 
report illustrated that the Army Corps shifted its focus to analyzing 
benefits of flood control in addition to flood control improvements.  
The report reads: 
 
A study of growth in population and of business and 
industrial trends indicated that as a result of future 
development the total average value of residential, 
business, and industrial property in the overflow 
zones during the next 50 years, 1947-96, generally 
will increase 50 percent and that the total average 
value of highway property and public utilities, 
including sewers and water systems, generally will 
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increase 30 percent. Property values were estimated 
on the basis of prewar (1940) conditions.  Based on 
1946 replacement costs, present property values are 
estimated to be from 50 to 100 percent greater than 
prewar values.  The 1940 true value of nonmilitary 
property in the principal overflow zones is 
estimated at $167,213,000, including $55,864,000 
for residential, business, and industrial property, 
$68,080.000 for agricultural property.121 
 
Over time, flood control allowed an increase in property values, 
and a corresponding rise in property tax revenue.  Local 
governments, such as the County of San Bernardino, realized the 
positive impacts of flood control.  A Board of Supervisors meeting 
held on December 22, 1947, urged the federal government to 
embark on new flood control improvements. By law, local interests 
have to fund a portion of flood control improvements.  Yet, the 
recorded minutes illustrated that the local interests were willing to 
contribute their portion of funds to lure Congress to contribute 
monies for new channel improvements: 
 
Minutes of the Board of Supervisors of San 
Bernardino County acting as ex-officio Board of 
Supervisors of San Bernardino County Flood 
Control District” meeting held December 22, 1947. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that, if the above 
described channel improvements be authorized by 
the said Congress, then the San Bernardino County 
Flood Control District, to the best of its ability, will 
assist the Federal Government in undertaking said 
flood control improvements by assuming the 
following obligations, to-wit:  
(1) Those non-Federal contributions, which are 
required by Federal laws. 
(2) In addition---and in recognition that property 
values would be increased by the improvement with 
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increased utilization of the land protected from 
flooding --- and if such payment shall be required 
by Congress in authorizing the improvement, 
contribute $200,000.00 of the first cost of the 
project.122 
 
The crucial part of this document is that it does not state that flood 
control improvements are for the protection of the residents; 
instead the supervisors recognize the land use and property 
benefits only. Then the Board entices Congress to appropriate 
funds, because they have already agreed to provide the county’s 
financial contribution for flood control.  As a hypothetical 
question, this type of behavior can also breed corruption in local 
governments worthy of investigation. If property values are low 
because its location is on a floodplain and local officials knowingly 
ask for improvements that will undoubtedly increase property 
value, one could buy the land cheaply before the flood control 
improvements are made and then later and sell it for a substantial 
profit. 
   Examples of increased land use can be seen throughout 
southern California.  The City of Yorba Linda is a prime example 
of floodplain land that is utilized for residential and business use. 
Below is an illustration, using Google Earth, of the current 
development that has taken place in the City of Yorba Linda. The 
other is a photograph that was taken by the Army Corps during the 
March 1938 flood.  The two are taken from virtually the same 
perspective.  Compare the Santa Ana River’s size while in flood 
and the land developments that have taken place. Clearly, the 
untold wealth Major Wyman noted in his April 1937 report was 
discovered. Thus, flood control allowed for future developments 
on the floodplain creating an immeasurable amount of wealth. 
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Figure 11.  Image Captured from Google Earth.  City of Yorba Linda as of 
2010:  Note the Arrow pointing to Yorba Bridge.  The blue line marks the path 
of the Santa Ana River. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at 
Riverside.  Photo taken 3/3/1938. View looking northeast on Santa Ana River.  
Note the arrow pointing to Yorba Bridge.  Compare the two photos, the size of 
the Santa Ana River and permanent developments encroaching on the floodplain 
as to agricultural land. 








The question as to whether the region was worth protecting from 
flooding might sound superfluous after analyzing flood control on 
the Santa Ana River basin. The untold wealth created from 
extended land use and the drastic increase in property tax revenue 
certainly improved the region.  Flood control allowed the region’s 
economy to shift from primarily agricultural to industrial. The 
defense industry prospered in southern California, bringing with it 
skilled workers.  In fact because the defense industry was so 
critical in southern California flood control became a matter of 
national security.123  During World War II, the Cold War, the 
Korean War, and Vietnam, the United States relied on southern 
California’s defense material and technology output.  If a large 
flood disrupted the defense industry, it could cripple the U.S. 
military and hinder its ability to supply equipment to the troops at 
home and abroad.  
Of course some criticism arises when discussing flood 
control projects. The mere sight of concrete channels and dams 
take away from the beauty of the southern California landscape.  
Mike Davis’s book, Ecology of Fear, argues that flood control was 
a political construct.  “The Los Angeles River- the defining 
landscape of the nineteenth-century city-was sacrificed for the sake 
of emergency work relief, the preservation of industrial land 
values, and a temporary abatement of the flood problem.” 124 
Moreover, flood control benefited wealthy large landowners who 
forced “the natural river into a concrete straitjacket-destroying the 
riparian ecology and precluding use of the riverway as a 
greenbelt.”125 Inversely, in densely populated, flatland areas such 
as Orange County and Los Angeles, unsightly concrete channels 
might be the only option to assist water out of the area rapidly. The 
debate may still continue today, but after the residents of southern 
California and the nation experienced or witnessed the affects of 
the March 1938 flood, perceptions changed. 
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The timing of the March flood was critical.  Since the 
region’s population was large enough to warrant concern about 
flood control, yet was not developed to the size of the 1950’s 
California, a national calamity was averted.  Had the circumstances 
been different, the 1938 flood might have done to southern 
California what Hurricane Katrina did to New Orleans in 2005.  
The March flood marked a turning point in southern California.  
Modern flood control began just before an industrial and 
population explosion occurred.  Those devastated by the flood may 
not agree with such a positive outlook, but future residents should 
be made aware of California’s natural flooding occurrences.  As 
historian Anthony Turhollow wrote, another lesson the March 
flood provided was the need for a permanent disaster agency.  The 
dependence on volunteers became outdated.  “Plans for an 
emergency relief organization began as a result of the 1938 flood 
to cope with sightseers and looters, as well as to provide 
emergency aid.”126 Only sporadic flooding occurred in the wake of 
the major storm that passed through southern California in January 
2010.  The most severe images reported on television were a 
neighborhood in Long Beach submerged in two feet of water:  
enough to cause damage, but nothing compared to prior floods. 
  If comparing rainfall from the past and superimposing it 
on the southern California of today, 2010, one wonders what the 
possible outcome might be.  The rainfall that caused the 1862 flood 
caused insignificant damage, but what if that storm occurred in 
today’s vastly developed area?  The Army Corp believed in the 
1940’s that the structures they built could withstand maximum 
probable floods.  The flood of 1969 proved their calculations 
wrong, which then sparked the construction of the Seven Oaks 
Dam and increase of the Prado Dam’s overall height.  In the past 
decade the Inland Empire has grown tremendously.  That growth 
has caused numerous housing projects and roads covering the bare 
ground with asphalt and concrete, furthermore adding sewers and 
storm drains that ultimately empty into the Santa Ana River.  Since 
severe flooding has not occurred in recent decades, as a result of 
flood control developments, the population may not be aware of 
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the potential of major rainstorms.  Historians need to educate and 
remind the community of the region’s past flood disasters. 
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Figure 10. Major Theodore Wyman, May 28, 1938, Flood of  
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Angeles District General Administrative files 1935-1950 
800.73, box 40; Record Group 77; National Archives 
Pacific Region Riverside, CA. 
 
Figure 11.  Satellite Image from Google Earth of the City of Yorba 
 Linda.  Accessed May 1, 2010.  http://google.earth.com. 
 
Figure 12. Major Theodore Wyman, May 28, 1938, Flood of 
February 27 to March 3, 1938 Below Prado Dam Site, 
photo 104; LA 800.73 Storm Damage (Photos) 14 [2/2]; 
Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers Los 
Angeles District General Administrative files 1935-1950 
800.73, box 40; Record Group 77; National Archives 
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Preserving Local History: The Important Role of the Small 
Museum 
"Unofficial" McDonald’s Museum and Original Store Site.   
 
Albert Okura, owner and director, San Bernardino, California 
Route 66 Museum.  Paul Chassey, board of directors, Victorville, California. 
 
Original sign at the first McDonald's Restaurant (personal photo by author)1 
 
The proliferation of historical museums attests to human 
fascination with the past and the desire to be in the physical 
presence of history.  In Southern California, one has access to 
numerous large, world-class institutions where stunning collections 
are abundant, artfully displayed, and arranged in such a fashion 
that a visit feels more like a profound experience.  Often 
overlooked in the search for cultural experience and historical 
preservation is the small museum, which plays a role in the 
community that a larger institution cannot attempt.  In the area of 
                                                
1 All photos of the McDonald's Museum taken by the author and printed with 




greater San Bernardino, California, a handful of these little 
attractions are working to diligently preserve and promote local 
history, providing a common ground for the surrounding 
communities to come together, and greatly enhancing the cultural 
landscape. 
One such institution engaged in this noble pursuit is the 
Unofficial McDonald’s Museum on E Street in downtown San 
Bernardino.  Built on the site of the original McDonald’s 
Hamburgers restaurant, which opened in 1948, the unassuming 
building boasts the large sign that drew customers into the first 
drive-through establishment beginning in 1953.  Though the 
building itself is not original, as the restaurant was torn down in 
1972, it marks the very spot where the birth of a pop culture icon 
and the fast food industry took place.  Inside, visitors find a 
veritable mountain of material, including photos, retired 
playground equipment, advertising signage, Happy Meal toys, and 
literature.  As is often the case with small institutions such as this, 
every available corner and surface is utilized to display the 
abundant artifacts.   
 
 
"Unofficial" McDonald's Museum (personal photo by author) 
 
 The site was purchased in 1998 by Albert Okura, owner of 
the local chicken restaurant chain, Juan Pollo.  According to Jack 
Marcus, the Juan Pollo product developer and animator who runs 






plans of the restaurant’s founders, the McDonald brothers, and Ray 
Kroc, who purchased the chain and created the corporation that 
remains in place today.2  However, Okura’s museum must be 
careful to make clear that it is not associated or affiliated with the 
McDonald’s Corporation, and it is actually regularly monitored to 
make sure this condition is upheld.3  In spite of this restriction, 
there is no denying the importance of the site to the history of San 
Bernardino, and Markus is actively involved in keeping that 
history alive.  He listens intently to the personal stories of people 
who remember the original restaurant and then relates those same 
stories to other visitors to the museum, displaying the characteristic 
back and forth exchange of culture and information distinctive of a 
small, local institution.  He states that, in this way, he is able to 
impart information that many people have never heard and may 
find surprising, such as the fact that the original McDonald's BBQ 
restaurant of 1948 was staffed by carhops who were always 
attractive, young females that carried bottles of white shoe polish 
with them to keep their work boots looking spotless.4 
 
 
Signage outside the Route 66 Museum in Victorville, California (personal photo 
by author)5 
 
 The birthplace of the iconic fast food giant draws visitors 
from all over the world on a regular basis, showing that the 
museum is much more than a simple piece of kitschy Americana.  
                                                
2 Personal Communication, Jack Marcus to Jennifer Ferguson, May 8, 2010. 
3 Personal Communication, Jack Marcus to Jennifer Ferguson, May 8, 2010. 
4 Personal Communication, Jack Marcus to Jennifer Ferguson, May 8, 2010. 
5 All photos of the Route 66 Museum taken by the author and printed with 




As well, its simultaneous popularity with locals belies its function 
as a source of local history, pride, and community.  Markus notes 
the institution’s “open-door policy” despite its residence in a part 
of the city known for a fairly high level of crime, and states that 
Okura would not charge a fee for admission “out of respect” for 
both the community and the men who made the location famous.6  
It is this level of bravery and esteem for one's neighbors that makes 
the “unofficial” McDonald’s museum a local treasure and provides 
a cultural “common ground” on which the diverse populations of 
the greater San Bernardino area can come together and celebrate 
that which has shaped the area and its residents. 
 The growth of the first McDonald’s restaurant was partially 
contingent upon its location on Route 66, which channeled 
travelers through downtown San Bernardino, and this connection is 
evident in the small section in the museum’s rear that showcases 
Route 66 memorabilia as part of its permanent collection.  One 
cannot escape the influence of the Mother Road in San Bernardino 
and the surrounding communities, and a short trip north into the 
High Desert warrants a visit to the Route 66 Museum in 
Victorville, California.  This small institution is also a free 
attraction filled with local artifacts, though its focus is entirely on 
the influence and legacy of Route 66.   
Celebrating its fifteenth anniversary this year (2010), the 
Route 66 Museum boasts a diverse, eclectic collection and a 
clientele that travels from all over the world to learn about the 
history of the famous route.  Board of Directors member Paul 
Chassey estimates that around ninety percent of the total visitors 
are non-locals, with fifty to sixty percent of those non-locals 
coming from outside the United States.7  When they arrive, patrons 
are treated to a visual representation of the Mother Road and how 
it shaped the greater San Bernardino area, particularly the High 
Desert.  Road and advertising signs adorn all available wall spaces, 
numerous artifacts sit neatly in glass cases, and many larger items 
are unencumbered by enclosures and thus available for closer 
scrutiny.   
 
                                                
6 Personal Communication, Jack Marcus to Jennifer Ferguson, May 8, 2010. 







Route 66 Museum in Victorville, California (personal photo by author) 
 
  In a place such as California, which Chassey feels is 
"notorious for tearing things down," he states that the museum's 
main goal is to save whatever it can for the benefit of future 
generations.8  When there are large historical pieces they are 
unable to save, such as buildings, the museum endeavors to 
document such artifacts in pictures and written descriptions.  In 
this way, they are preserving as much history as they possibly can, 
and providing the community with a sense of its origins and its 
importance.  It is likely that, in their absence, much of the cultural 
artifacts and knowledge that they have accumulated would have 
been lost forever.  Despite their considerable contribution to the 
community, the Victorville Route 66 Museum faces several 
challenges with regard to finances, community support, and 
adequate numbers of volunteers.9  Hopefully the museum can 
continue to achieve its goal and survive, as its presence in the High 
Deserts constitutes fully half of the area's museums.  
 Both the Route 66 Museum and the McDonald's Museum 
boast a relaxed and friendly atmosphere that is common to small 
institutions of local history.  The experiences of visitors are more 
personal and individual than is usually possible at a larger, for-
profit museum thanks to passionate staff members and self-
proclaimed goals of community service and education.  What these 
institutions may lack in polish and prestige is more than 
compensated for by their distinctiveness and personality.  Their 
                                                
8 Personal Communication, Paul Chassey to Jennifer Ferguson, May 13, 2010. 




efforts are preserving local history, both for residents and visitors, 
and give the residents of the greater San Bernardino area a cultural 
anchor to strengthen their senses of self and their relationships with 
each other.  If you are searching for something fulfilling, 
interesting, and inexpensive to do close to home, consider 
patronizing one of the small, local museums in your area.  You 
never know what you might discover. 
 
Jennifer Ferguson 








Greater San Bernardino Area Museums 
 
"Unofficial" McDonald’s Museum 
and  
Original Restaurant Site  
1398 North E Street 
 San Bernardino, CA 92405 
(909) 885-6324 
 
Route 66 Museum 
16825 South D Street  




Robert V. Fullerton Art Museum 
California State University, San 
Bernardino 
5500 University Parkway 




A Special Place Children's 
Museum 
1003 East Highland Avenue 
San Bernardino, CA 92404 
(909) 881-1201 
 
Redlands Historical Glass Museum 
1157 Orange Street 
Redlands, CA 92373 
(909) 798-0868  
www.historicalglassmuseum.com 
 
Lincoln Memorial Shrine 
125 West Vine Street 




California Museum of 
Photography 
University of California, 
Riverside 
3824 Main Street 




Harrison Exhibit Center 
16367 Main Street 
Hesperia, CA 92345 
(760) 244-5488 
 
San Bernardino History & 
Railroad Museum 
1170 West 3rd Street 
 San Bernardino, CA 92408 
(909) 537-7373 
 
Victor Valley Museum & 
Art Gallery 
11873 Apple Valley Road 












Art, Activism, Access: 40 Years of Ethnic Studies at UCLA. 
Fowler Museum, UCLA.  
 
Marla C. Berns, director; Betsy Quick, director of Education; Sebastian Clough, 
director of Exhibitions. February 28, 2010-June 13, 2010. 
 
The city of Los Angeles is known for its ethnically diverse 
population. Consequently, L.A. has often been a focal point for 
discussions regarding ethnicity. It seems appropriate, therefore, 
that the exhibit, Art, Activism, Access: 40 Years of Ethnic Studies 
at UCLA should detail the history – as the title suggests – of ethnic 
studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. The exhibit is 
part of the 2009-2010 celebration of forty years of ethnic studies at 
UCLA. The purpose of the exhibit is to present the history of 
ethnic studies at UCLA to a general audience of museum patrons.1 
The exhibit’s history begins in 1969, when social tensions 
created by the Civil Rights Movement increased public demand for 
an ethnic studies program at UCLA. UCLA Chancellor Charles 
Young established the university’s four ethnic studies centers in 
response to this demand. These were among the first ethnic studies 
programs in the United States. The four centers – the Asian 
American Studies Center, American Indian Studies Center, Bunche 
Center for African American Studies, and the Chicano Studies 
Research Center – were established in order to study issues facing 
ethnic minorities and to raise public awareness regarding these 
issues.  
 Art, Activism, Access: 40 Years of Ethnic Studies at UCLA 
is a collaborative effort between the four ethnic studies centers, the 
UCLA Institute of American Cultures, and the Fowler Museum at 
UCLA. The wide variety of artifacts and images on display in the 
exhibit are testaments to the depth of interdepartmental 
cooperation; each of the four ethnic studies centers’ archives 
provided books, films, journals, murals, newspapers, photographs 
and many other materials for exhibition.  
                                                






The exhibit is situated in a spacious room adjacent to the 
museum courtyard. A room-sized display case in the center loosely 
divides the exhibit into four sections representing the ethnic studies 
centers. Immediately upon entering the exhibit, patrons will see a 
glass case containing newspaper articles detailing the founding of 
UCLA’s ethnic studies program.  
The exhibit uses such primary written materials to narrate 
its complex history. Interspersed throughout the exhibit are glass 
cases displaying newspaper articles, academic journals and books.  
One campus newspaper recounts UCLA students’ reaction against 
the 1996-1997 state legislation curtailing affirmative action in 
California.  Another article describes the American Indian 
Movement’s (AIM) occupation of Alcatraz Island in 1969. The 
written materials are not presented in chronological order, but 
patrons who circle the room and read each exhibition will gain a 
broad idea of the exhibit’s history. A limitation on some written 
materials is their relative inaccessibility. Many texts are closed and 
neatly shelved inside glass display cabinets, leaving patrons to 
infer content from book titles. Without accessibility, these 
particular texts do not contribute to the exhibit’s history in a 
significant way.  
Despite its reliance on primary written sources, the exhibit 
does not neglect other sources of media. In terms of visual media, 
the exhibit showcases a variety of material, including three large 
murals. Two fourteen-year-old students attending a summer 
session at UCLA painted one of these murals around 1970. This 














Untitled, 1971. Los Angeles, CA. Mural by Richard Wyatt and Guillermo 
Anderson.  Photograph courtesy of Stacey Abarbanel. 
 
The exhibit effectively uses its vibrant and evocative visual 
media to supplement its history. An example of this historical 
narration using visual media can be seen in the photo series, “Life 
in a Day in Black L.A.”, which documents the grim repercussions 
of the Los Angeles Riots in 1992 for L.A.’s black communities. 
The exhibit also makes effective use of visual media using 
film. Most of the exhibit’s films are displayed in two media centers 
containing a total of seven televisions. Patrons are free to watch 
clips from films such as Marco Williams’ “In Search of Our 
Fathers,” Duane Kubo and Robert Nakamura’s “Hito Hata: Raise 
the Banner,” as well as other documentaries. The use of film is 
limited by the fact that only one pair of headphones is available per 
television. This discourages groups from watching the same film 
simultaneously. This is only a minor limitation; the films provide a 
human voice to the exhibit, even when viewed by one person at a 
time. 
The exhibit’s overall presentation is exceptional; it 
balances artistic materials with written materials, thus patrons are 
exposed to both the cultural and academic accomplishments of the 
ethnic studies centers. The exhibit does not, however, leave patrons 
with a clear idea as to the impact of UCLA’s research. After forty 






ethnic minorities stand today? The answer is inconclusive, but the 
history presented at the exhibit suggests that progress has been 
made. UCLA’s campus newspaper, The Daily Bruin, explains the 
exhibit’s lack of closure in quoting Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, vice 
chancellor of the UCLA graduate division: “We need to be aware 
that the struggle is not complete. We all wish for a more just 
society … This [the exhibit] represents to many of us the 
contributions we have made towards that end.”2 
 
 
Education Through Struggle, 1995. Los Angeles, CA. Mural by Darryl Mar and 
students.  Photograph courtesy of Stacey Abarbanel. 
 
UCLA’s exhibi, Art, Activism, Access: 40 Years of Ethnic 
Studies at UCLA, accomplishes its stated goal; it successfully 
presents the history of ethnic studies at UCLA. The largest flaw in 
the exhibit is in the history it covers.  UCLA’s research on the 
political and social struggles of ethnic minorities is ongoing, thus 
the exhibit feels incomplete. In other words, the exhibit tells an 
unfinished story. Despite minor issues in presentation, the exhibit 
makes excellent use of its materials to tell this unfinished story.  
 
Chris Moreland 
California State University, San Bernardino 
 
                                                
2 Aly Holmes, “Exhibit Honors UCLA Ethnic Studies,” The Daily Bruin, 
February 26, 2010, under “A&E,” 
http://www.dailybruin.com/articles/2010/2/26/exhibit-honors-ucla-ethnic-






Home Lands: How Women Made the West  
 
CAROLYN BRUCKER and VIRGINIA SCHARFF, curators. Autry National 
Center of the American West April 16 – August 22, 2010. 
 
Companion Volume: Home Lands: How Women Made the West by VIRGINIA 





When we think of women in the old west we think of the rugged 
and brave pioneer wife or perhaps the clever and spiritual Native 
American woman. But do we ever consider women in the old West 
as doctors, mayors, authors or builders? As we move beyond the 
stereotypical Little House on the Prairie and Pocahontas, we 
uncover a rich and diverse history of women in the West shaped by 
the choices they have made, each individual and remarkable in its 
own right. 
 Home Lands exhibit at the Autry National Center offers 
the visitor a unique perspective on how women have shaped the 
west based on their choices as providers and leaders. The exhibit 
focuses on three themes that have integrally influenced the lives of 






the themes, three regions in the west were chosen as focal points 
for the exhibit: northern New Mexico for earth, the Colorado Front 
Range for transportation and Puget Sound, Washington for water. 
Patrons are exposed to a multitude of mediums including vision, 
sound, and tactile experience that delight the senses and inspire the 
mind. 
On the day of my visit to the museum the exhibit halls were 
full of people, men and women, all from different ethnic 
backgrounds, each one admiring this unique perspective of 
women’s history.  One of the curator’s goals in designing the 






Entering the exhibit hall the smell of wood hits your olfactory 
sense from the simple peg board that displays the title of the 
exhibit. Dr Brucken, one of the curators, explains that simple, 
home materials that would be accessible to women were the 
inspiration behind the entrance wall and all of the walls in the 
exhibit.2 Moving on, the visitor sees an immense wall covered in 
corn husks, underneath of which is displayed a massive grinding 
stone and pottery of the southwest, handmade from the earth by 
women.  This area brings the visitor right into two main themes of 
the exhibit: home and the earth. In a side room, a visitor can sit and 
enjoy a projection of the stories of one woman’s experience as a 
mixed-blood woman growing up in the southwest—read from her 
diary by her granddaughter—which celebrates the diversity and 
rich culture of the region.  The room’s walls are made of burlap, 
purposely wrinkled to create texture and bring it to life.  Along a 
large wall in the back of the exhibit area, a mural celebrates the 
twentieth century generations of women of the southwest.  Dr. 
Brucken pointed out that instead of creating a handrail to protect 
the mural, a floor mosaic made of multi colored corn spells out 
“Earth remained a potent symbol for twentieth century New 
                                                
1 Interview and tour of the exhibit with Dr Carolyn Brucken May 11, 2010. 




Mexican women” and keeps the visitors at a safe distance, while 
adding living texture. 
  One aspect of the exhibit was particularly challenging: 
how to display books in an interesting way that could create an 
interactive space for the visitor. The result is ingenious: a wall of 
glass encases the books, each with their own microphone sticking 
out with the voices of women reading from the text. As part of the 
same exhibit, the cookbooks of Fabiola Cabeza de Baca, an 
independent southwestern author, educator, and home economist 
who lived from 1894 to 1991, are displayed while her voice is 
projected through a special speaker hanging from the ceiling.  This 
speaker is made specifically to optimize a woman’s voice range.  
On one of the walls in this section is a rope, along which visitors 
are encouraged to hang their favorite foods or recipes from safety 
pins. Alive with texture, sound and color, the southwest area of the 





As the visitor enters the next section, the Colorado Front Range, 
the eyes are immediately drawn to the mustard-yellow life size 
figure of a Native American woman elevated on a horse. Behind 
her, small lights hang in the distance across the room while strips 
of blue dyed cloth flutter on the wall creating the illusion of a sky. 
This section highlights women on the move and change in the 19th 
and early 20th century. The visitor is struck by the manner in which 
transportation changed the way of life for women via horses, the 
railroad, and automobiles. The exhibit tells the story of Owl 
Woman, a Native American girl who went to live at an American 
fort, and it even displays her tea set; immediately upsetting the 
normal images of a Native American’s home. Moving on, the 
visitor also learns about Dr Justina Ford, the first female African 
American doctor in the late nineteenth century, Colorado. 
One of the more popular interactive areas on the day I 
visited was a wall of rear-view mirrors with air fresheners hanging 
from them.  Guests are allowed to write sayings on the air 
fresheners.  Another striking feature of this area is the contrast 






the landscape and women’s experience has changed with each 
stage of transportation progress.  Yet another important theme in 
this section shows how spaces have changed from the flat expanse 
of the prairies to the rectilinear spaces that occupy the landscape 





Moving from the plains to the lush, damp region of the Puget 
Sound the exhibit takes us into the importance of water in 
women’s lives, from producing income in the form of fishing and 
farming, to energy.  Electricity in the form of hydropower 
transformed the lives of women through modern conveniences 
such as washing machines and vacuum cleaners.  The navy is also 
highlighted in this section, as well as the women working in 
canneries.  Telephone receivers allow the visitors to listen to the 
stories of one woman’s experience as a Japanese immigrant in the 
Puget Sound.  Another important theme in this area is how women 
from many different cultures co-existed.  From Scandinavian 
immigrants to Japanese immigrants, the Northwest was a melting 
pot of independent women on the cutting edge of technology.  
Seattle was also home to the first female mayor in the United 
States and this area tells her story.  The wall treatment in this area 
is can lids to represent the industry that allowed independence for 
many women in the Northwest region.  
Home Lands is a beautifully unusual exhibit displaying 
different and lesser known aspects of women’s lives in the west.  
The exhibit artfully employs various mediums that are fun and 
accessible for people of any gender and age.  The goals of the 
curators have been masterfully met, even if a person is unaware of 
the underlying themes, the exhibit allows the patron to immerse 
themselves into the themes using the senses, so that the patron 
walks away with the sense that their understanding of women’s 
experience in the west has been transformed, if even just a little. 
 
Oceana Collins 
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